# CHESS MASTERY

## BY QUESTION AND ANSWER

BY

FRED REINFELD

# INTRODUCTION

As this book has been written along rather novel lines, I think that some comment on the underlying ideas will not be out of place.

For thousands of years, the question-and-answer method has been accepted as a commonplace basis of pedagogy. In recent years, it has been supplemented by the now widely accepted theory that one of the most important elements of the learning process is "learning by doing." And yet our standard books on chess instruction ignore, to an amazingly large extent, these successful methods of teaching. Chess instruction has made very little use of the question-and-answer method or of "learning by doing."* This is all the more remarkable when one reflects that as far as chess is concerned, these methods are identical! For you cannot ask or answer any chess question about a game of chess without making or implying *actual moves*! Yet our chess instruction has been content to rely on admonition and precept and example.

It may be objected that annotated games, or annotated parts of games, fully serve the purpose of enabling the student to improve his play. This sounds plausible; but if we look at the matter more carefully, we see that the following dilemma arises: if the annotations are bad, they are obviously of no use to the student.

* There have been some honourable exceptions: Alexander's *Chess*; several works of Znosko-Borovsky; Dr. Euwe's *Schaaklessen* (Dutch text), unquestionably the best manual on the game; Rabinovich's *Endshpeel* (Russian text), a monumental work on practical end-game play; Mitchell's *Guide to the Game of Chess*; and Eze's distinguished and wonderfully original articles in the *British Chess Magazine*. These seem to be the outstanding examples.

But even if they are good, *they may not be of any use to him!* These annotations are a kind of predigested food for the mind. The student is supplied with the answers at once; there is no stimulation here for his reasoning faculties; he is set no problems on which he can sharpen his wits and learn in the school of experience. The game remains something foreign; it is never truly assimilated; it never becomes a part of the intellectual equipment of the reader. It has not been "lived through." He studies these notes by rote, he tries to memorize some details, grossly missing the spirit and living principle of these variations; or else he tries to grasp some principle which his inadequate knowledge simplifies into a platitude that by some perversity is generally applied on the wrong occasion.

This is not to say that such study is altogether useless. Annotators with the expository clarity of Dr. Euwe, for example, cannot fail of their effect on the student. But it is my belief (based on considerable teaching experience) that the acquisition of chess knowledge and ability is a terribly laborious and time-consuming achievement.

So much for the negative ideas on which this book is based. What are the positive underlying ideas?

My first goal has been to arouse the intellectual curiosity of the chess player. I hammer away at him with all kinds of questions. If he reads this book with any degree of attention, he cannot fail to carry this questioning attitude into his own games. I am satisfied if he can get to the point of being alert in his own games: "What's he up to now?" "What's that move for?" "Is Kt—Q6 a real threat?" "Will the ending be in my favour?" "Is that combination sound?"—and the like. The thoughts of a great chess master during

a game are after all mainly discussion and answer of such questions. What on the other hand are the reactions of an inexperienced player during a game? Mainly a great mental fog, occasionally lifted (or further obscured) by blind intuition, baseless fear and equally baseless rejoicing. *Not until the chess player asks and answers questions can his games begin to shed the irrational character which purely instinctive play gives them.*

Furthermore, I believe that after having striven for the answer to a question, the reader will be eager for the answer; he will take a genuine interest in it; he will be elated if he has already hit on it himself; he will reflect on it if he is wrong. This may seem sheer optimism on my part, but my assumption of the reader's interest is based on the belief that his attempt to answer questions makes him a *participant* (on a somewhat smaller scale than the actual players) *in the game itself*; he takes a personal interest in the game, it absorbs his faculties, he begins to have opinions and hopes and definite views, as if it were his own game; and he has a corresponding interest in the answers. Here he is not learning by rote or merely playing over moves mechanically; he is reliving the drama of great master games. The author has taken the watch apart, and the reader is asked to put it together again; in the process, he will discover what makes the watch go.

It seems to me that little effort is exerted as a rule to make the study of a chess book an interesting and pleasant occupation. In the present book, I have sought to provide for the comfort and convenience of the reader; and the publishers have been most helpful and co-operative in this respect. Among features along these lines are: printing the moves and the letters of questions in bold type, so as to make for

easier reading; a generous use of diagrams at critical points; headings for each diagram so as to arouse the interest of the casual reader and to focus the attention of the careful student.

To facilitate the work of the student, I have arranged the games in the order of ascending difficulty; I have italicised and repeated important principles, stating them in the simplest language I could devise. (There is a school of annotators which gains prestige from the obscurantism of its "scientific" jargon; another turns principles into rhetorical quips; a third buries them in variations and embalms them with parentheses.) I have one more suggestion for the ambitious reader who earnestly desires to improve his game: play over these games on two boards, so that you can get the most out of the analytical material. For sustained and lasting improvement, correspondence chess is unquestionably the most valuable method known; here the question-and-answer method truly comes into its own.

My grateful thanks are due to Sidney Bernstein for his invaluable help in reading the proofs.

FRED REINFELD

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# CHESS MASTERY
## BY QUESTION AND ANSWER

### LESSON I

**LINE-OPENING—THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—THE POWER OF THE CENTRALIZED KNIGHT—THE LONG DIAGONAL—THE EXPLOITATION OF PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—PLAY IN THE OPEN FILE—THE FORK AND THE PIN**

RICHARD RETI (1889–1929) was one of the greatest chess artists of our generation. Unfortunately, he lacked that dogged determination which contributes something useful to the score table day after day.

Reti's elaboration of the opening which has been named after him, was one of the greatest achievements of the hypermoderns, and probably made a deeper impression on the chess public than any other hypermodern innovation.

The following game has been selected with a view to helping to break down the prejudice which so many amateurs have against an early exchange of Queens!

London, 1927

(Match: Czechoslovakia–Argentine)

**QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED** (in effect)

| | WHITE<br>R. Reti | BLACK<br>R. Grau |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **P–QB4** | **P–QB4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 3 | **P–Q4** | **P–Q4** |

(**a**) What do you think of this move, and what kind of policy does it foreshadow on Black's part?

4 **BP×P** **BP×P**

(**b**) Consider the alternatives . . . Q×P or . . . Kt×P.

5 **Q×P** **Q×P**
6 **Kt–B3** **Q×Q**
7 **Kt×Q** **P–QR3**

(**c**) This seems like a superfluous precaution. How would play proceed after the immediate . . . P–K4 . . . ?

8 **P–KKt3** **P–K4**
9 **Kt–Kt3** **Kt–B3**

(**d**) Very superficial. In view of the great power of White's KB later on in the game, Black should have played . . . ?

10 **B–Kt2** **B–Q2**
11 **O–O** **B–K2**

(**e**) Again rather careless, as 11 . . . , P–R3 would have been safer. Why? How would play have proceeded in that event?

12 **B–Kt5!**

(**f**) Why is this a strong move?

12 . . . **O–O?**

(**g**) Why is this definitely bad, and what should Black have played instead?

13 **KR–Q1**

(**h**) Taking the open file. What is the threat?

13 . . . **KR–Q1**

(**i**) Give analysis to prove that 13 . . . , QR–Q1 also has its drawbacks.

14 **QB×Kt!**
14 . . . **P×B**

(**j**) Would 14 . . . , B×B have been any better?

15 **Kt–Q5**

(**k**) Threatening?

15 . . . **QR–Kt1**
16 **Kt–B5!**

(**l**) Threatening? How would 16 . . . , B×Kt or . . . B–K1 be answered?

16 . . . **K–B1**

Parrying the threat, but setting the stage for a catastrophe. There was no wholly satisfactory move.

17 **Kt×BP!** Resigns

(**m**) Why?

Rarely does one see so elegant and incisive a refutation of faulty strategy.

# LESSON II

**LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE—THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY —BISHOPS WITHOUT DIAGONALS—A DIRECT KING-SIDE ATTACK—PSEUDO-DEVELOPMENT**

SIR GEORGE THOMAS has for years been one of England's outstanding players. There is no doubt but that he would have achieved a much higher place in international chess had he given the game a more intense study. As it is, he has to his credit notable wins against such celebrities as Capablanca, Nimzovich, Sultan Khan, Botvinnik, Reti, Tartakover, Spielmann, Flohr —to mention only a few.

Folkestone, 1933
(Match: England–Italy)

## RUY LOPEZ

| | WHITE<br>Sir G. A. Thomas | BLACK<br>M. Monticelli |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–K4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 3 | **B–Kt5** | **P–QR3** |
| 4 | **B–R4** | **P–Q3** |
| 5 | **B×Ktch** | |

For 5 O–O see Lesson VI.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | . . . | **P×B** |
| 6 | **P–Q4** | **P–B3** |

(**a**) What is the theory underlying this move? What can you foresee regarding Black's procedure in the centre?

(**b**) Answer the above questions with regard to the alternative 6 . . ., P×P.

7 **B–K3!**

(**c**) While it ultimately amounts to only a matter of transposition, the text is stronger than 7 Kt–B3. Can you see the reason for this finesse?

7 . . . **Kt–K2**

(**d**) Why does Black discard the logical development . . . P–KKt3 followed by . . . B—KKt2 . . .?

8 **Q–Q2** **Kt–Kt3**
9 **Kt—B3** **B–K2**

(**e**) What kind of a future is available to this Bishop? Why?

10 **P–KR4**

(**f**) With what object?

10 . . . **O–O**

(**g**) What was the alternative?

11 **P–R5** **Kt–R1**
12 **O–O–O** **Kt–B2**

(**h**) Would 12 . . . , B–Kt5 have been better?

13 **QR–Kt1**

(**i**) Played with a view to . . .?

13 . . . **B–Q2**

(**j**) Another case of pseudo-development; but there is no good use to which this Bishop can be put. Would 13 . . . , B—Kt5 have been any better? What do you think of the effectiveness of Black's minor pieces?

14 **P–KKt4**

(**k**) How is White likely to continue, if Black plays passively?

14 . . . **P×P**

(**l**) What is the policy indicated by this move, and why is it likely to fail?

15 **Kt×P** **Kt–K4**
16 **Q–K2**

Guarding against . . . Kt×P or . . . Kt—B5.

16 . . . **Q–B1**
17 **Kt–B5** **R–K1**

(**m**) Is 17 . . . , B×Kt any better?

18 **P–B4** **Kt–B2**
19 **P–R6!**

Forcing a decisive line-opening.

19 . . . **Kt×P**

(**n**) Prove that both 19 . . . , B×Kt and 19 . . . , P—Kt3 are unsatisfactory.

A Sacrifice Breaks up Black's Position

Black (Monticelli)



White (Thomas)

(After 19 . . . , Kt×P)

20 **Kt×KtP!**

White would also have a winning game with 20 Kt×Ktch, P×Kt; 21 R×P—but the text is even more devastating.

20 . . . **K×Kt**
21 **Q–R2** **Kt–B2**

(**o**) Consider the alternatives 21 . . . , Kt×P, or 21 . . . , Kt—Kt1, or 21 . . . , R–R1.

| | |
|---|---|
| 22 **Q×Pch** | **K–B1** |
| 23 **P–B5!** | |

(**p**) Threatening?

| | |
|---|---|
| 23 . . . | **B–Q1** |

(**q**) What is the purpose of this move? Refute 23 . . . , Kt–Kt4.

| | |
|---|---|
| 24 **Q–Kt6!** | **K–K2** |

A vain attempt at flight, as Black's pieces are bunched together too ineffectually to make a rational defence possible.

(**r**) Refute 24 . . . , R–K2.

| | |
|---|---|
| 25 **R–R7** | **R–B1** |
| 26 **B–R6** | **B–K1** |
| 27 **Q–Kt7** | Resigns |

Black loses the Rook to begin with. A tragi-comic position!

# LESSON III

## LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN OPEN FILE—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES—DIRECT KING-SIDE ATTACK

H. N. PILLSBURY (1872–1905) is one of the most attractive and romantic figures in modern chess. This is due to his triumph in the first of the great modern tournaments (Hastings, 1895); to his phenomenal blindfold play; to his epoch-making games with Emanuel Lasker; and to his tragically early death.

Pillsbury's style was a dynamic one: it was distinguished by his keenly developed tactical alertness and his knack of springing surprises and creating tension in even the most simple and harmless looking positions. In these qualities he is closely akin to Alekhine.

Vienna, 1898

### RUY LOPEZ

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| C. A. Walbrodt | H. N. Pillsbury |
| 1 **P–K4** | **P–K4** |
| 2 **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 3 **B–Kt5** | **Kt–B3** |
| 4 **P–Q3** | |

(**a**) Protecting his KP and therefore threatening to win a Pawn by . . .?

4 . . . **B–B4**

(**b**) Indirectly parrying the threat. How so?

5 **Kt–B3**

(**c**) Instead of this, White can obtain a strategical advantage by . . .?

(**d**) Evaluate the results of 5 Kt×P.

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 . . . | **P–Q3** |
| 6 **B–Kt5** | **P–KR3** |
| 7 **B–K3** | **B–Kt3** |
| 8 **P–QR4** | |

(**e**) Discuss the desirability of this move and the purpose behind it.

| | |
|---|---|
| 8 . . . | **O–O** |
| 9 **B×Kt** | **P×B** |
| 10 **P–R5** | **B×B** |
| 11 **P×B** | **R–Kt1** |
| 12 **P–QKt3** | |

(**f**) What are now the alternative strategical plans at Black's disposal?

| | |
|---|---|
| 12 . . . | **Kt–Kt5** |
| 13 **Q–K2** | **P–KB4** |
| 14 **P×P** | **B×P** |
| 15 **P–K4** | **B–K3** |

WHITE NOW CREATES A POTENTIAL PAWN "TARGET"

BLACK (Pillsbury)



WHITE (Walbrodt)

(After 15 . . . , B–K3)

16 **P–R3**

(**g**) This ejection of the Knight is quite natural (and even desirable, as the presence of the Knight is

too annoying for White); yet the advanced state of the Pawn may involve difficulties later on. Why?

16 . . . **Kt–B3**
17 **Q–K3** **P–B4**
18 **O–O** **Kt–R4!**

(**h**) An important move. The Knight is to be placed on the effective square KB5. Why will White find it difficult to drive the Knight away?

19 **Kt–K2** **P–Kt4!**

(**i**) Another good move. Why?

20 **K–R2**

(**j**) Intending?

20 . . . **Q–Q2**

(**k**) Crossing White's plan because . . .?

21 **Kt(B3)–Kt1**

(**l**) A better defensive plan was . . .?

21 . . . **Kt–B5**

(**m**) Now the defensive plan previously mentioned is no longer available, because . . .?

22 **Kt×Kt**

(**n**) Consider the alternatives to this capture.

22 . . . **KtP×Kt**

(**o**) Why not capture with the KP?

23 **Q–B3** **K–R2**

Preparing to utilize the KKt file.

24 **P–Kt3**

(**p**) What is the motivation for this move? Study alternative lines based on such moves as R–B2 and Kt–K2.

24 . . . **P×Pch**
25 **Q×P** **R–Kt1**
26 **Q–K3**

(**q**) What would be the most likely continuation after Q–B3 . . .?

26 . . . **Q–Kt2**

Threatening mate, and thus gaining control of the KKt file without loss of time.

27 **R–B2** **QR–KB1**
28 **QR–KB1**

(**r**) How would Black answer 28 Kt–K2 (intending to dispute the KKt file with R–KKt1 and thus bring about simplifying exchanges to ease the pressure) . . .?

28 . . . **R–B3!**

An obvious enough move, yet not without a certain artistry.

(**s**) Its purpose is . . .?

29 **Kt–K2**

(**t**) This is about the only move White has! Demonstrate that this is so.

29 . . . **R–Kt3**

(**u**) Black has achieved his purpose: absolute control of the KKt file. What is the next—and decisive—step?

30 **Q–B3** **R–Kt4**
31 **Q–K3**

(**v**) What would have been Black's strongest method of procedure against 31 Q–B6 . . .?

31 . . . **Q–Kt3!**

(**w**) What is the underlying idea of this move, and why is it stronger than the formidable-looking 31 . . ., R–Kt7ch . . .?

32 **K–R1**

(**x**) White was helpless against the threat. Show this by refuting (i) 32 R–B6?; (ii) 32 Q–B3.

32 . . . **B×RP!**

(**y**) White resigns. Why?

# LESSON IV

**THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE—THE CONSTRICTION MOTIF—EXPLOITING A WEAK SQUARE—THE PIN**

BORIS KOSTICH is a player of the old school who has learned to accommodate himself to the modern theories. His style is therefore an interesting blend of contrasting theories. In the following game, the demarcation between the two disparate elements is very clear: first we have a portentous struggle for the centre in the modern manner, followed by an elementary but sharp tactical exploitation of Black's previous strategical blunders.

Budapest, 1921

## INDIAN DEFENCE

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| B. Kostich | E. Steiner |
| 1 **P–Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 **Kt–KB3** | **P–QKt3** |
| 3 **P–KKt3** | **B–Kt2** |
| 4 **B–Kt2** | |

(**a**) What is the respective function of the fianchetto for either side here? In this connection study the opening strategy of Lessons VIII and XIV.

4 . . . **P–Kt3**

Preparing to fianchetto the other Bishop.

(**b**) Can you see why 4 . . . , P–B4 would be more to the point?

5 **O–O**

(**c**) Why was 5 P–B4 more exact?

5 . . . **B–Kt2**

(**d**) Missing his last favourable opportunity to play

. . . P–B4. Can you now come to any conclusion regarding the efficacy of Black's Bishops?

6 **P–B4** **O–O**

(**e**) How would 6 . . ., P–B4 be answered now?

7 **Kt–B3** **P–Q3?**

(**f**) A grave strategical error. Why was 7 . . . , Kt–K5 called for here?

8 **Q–B2!**

(**g**) Taking advantage of Black's omission. What strategical goals are furthered by the text?

8 . . . **QKt–Q2**

9 **R–Q1!**

(**h**) What is the purpose of this move?

9 . . . **R–K1**

(**i**) With what purpose? How do you relate Black's difficulties to his previous omission of . . . P—B4 or . . . Kt–K5 . . .?

10 **P–K4** **P–K4**

(**j**) Why is this played?

LINE-OPENING IS FAVOURABLE TO THE BETTER-DEVELOPED SIDE

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Kostich) (After 10 . . ., P–K4)

11 **P×P!**

(**k**) Played with what idea in view?

11 . . . **P×P**

(**l**) What is the disadvantage entailed by this move? Give the continuation after 11 . . . , QKt×P and indicate how play would proceed.

12 **B–Kt5!** **P–B3?**

(**m**) What was White's threat? Why is the text weak?

(**n**) Suggest a better defence for Black.

13 **B×Kt!** **B×B**

Forced.

14 **B–R3!**

A deadly pin which must lead to a conclusive advantage.

14 . . . **R–K2**

(**o**) Prove that 14 . . . , B–B1 would also result in a loss of material.

15 **R–Q6** **Q–B2**

Vainly hoping to extricate himself from the strangling effect of the pin. Unfortunately the menaced Knight cannot budge, as the KB requires protection.

(**p**) Was 15 . . . , B–Kt2 a feasible alternative?

16 **QR–Q1** **R–Q1**

BLACK CANNOT FREE HIMSELF!

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Kostich) (After 16 . . . , R–Q1)

17 **Q–Q2!**

(q) Why is 17 B×Kt, KR×B; 18 R×B unsatisfactory for White?

17 . . . **B–B1**

Losing a piece, but there was no way to save it.

18 **R×B!** Resigns

A drastic example of play in an open file against an undeveloped position.

# LESSON V

## PROVOKING AND EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE—SIMPLIFICATION LEADING TO A WON ENDING

SALO FLOHR, like most of the famous masters now in their late twenties or early thirties, is noted for his reliance on his end-game technique, his almost flawless position judgment, his patient manoeuvring ability, his wonderful sensitivity to the slightest hostile weakness.

This pronounced preoccupation with positional considerations (at the expense of more flashy tactical fireworks) is deplored by most amateurs. Yet, as the following exquisite game shows, this style has a subtle poetry of its own, which is well calculated to charm those who have seen too many brilliancies which resulted from pathetic inability to defend a position properly.

Rosas, 1935

### SICILIAN DEFENCE

| | WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|---|
| | R. Domenech | S. Flohr |
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–QB4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **P–K3** |
| 3 | **P–B4** | |

(**a**) What is your opinion of the usefulness of this move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | . . . | **Kt–QB3** |
| 4 | **P–Q4** | **P×P** |
| 5 | **Kt×P** | **Kt–B3** |
| 6 | **Kt×Kt** | |

(**b**) Why does this nullify the effect of his third move?

(**c**) How would Black proceed after 6 Kt–QB3 . . . ?

6 . . . **QP×Kt!**

(**d**) What is the motivation for this move?

7 **Q×Qch** **K×Q**

(**e**) What do you think of the placement of Black's King? Risky? Effective? Useless?

8 **P–B3**

(**f**) How does this affect the scope of White's KB?

(**g**) Consider the alternatives 8 P–K5 or 8 B–Kt5.

8 . . . **P–K4**

(**h**) Played with what immediate object? How does it affect the Pawn position?

9 **B–K3** **K–B2**
10 **P–QR3**

(**i**) What is the point of this move? How does it affect the Pawn position?

10 . . . **Kt–Q2!**

(**j**) With what object in view?

11 **Kt–Q2** **P–QR4!**

(**k**) Show the relation between this move and Black's general plan.

12 **B–K2**

(**l**) White could have prevented his opponent's next move with 12 P–QKt3. What would be the drawback to this move?

12 . . . **P–R5!**
13 **K–B2** **B–B4!**

(**m**) How does this move fit in with Black's general plan?

14 **B×B** **Kt×B**
15 **QR–QB1** **B–K3**

(**n**) Compare the scope of the respective Bishops.

16 **KR–Q1** **KR–Q1**
17 **K–K3**

(**o**) In the face of Black's coming control of the Q file, should White attempt to dispute that control with Kt–B1 here or on the next move?

17 . . . **R–Q2**
18 **P–KKt3**

(**p**) It was difficult for White to foresee that this move would notably enhance his troubles. What are the disadvantages that this and the next move are intended to alleviate?

18 . . . **QR–Q1**
19 **P–B4?**

Plausible, but Black has an elegant refutation.

19 . . . **P×Pch**
20 **P×P**

White seems to have freed himself, and even threatens to win a piece with P–B5.

NOW COMES AN ELEGANT SIMPLIFYING COMBINATION!

BLACK (Flohr)



WHITE (Domenech)
(After 20 P×P)

20 . . . **R–Q6ch!!**

Paradoxically enough, to find a combination in so simple a position is not at all easy, and it is certainly not in keeping with the general opinion of Flohr as a routine player.

21 **B×R**

Forced.

21 . . . **R×Bch**
22 **K–B2**

(**q**) Why is this relatively better than 22 K–K2 . . . ?

22 . . . **B–Kt5**
23 **P–K5**

(**r**) Prove that this is forced.

23 . . . **B×R**
24 **R×B** **Kt–K3!**

(**s**) Why is this stronger than immediate simplification with . . . Kt–Kt6 or . . . Kt–K5ch or . . . R×Ktch . . .?

25 **P–KB5**

Forced.

25 . . . **Kt–Q5**
26 **P–B6**

Again forced.

26 . . . **P×P**
27 **P×P** **Kt–Kt6**
28 **K–K2** **R×Ktch**
29 **R×R** **Kt×R**
30 **K×Kt** **K–Q3**
Resigns

(**t**) Why?

Rarely does one come across a game in which a player sets forth the basic elements of his plan with such crystalline clarity.

# LESSON VI

## EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES—THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY—A POSITIONAL SACRIFICE OF THE EXCHANGE

ALEXANDER ALEKHINE (1892–1946) was considered by many the greatest chess master of all time. He wrested the World Championship title from Capablanca in 1926, lost it to Euwe in 1935, and regained it two years later.

This game is an impressive demonstration of the wide gap which separates a Grandmaster from an amateur—even a first-rate amateur. White starts out with what is perhaps the strongest opening in the repertoire: the Ruy Lopez. Yet his opponent wins after only twenty-eight moves. How did Black manage to seize the initiative at such an amazingly early stage?

Once the game is examined carefully, the "secret" of Black's success becomes all too clear. Black develops purposefully, efficiently, and creatively from the very start. White, on the other hand, vacillates and loses time. The penalty is exacted in Alekhine's best style.

Margate Easter Tournament, 1938

### RUY LOPEZ

| | WHITE<br>E. G. Sergeant | BLACK<br>Dr. A. Alekhine |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–K4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 3 | **B–Kt5** | **P–QR3** |
| 4 | **B–R4** | **P–Q3** |

This is known as the Steinitz Defence Deferred, as distinguished from the Steinitz Defence Proper (3 . . .,

P–Q3). The interpolation of 3 . . . , P–QR3 gives Black a more elastic game and certain tactical possibilities (such as, for example, the opportunity to drive back the KB with . . . P–QKt4).

5 **O–O**

(**a**) Aside from this rather leisurely continuation, what other modes of development seem plausible?

5 . . . **B–Q2**

(**b**) What is the underlying idea behind this move?
(**c**) Why does Black reject 5 . . . , P–B4 . . .?

6 **P–B3**

(**d**) Consider the alternatives 6 P–Q4 or 6 P–B4.

6 . . . **P–KKt3**

(**e**) What are the respective merits of the intended fianchetto development as compared with the alternative procedure . . . Kt–B3 and . . . B–K2 . . .?

7 **P–Q4** **B–Kt2**
8 **P×P**

The motivation for this rather surprising move is that after the reply 8 . . . , Kt×P, White has an opportunity for simplifying exchanges, whilst after 8 . . . , P×P, White hopes to get a strong game by planting his QB at QB5.

(**f**) Aside from the fact that this latter policy does not prove feasible, point out a possible drawback inherent in the text.

8 . . . **P×P**
9 **B–K3** **Kt–B3**

An ideal developing move as it *gains time.*

10 **QKt–Q2** **Q–K2**

(**g**) Why not castle directly?

11 **P–QKt4**

(**h**) What is the purpose of this move; why is it of dubious value? Consider the alternatives and relate them back to White's plan (8 P×P).

11 . . . **P–Kt3**
12 **P–KR3**

(**i**) What is the function of this move?

12 . . . **O–O**
13 **B–Kt3** **P–QR4!**

(**j**) Explain the significance of this move.

14 **P–Kt5**

(**k**) Do you think 14 P–R3 was better? If not, study the following play until you are satisfied that you have the answer to this question.

14 . . . **Kt–Q1**
15 **P–QR4**

(**l**) Why not protect the Pawn with 15 P–B4 . . .?

15 . . . **Kt–Kt2**
16 **B–Kt5**

In order to be able to post the other Bishop at Q5.

(**m**) But it will be impossible to establish a harmonious and effective position, as the intended manoeuvre involves the exchange of White's QB, which means that . . . ?

16 . . . **Kt–B4**
17 **B–Q5** **QR–Q1**
18 **Kt–B4** **P–R3!**

Forcing the following exchange, for if 19 B–K3?, KKt×P, etc.

19 **B×Kt** **B×B**

(**n**) If you have properly answered the questions following White's 14th and 16th moves, you can estimate the probable results of the foregoing exchange.

20 **Q–B1** **K–Kt2!**

(**o**) Declining to win the exchange by 20 . . . , Kt–Kt6, because . . .?

21 **Q–K3**

(**p**) Although better than the text, 21 Q–B2 would still have left White with the inferior game, because . . . ?

21 . . . **Kt×RP!!**

A true Alekhine combination, unexpected and sound. Black demonstrates the inferiority of his opponent's previous *strategy* by *tactical* means.

BLACK HAS JUST PLAYED . . . Kt×RP!!

BLACK (Alekhine)



WHITE (Sergeant)

(After 21 . . . , Kt×RP!!)

22 **R×Kt** **B×KtP**
23 **QR–R1**

(**q**) Practically forced. How would you refute (i) 23 KR–R1; (ii) 23 R–R2; (iii) 23 Kt–Kt2?

23 . . . **R×B!**
24 **P×R** **B×Kt**
25 **KR–Q1**

(*r*) How would play proceed after 25 KR–K1, . . .?

25 . . . **R–Q1**
26 **Q–K4**

White has little choice; he must protect the QP, else Black will have three Pawns for the exchange, which is more than an equivalent.

| | |
|---|---|
| 26 . . . | **B–Kt6** |
| 27 **R–Q2** | **Q–B4** |
| 28 **Kt×P?** | |

(**s**) This has all the earmarks of a time-pressure blunder. 28 Q–K3 is relatively better, Black proceeding with . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 28 . . . | **Q×BP** |

A drastic, albeit obvious, exploitation of the awkward position of White's pieces. White resigned.

# LESSON VII

**PSEUDO-DEVELOPMENT—DIRECT KING-SIDE ATTACK—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—THE POWER OF THE CENTRALIZED KNIGHT—ELEMENTARY COMBINATIONS: THE PIN AND THE FORK**

EMANUEL LASKER, the "grand old man" of chess, combined the theories of Steinitz with other elements which his master had totally disregarded: the *personal*, the *psychological*, and the *irrational*. As one would naturally expect, therefore, Lasker's games have been rich in dramatic qualities: crises, suspense, hair-breadth escapes, "bluff"—in short, constant *struggle* —Lasker's favourite word for the game. This heady blend of the subjective and the objective is not to everyone's taste, or within everyone's scope; it requires the uniquely powerful will and the supreme self-confidence of a Lasker.

There are times, however, when Lasker can be wonderfully simple and direct; the present game shows him in this mood.

Berne, 1919

## RUY LOPEZ

| | WHITE<br>Dr. E. Lasker | BLACK<br>W. Henneberger<br>W. Rivier |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–K4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 3 | **B–Kt5** | **Kt–B3** |
| 4 | **O–O** | **B–B4** |

(**a**) The customary move here is 4 . . ., P–Q3, followed eventually by . . . B–K2. Merely by

comparison of the position of the KB at K2 and QB4, can you see why Black has chosen the text?

(**b**) Yet the development of the KB at QB4 in the Ruy Lopez has grave drawbacks. Can you see what they might be?

(**c**) Is it not possible for White to win a Pawn now? Give specific analysis to prove your claim.

5 **Kt–B3** **P–Q3**

(**d**) Was White threatening to win a Pawn?

6 **P–Q4!**

(**e**) What are the advantages conferred by this move?

6 . . . **P×P**
7 **Kt×P** **B–Q2**

(**f**) Consider the alternative . . . B×Kt.

8 **Kt–Kt3** **B–Kt3**

(**g**) Even at this early stage of the game, the KB has become a source of embarrassment. Would 8 . . ., O–O have been preferable?

9 **B–Kt5!**

(**h**) What is the effect of this on Black's game? Link up your reply with your answer (**b**).

9 . . . **Kt–K4**

(**i**) What is the twofold object of this move?

10 **P–QR4!**

(**j**) What are some of the advantages accruing from this unconventional move?

10 . . . **B×B**

(**k**) Hoping to free his position, and removing any possibility of attack on his KB by P–R5. Yet the exchange yields White what advantage? Would 10 . . ., P–B3 have been better?

11 **P×B!**

(**l**) Why is this superior to the recapture with the Knight?

11 . . . **P–KR3**

(**m**) In order to remove the pin with . . .?

(**n**) Does the text involve the creation of any possible weakness?

12 **B×Kt!** **Q×B**

(**o**) Would 12 . . . , P×B be better?

13 **Kt–Q5** **Q–Q1**
14 **Kt–Q4**

In order to play this Knight to the very powerful square KB5.

14 . . . **O–O**

(**p**) Exposing himself, as will be seen, to a powerful attack. Should he have played 14 . . . , B×Kt . . .? or 14 . . . , P–Kt3 . . .?

15 **Kt–B5** **K–R2**

(**q**) Defending himself against what manoeuvre?

How does White Strengthen the Attack?

Black (Allies)



White (Lasker)

(After 15 . . . , K–R2)

16 **R–R3!** **P–KB3**

(**r**) In order to defend himself along the second rank; but the move is open to what objection?

(**s**) Can Black free himself with 16 . . . , P–QB3 . . .? or with 16 . . . , P–Kt3 . . .?

In each instance be guided by the general principle involved, and then give specific analysis.

17 **R–KKt3** **R–B2**

(**t**) How does White proceed against 17 . . . , P–Kt3 . . .?

18 **Kt–B4!**

(**u**) Threatening?

18 . . . **Q–Q2**
19 **Q–R5**

(**v**) Intending to continue with?

19 . . . **R–R1**

BLACK'S POSITION CRACKS UP IN TWO MOVES!

BLACK (Allies)



WHITE (Lasker)

(After 19 . . . , R–R1)

20 **Kt–K6!**

(**w**) Very artistic. Why is this Knight immune?

| | |
|---|---|
| 20 . . . | **R–KKt1** |
| 21 **Kt(5)×KtP!** | Resigns |

(**x**) Just in time to avoid what charming conclusion? Note that the "well-posted" Black Bishop has played no part whatever in the proceedings!

# LESSON VIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—THE POWER OF THE CENTRALIZED KNIGHT—THE LONG DIAGONAL—PLANLESS PLAY

WHILE India is the ancient home of chess, it has produced only one master who can vie with the modern experts: SULTAN KHAN. His ability to hold his own is all the more remarkable when one considers his startling ignorance of the "book" variations and all their ramifications and finesses. His style has a certain tortuous quality as a result, since he often finds himself in hot water in the early stages of his games. But all this is only a more convincing indication of his phenomenal native ability.

Liége, 1930

## INDIAN DEFENCE

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| V. Soultainbeieff | Sultan Khan |
| 1 **P–Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 **Kt–KB3** | **P–QKt3** |
| 3 **P–B4** | **P–K3** |
| 4 **P–KKt3** | **B–Kt2** |

Black wishes to exert pressure along the long diagonal; and White has decided on a counter-fianchetto to neutralize the pressure.

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 **B–Kt2** | **B–Kt5ch** |
| 6 **B–Q2** | |

(**a**) What would be the drawback to 6 Kt–B3, . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 . . . | **B×Bch** |
| 7 **QKt×B** | |

(**b**) Evaluate this move as compared with 7 Q×B. Remember to check up the accuracy of your appraisal during the further course of the game.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | . . . | **O–O** |
| 8 | **O–O** | **P–B4!** |

(**c**) If White could answer this with P–Q5, he would cramp Black's game badly. But in this position the move is obviously impossible; how does this affect your reply to the previous question?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 9 | **Q–B2** | **Kt–B3** |
| 10 | **P×P** | |

(**d**) Study the alternatives to this move.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 10 | . . . | **P×P** |

WHO HAS THE BETTER PROSPECTS?

BLACK (Khan)



WHITE (Soultainbeieff)

(After 10 . . . , P×P)

(**e**) By studying the Pawn position, the files available to the Rooks on each side, and the squares which might be occupied by Knights, the student can forecast the coming trend of the play.

11 **P–K4?**

(**f**) What is wrong with this move, and what would have been the logical plan?

| | |
|---|---|
| 11 . . . | **Q–B2** |
| 12 **KR–K1** | **P–Q3** |
| 13 **QR–B1** | **P–KR3** |
| 14 **P–QR3** | |

(**g**) Do the very last moves on each side have any objective significance?

| | |
|---|---|
| 14 . . . | **Kt–Q2!** |

(**h**) What is the idea behind this move?

| | |
|---|---|
| 15 **Q–B3** | **P–QR4!** |

(**i**) Played with what object in view?

| | |
|---|---|
| 16 **Kt–R4** | **P–Kt4** |

(**j**) Despite its risky appearance, this move has the function of . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 17 **Q–K3** | **Q–Q1!** |

(**k**) Why does Black decline the Knight?

| | |
|---|---|
| 18 **KKt–B3** | **Q–K2** |
| 19 **P–R3** | **QR–Kt1!** |

(**l**) Wherefore?

| | |
|---|---|
| 20 **P–Kt3** | **B–R1!** |
| 21 **Kt–Kt1?** | |

(**m**) Why is this bad?

| | |
|---|---|
| 21 . . . | **KKt–K4!** |
| 22 **P–QR4?** | |

(**n**) Can you see why this is bad, and can you suggest a better move?

| | |
|---|---|
| 22 . . . | **Kt×Ktch** |
| 23 **B×Kt** | **Kt–Q5** |
| 24 **B–Q1** | |

(**o**) Examine the alternatives to this move.

| | |
|---|---|
| 24 . . . | **P–B4!** |

(**p**) Why is this move strong, on purely theoretical

grounds, without reference to the specific possibilities in the position?

25 **P×P**

(**q**) Is any other move available, and how would Black reply?

| | |
|---|---|
| 25 . . . | **R×BP** |
| 26 **R–B3** | **QR–KB1** |
| 27 **R–KB1** | **R–B6!** |

BLACK TRIUMPHS ON THE LONG DIAGONAL!

BLACK (Khan)



WHITE (Soultainbeieff)

(After 27 . . . , R–B6!)

(**r**) Forcibly bringing about a debacle on the long diagonal, for 28 Q–K1 or 28 Q–Q2 is refuted by . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 28 **B×R** | **R×B** |
| Resigns | |

(**s**) Demonstrate that Black must come out at least a piece ahead.

# LESSON IX

**LINE-OPENING — EXPLOITATION OF PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES — PLAY IN OPEN FILE — BISHOP *v.* KNIGHT — SIMPLIFICATION LEADING TO A WON ENDING — A SIMPLE ROOK AND PAWN ENDING**

ALTHOUGH he is a teacher by profession and chess is therefore only an avocation for him, DR. MAX EUWE (born 1901) is one of the outstanding masters of the day. Prior to the tense and thrilling struggle in 1935, which resulted in his capturing the World Championship title from Alekhine, the general chess public knew little about Euwe. His victory in this, the most exciting championship match that has ever taken place, was a fitting proof not only of his ability but also of his courage and tenacity (at one point he was three games down !).

Euwe's style is a very deceptive one. His games are generally quiet on the surface, but a great deal is "happening" which is apparent only to the expert. Euwe's lack of practice leads him to commit occasional inexactitudes, and he is then seen as a fine defensive player: keen and subtle in discovering ingenious resources, bold and alert for possibilities of counterplay.

Stockholm, 1937

(Match: Argentine–Holland)

## QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED

| | WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|---|
| | L. Piazzini | Dr. M. Euwe |
| 1 | **P–Q4** | **P–Q4** |
| 2 | **P–QB4** | **P–QB3** |
| 3 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–B3** |
| 4 | **Kt–B3** | **P–K3** |
| 5 | **P–K3** | **P–QR3** |

(**a**) Can you see why Black plays this instead of the customary 5 . . . , QKt–Q2.

(**b**) The text creates a weakness which White might attempt to exploit by . . . ? What would be the strategy for both sides in that event?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | **B–Q3** | **P×P** |
| 7 | **B×BP** | **P–QKt4** |
| 8 | **B–Q3** | **P–B4** |
| 9 | **O–O** | **B–Kt2** |
| 10 | **Q–K2** | **QKt–Q2** |
| 11 | **R–Q1** | **Q–B2** |

(**c**) It seems that a Queen move is indicated to avoid the opposition of White's Rook on the Q file. What possible drawback does the text have?

12 **B–Q2**

(**d**) Since the QB can hardly be said to be "developed" on this modest square, should White have continued with 12 P–QR4, so that if 12 . . . , P–Kt5; 13 Kt–Kt1, intending QKt–Q2–B4 . . .?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | . . . | **B–Q3** |
| 13 | **P×P** | |

(**e**) Black has achieved a beautiful development and the text only improves it; hence what do you suppose was White's object in playing the text?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 13 | . . . | **Kt × P** |
| 14 | **QR–B1** | |

(**f**) Leading to some knotty problems. If now 14 . . . , Kt×B, can White play 15 Kt×P, . . .?

WHITE HAS INDIRECT THREATS ON THE QB FILE

BLACK (Euwe)



WHITE (Piazzini) (After 14 QR–B1)

14 . . . **O–O**

(**g**) Can Black win a Pawn with 14 . . ., Kt×B; 15 Q×Kt, B×Kt . . .? What do you conclude about his decision to castle?

15 **B–Kt1**

(**h**) How would play proceed after 15 Kt×P . . .?

15 . . . **Q–Kt1**

(**i**) Can Black win a Pawn with . . . B×Kt, etc.? How does Black's last move affect the issue?

16 **P–QKt4?**

WHITE HAS JUST WEAKENED HIS POSITION

BLACK (Euwe)



WHITE (Piazzini) (After 16 P–QKt4?)

(**j**) White should have played P–KR3. His last move has created two weaknesses, namely . . .? What will be Black's general policy in order to exploit them?

16 . . . Kt(4)–K5
17 Kt×Kt B×Kt!

(**k**) Keeping in mind the previous question, do you see why Black recaptures this way instead of with the Knight?

18 B×B Kt×B
19 Q–Q3 Kt×B

(**l**) Aside from the benefits of simplification for Black, what further advantage is derived from this specific exchange?

20 Q×Kt R–Q1

(**m**) How does this gain time for further exchanges?

21 Q–Kt2 B–K2

(**n**) Do you now see why Black is consistently playing for simplification?

22 Q–Kt3 R×Rch
23 R×R Q–B2

(**o**) Played with what end in view?

24 P–KR3

(**p**) What is the purpose of this move?

24 . . . R–QB1
25 P–R3

(**q**) Why is this move necessary and how does it affect the position? Consider the effect of 25 P–QR4.

25 . . . P–Kt3

(**r**) Why is this move played, and why does it serve the purpose better than 25 . . . , P–R 3 . . .?

26 Kt–Q4 Q–B6!

(**s**) Forcing a winning ending, on the basis of what advantages?

(**t**) How would play proceed after 27 R–Kt1 or 27 Q–R2, . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 27 **Q×Q** | **R×Q** |
| 28 **R–R1** | **B–B3!** |

(**u**) By considering the play after the reply 29 Kt–B3 (or Kt–K2) or 29 R–R2, show that the text wins a Pawn by force.

29 **P–QR4**

(**v**) What is the purpose of this move?

| | |
|---|---|
| 29 . . . | **B×Kt** |
| 30 **P×B** | **R–B5** |

At last!

(**w**) Why would 30 . . . , R–Q6 be a mistake?

| | |
|---|---|
| 31 **P×P** | **P×P** |
| 32 **R–R8ch** | |

(**x**) How would play proceed after 32 R–Kt1, . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 32 . . . | **K–Kt2** |
| 33 **R–Q8** | **R×KtP** |
| 34 **P–Q5** | **P×P** |
| 35 **R×P** | **R–Kt8ch** |

(**y**) What is the point of this check?

| | |
|---|---|
| 36 **K–R2** | **K–B3** |

(**z**) Outline broadly the winning process to be employed by Black.

| | |
|---|---|
| 37 **R–Q6ch** | **K–K4** |
| 38 **R–Q7** | **K–K3** |
| 39 **R–Kt7** | **P–Kt5** |
| 40 **K–Kt3** | **P–Kt6** |
| 41 **K–B3** | **K–Q4** |

(**aa**) *Cf.* the previous question. If White tries to prevent the entry of Black's King with 42 K–K3, K–B5; 43 K–Q2—how does Black proceed?

| | |
|---|---|
| 42 **R×BP** | **R–K8!** |

(**bb**) What is the twofold purpose of this move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 43 | **R–QKt7** | **K–B5** |
| 44 | **K–Kt4** | |

(**cc**) Would 44 K–B4 be any better?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 44 | . . . | **R–K4** |

(**dd**) Threatening?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 45 | **P–B4** | **R–Kt4** |
| 46 | **R–B7ch** | **K–Q6** |
| 47 | **R–Q7ch** | **K–K7** |
| 48 | **R–K7ch** | **K–B7** |
| | Resigns | |

White's last few moves were merely spite checks.

# LESSON X

## THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—THE POWER OF THE CENTRALIZED KNIGHT

ARON NIMZOVICH (1887–1935) was the most original thinker (after Steinitz) that the game has known. Although it took him almost twenty years to obtain an appreciative audience, his theories have profoundly affected the play of the past ten years. To-day such theories of his as *over-protection*, the *blockade*, the *seventh rank absolute*, the *outpost*, *centralization*, are becoming familiar to an ever-increasing number of players.

Carlsbad, 1929

## INDIAN DEFENCE

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| H. Mattison | A. Nimzovich |
| 1 **P–Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 **P–QB4** | **P–K3** |
| 3 **Kt—QB3** | **B–Kt5** |

(**a**) The text move and 3 . . . , P–Q4 imply two totally different conceptions of controlling the centre, namely . . . ?

4 **Kt–B3**

(**b**) Evidently not fearing Black's next move, which may conceivably cause White some difficulty in what respect?

(**c**) Granted that such difficulties may arise, what does White expect as compensation?

4 . . . **B×Ktch**

Nimzovich, as you may know, devoted a great deal of study in his games and works to the weakness (and the strength!) of the doubled QBP.

5 **P×B** **P–Q3**

(**d**) Explain the idea behind this and Black's next move.

6 **Q–B2** **Q–K2**
7 **B–R3**

(**e**) What is the purpose of this move?

7 . . . **P–B4**

(**f**) In addition to interrupting the White Bishop's diagonal, this move also has what purpose?

8 **P–KKt3**

(**g**) What is the purpose of the fianchetto development, and how will it affect White's QBP?
(**h**) Suggest an alternative line of development.

8 . . . **P–QKt3**

(**i**) Black follows suit, in order to neutralize the power of White's KB, and with what further object?

9 **B–Kt2** **B–Kt2**
10 **O–O** **O–O**
11 **Kt–R4?**

(**j**) Why does White want to exchange Bishops?
(**k**) Why is the text inferior on principle to Kt–Q2 . . . ?

11 . . . **B×B**
12 **K×B?**

(**l**) Explain why this is a strategical blunder, and why 12 Kt×B would have been much better.

How does Black Proceed to Attack the Weak QBP?

Black (Nimzovich)



White (Mattison) (After 12 K×B?)

12 . . . **Q–Kt2ch!**

This long-distance check enables Black to get at the weak points without any loss of time.

13 **K–Kt1?**

(**m**) How does Black continue after 13 P–B3, . . .? after 13 Kt–B3, . . . ?

13 . . . **Q–R3**

Forcing White's reply.

14 **Q–Kt3** **Kt–B3**

Can White Guard the Weak Pawns?

Black (Nimzovich)



White (Mattison) (After 14 . . . , Kt–B3)

15 **KR–Q1**

(**n**) Consider the alternatives 15 P×P or 15 Kt–B3.

15 . . . **Kt–QR4**
16 **Q–Kt5**

(**o**) Temporarily saving the Pawn, but now Black gets a tremendous advantage by planting his Knight at QB5. In what does this advantage consist?

16 . . . **Q×Q**
17 **P×Q** **Kt–B5**
18 **B–B1** **P–QR3!**

(**p**) Why is this a very strong move?

19 **KtP×P** **R×P**
20 **P×P** **KtP×P**
21 **Kt–Kt2**

At last the prodigal son prepares to return—but he does not get very far.

21 . . . **Kt–Q4**

(**q**) Compare the placement of Black's minor pieces in relation to that of White's minor pieces.

(**r**) Evaluate the respective Pawn positions.

22 **R–Q3** **KR–R1**
23 **P–K4** **Kt–K4!**
Resigns

(**s**) Why?

A Field Day for Black's Knights!

Black (Nimzovich)



White (Mattison) (After 23 . . . , Kt–K4!)

# LESSON XI

**THE CONSTRICTION MOTIF—LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN THE OPEN FILE CULMINATING IN CONTROL OF THE SEVENTH RANK—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY**

IT is curious that DR. SIEGBERT TARRASCH (1862–1934) both popularized and opposed many of the doctrines of Steinitz. Tarrasch's specialty was his demonstration of the usefulness of an advantage in mobility or in time. In this Steinitz would have agreed with him; but Tarrasch went so far as to claim that objective elements (such as an isolated Pawn, for example) were of secondary importance. To Steinitz positional landmarks were of paramount significance, and the same view was the basis of Nimzovich's theories. This explains the fierce controversies which raged for many years between Tarrasch and Nimzovich.

To-day, Nimzovich is held in high esteem, and Tarrasch is greatly underrated. When one removes the exaggeration, dogmatism, and over-simplification of which Tarrasch was sometimes guilty, there still remains a very great core of solid truth and genuine achievement in Tarrasch's work. Gratitude and not condescension should therefore be our attitude toward Tarrasch. Even those who later opposed Tarrasch were first compelled to study and master his ideas.

Vienna, 1898

## HUNGARIAN DEFENCE

| | White | Black |
|---|---|---|
| | Dr. S. Tarrasch | J. W. Showalter |
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–K4** |
| 2 | **Kt–KB3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 3 | **B–B4** | **B–K2** |

(**a**) What does this move (as compared with 3 . . . , B–B4) tell you about the kind of game Black intends to play?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | **P–Q4** | **P–Q3** |

(**b**) Show how this move is consistent with Black's previous move, and compare its possible consequences with those resulting from 4 . . . , P×P.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | **P–Q5** | |

(**c**) What kind of plan does this reveal?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | . . . | **Kt–Kt1** |
| 6 | **B–Q3!** | |

(**d**) What are the two objects of this move, and how is it connected with White's plan of the game, as indicated by his fifth move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | . . . | **Kt–KB3** |
| 7 | **P–B4** | **O–O** |
| 8 | **P–KR3!** | |

(**e**) What are the two reasons which induce White to play this move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | . . . | **P–B3** |

(**f**) Explain the underlying strategy involved in this advance.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 9 | **Kt–B3** | **Kt–R3** |

(**g**) Intending to play the Knight where (how is this plan spoiled by White's reply)?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 10 | **B–K3** | **Kt–B2** |
| 11 | **O–O** | **KKt–K1** |

(**h**) Why does Black play this? Can you suggest an alternative plan?

HOW DOES WHITE APPLY HIS CONSTRICTION STRATEGY?

BLACK (Showalter)



WHITE (Tarrasch)

(After 11 . . . , KKt–K1)

12 **Q–B2**

(**i**) Why is this move part of White's plan?

12 . . . **P×P**
13 **BP×P**

(**j**) Evaluate the alternatives 13 KP×P or 13 Kt×P.

13 . . . **P–KKt3**

(**k**) Intending to play?

14 **B–KR6**

(**l**) How does this cross Black's intentions?

14 . . . **Kt–Kt2**
15 **P–KKt4!**

(**m**) In order to prevent Black from playing . . .?

15 . . . **Kt(B2)–K1**
16 **K–R2** **K–R1**
17 **R–KKt1**

(**n**) Can you see why White plays the Rook to this file?

| | |
|---|---|
| 17 . . . | **B–Q2** |
| 18 **R–Kt2** | **R–B1** |
| 19 **QR–KKt1** | **P–Kt3?** |

(**o**) What are the positional drawbacks to this move? Can you suggest a better one?

20 **Q–Q2!**

(**p**) Why not Kt–K1 at once?

| | |
|---|---|
| 20 . . . | **Kt–B3** |
| 21 **Kt–K1** | **Kt–Kt1** |
| 22 **B–K3** | **P–KKt4** |

(**q**) Why is this move played, and to what new attack does it expose Black?

| | |
|---|---|
| 23 **Kt–B3** | **P–B3** |
| 24 **P–KR4!** | **P–KR3** |
| 25 **R–KR1** | **K–R2** |

(**r**) In order to . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 26 **K–Kt1** | **K–Kt3** |
| 27 **Kt–R2** | |

(**s**) Where is this Knight headed for?

| | |
|---|---|
| 27 . . . | **R–QB2** |
| 28 **Kt–B1** | **Q–B1** |
| 29 **Q–K2** | |

(**t**) With what primary strategic object in view? Would it not be simpler to protect the KKtP with P–B3 . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 29 . . . | **K–B2** |
| 30 **B–R6** | **Q–Kt1** |
| 31 **Kt–Kt5** | |

(**u**) Forcing the following exchange, which is advantageous for White because . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 31 . . . | **B×Kt** |
| 32 **B×B** | **KR–B1** |
| 33 **P×P** | **RP×P** |

(v) Would 33 . . . , BP×P be any better?

34 **B–B6**

Thus Black's occupation of the QB file is rendered useless.

| | |
|---|---|
| 34 . . . | **B–B1** |
| 35 **Q–B3!** | **R×B** |

(w) Why is this necessary? Prove the correctness of your reply by refuting 35 . . . , K–Kt3 as a means of parrying the threatened 36 B×KKtP.

| | |
|---|---|
| 36 **P×R** | **Kt–K3** |

In this way, Black has gained more space for his pieces. But in order to occupy this space, he has to concede control of other terrain!

| | |
|---|---|
| 37 **R–R7ch** | **B–Kt2** |

(x) Why is this forced?

38 **Kt–Kt3**

(y) Where is the Knight to be played? How does this represent a triumph for White's policies?

| | |
|---|---|
| 38 . . . | **R×P** |
| 39 **Kt–B5** | **Q–QB1** |
| 40 **R(2)–R2** | **Kt–K2** |

(z) Leading to a loss of a Pawn, which could be prevented by 40 . . . , K–Kt3. Would this have been a better course?

| | |
|---|---|
| 41 **Kt×B** | **Kt×Kt** |
| 42 **B×KKtP** | **Q–K3** |

Black resigned without awaiting his opponent's reply, which would obviously have been 43 B–R6, winning a piece.

Tarrasch's comment on this game is enlightening: "A game in which combinations are absent. Yet, after a modest beginning, White cramps his opponent's game more and more until it is completely crippled —and all this without any noticeable blunder on Black's side. That is the highest triumph of chess strategy."

# LESSON XII

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY—LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN THE OPEN FILE—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES COMBINATIVELY—TYPICAL ATTACKING MOTIFS (DOUBLE ATTACK, PIN, FORK, UNPROTECTED LAST RANK)

LIKE all the outstanding American players, ISAAC KASHDAN is a thorough master of position play. Kashdan's style, in its leaning toward simplification, is an echo of Capablanca's play; but the younger master is less reluctant to take risks.

Modern players are noted for their fondness for the two Bishops. In Kashdan's case, this preference is so marked that it may be considered an idiosyncrasy! It must be admitted, however, that his sensitivity to the power of these pieces is wonderfully developed, so that he can make them perform miracles.

Manhattan Chess Club Championship, 1934

## QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED

| | WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|---|
| | I. Kashdan | O. Tenner |
| 1 | **P–Q4** | **P–Q4** |
| 2 | **P–QB4** | **P–K3** |
| 3 | **Kt–QB3** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 4 | **Kt–B3** | **QKt–Q2** |
| 5 | **B–Kt5** | **B–Kt5** |

(**a**) Does this move seem appropriate in the present position?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | **P×P** | **P×P** |
| 7 | **Q–Kt3!** | |

(**b**) Indicating that the purpose of the foregoing Pawn exchange was . . .?

7 . . . **P–B4**

(**c**) Consider the alternatives 7 . . ., B–R4, 7 . . ., B–K2, 7 . . ., Q–K2, and 7 . . ., B×Ktch.

8 **B–Q2**

(**d**) Why is this played?

8 . . . **B×Kt**
9 **B×B** **O–O**
10 **P–K3** **P–B5**

(**e**) This move determines the subsequent strategy to be pursued by both players. What are the basic ideas involved?

11 **Q–B2** **Kt–K5**
12 **B–K2**

(**f**) Why not win a Pawn here with 12 B×P, . . . ?

12 . . . **Q–K2**
13 **O–O** **P–QKt4**

Now White has time to withdraw his QB.

(**g**) Consider therefore the desirability of 13 . . ., Kt×B.

14 **B–K1** **P–B4**

(**h**) In view of White's next move, do you think that 14 . . ., B–Kt2 would have been better? Or 14 . . ., P–Kt5 . . .?

15 **P–QKt3!**

(**i**) What is the immediate, tactical purpose of this move? What is the more general, strategic significance?

15 . . . **B–Kt2**
16 **P×P** **KtP×P**

(**j**) 16 . . ., QP×P seems more consistent with Black's plan. There would follow . . .?

17 **R–Kt1** **KR–Kt1**
18 **B–R5**

(**k**) What is the threat?

18 . . . **B–B3?**

Losing a Pawn outright.

(**l**) How would you evaluate the position after the alternative . . . B–B1 or . . . B–R3 . . .?

19 **B×P!**

A fairly obvious move; but it is worth noting that it is made possible by the combination of two circumstances: *Black's Bishop is unprotected and the diagonal leading to his King is open.*

19 . . . **Q–R6**
20 **B–Kt3!**

(**m**) Why is this preferable to other retreats?

20 . . . **Q–Q3?**

(**n**) . . . R–QB1 was better. White can then proceed with . . .?

WHAT IS WHITE'S STRONGEST MOVE?

BLACK (Tenner)



WHITE (Kashdan)

(After 20 . . . , Q–Q3?)

21 **B–B7!** **Q–K3**

(**o**) What would be the most likely play after 21 . . ., Q×B . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 22 **B×R** | **R×B** |
| 23 **B–R4!** | |

(**p**) Being ahead in material, White plays to secure further exchanges or obtain control of the QKt file. In so doing, he runs the danger of losing back the exchange. Before seeing the following moves, can you discover how he has provided for this contingency?

| | |
|---|---|
| 23 . . . | **R×R** |
| 24 **R×R** | **B×B** |
| 25 **Q×B** | **Kt–B6** |
| 26 **Q×Kt!** | Resigns |

(**q**) Why?

A Temporary Queen Sacrifice!

Black (Tenner)



White (Kashdan)

(After 26 Q×Kt!)

# LESSON XIII

LINE-OPENING—PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE—THE CONSTRICTION MOTIF—SIMPLIFICATION LEADING TO A WON ENDING

J. R. CAPABLANCA (born in 1889, and World Champion from 1921 to 1927) is a kind of super-Tarrasch. He is more cautious than Tarrasch, more rationalistic, more eclectic. But all these negative features are more than compensated for by his freedom from dogmatic preconceptions, his extraordinary natural facility (he was Champion of Cuba at the age of 12!) and his amazingly refined technique.

At its best, his style has a smooth elegance that lends his games a most attractive charm and lasting worth. Here is a case in point.

Budapest, 1928

## QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED

| | WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|---|
| | J. R. Capablanca | H. Steiner |
| 1 | **P–Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 | **P–QB4** | **P–K3** |
| 3 | **Kt–QB3** | **P–Q4** |

This is an order of moves frequently seen in modern games. Black has renounced any possible intention to play an Indian Defence (3 . . . , B–Kt5) and plays for direct occupation of the centre (3 . . . , P–Q4).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | **B–Kt5** | **QKt–Q2** |

(**a**) This sets one of the simplest traps in the whole realm of the openings; yet it is one which continues to claim a large annual toll of victims. Prove that

White cannot play to win a Pawn with 5 P×P, P×P; 6 Kt×P, etc.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | **P–K3** | **B–K2** |
| 6 | **Kt–B3** | **O–O** |
| 7 | **R–B1** | |

(**b**) Can you describe in general terms the motivation for this move? Give at least two answers.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | . . . | **P–B3** |
| 8 | **B–Q3** | **P×P** |

(**c**) This contradicts the idea behind Black's third move, which was played with a view to control of White's K4. What, then, are the considerations which explain Black's last move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 9 | **B×P** | **Kt–Q4** |
| 10 | **B×B** | **Q×B** |
| 11 | **O–O** | **Kt×Kt** |
| 12 | **R×Kt** | **P–QKt3?** |

(**d**) What is the natural freeing move, and why is it preferable to the text?

(**e**) Without seeing the further continuation of the game, can you discover the reason for the weakness of Black's last move?

BLACK HAS WEAKENED HIS POSITION

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Capablanca) (After 12 . . . , P–QKt3?)

13 **Q–B2!**

(**f**) Threatening?

13 . . . **P–QB4**

(**g**) Why is this move as good as forced? Indicate this on the basis of general principles, and then reinforce your conclusion by proving that 13 . . ., B–Kt2? would have lost a Pawn.

14 **P×P!**

(**h**) Very simple, but, as you shall see, quite effective. Yet the alternative 14 B–Kt5, P×P (White threatened to win a Pawn by B×Kt, etc.); 15 R–B7 seems even stronger. How would Black continue?

14 . . . **Kt×P**

(**i**) After this, White secures control of the QB file. Should Black therefore have played 14 . . ., P×P . . .?

15 **P–QKt4!**

(**j**) Demonstrate that Black's reply is practically compulsory.

15 . . . **Kt–R3**

(**k**) As we know, a Knight is almost always badly placed at the edge of the board. Hence, Black has played the Knight here because . . .?

16 **P–QR3** **B–Kt2**
17 **B–Q3!**

(**l**) Gaining time for . . .?

17 . . . **P–Kt3**
18 **R–B1!** **QR–Q1**

(**m**) Black cannot dispute the QB file with either Rook because of . . .? Relate this to your previous reply.

19 **Kt–K5**

(**n**) Threatening? Evaluate the effectiveness of the respective minor pieces.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 19 | . . . | **Q–Q3** |
| 20 | **P–B4** | **Kt–Kt1** |

(**o**) Black reconciles himself to the loss of a Pawn in order to rearrange his pieces. Before seeing the need for such desperate measures, we must convince ourselves that Black could not have succeeded in freeing himself with 20 . . . , P–B3. Prove that this alternative would likewise have been unsatisfactory.

21 **R–B7**

Thus White has been able to play the move which was one of the main objects of his command of the QB file. The Rook's occupation of the seventh rank is transitory but lucrative.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 21 | . . . | **B–R1** |
| 22 | **R×RP** | **Kt–B3?!** |

(**p**) As you readily see, White can now win a second Pawn by 23 Kt×Kt, etc. Why does he discard this line of play?

SHOULD WHITE PLAY TO WIN A SECOND PAWN?

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Capablanca)

(After 22 . . . , Kt–B3?!)

23 **R×B!**

Forcing Black's reply, else the latter is left with a Rook for two minor pieces.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 23 | . . . | **Kt×Kt** |
| 24 | **R×R** | **R×R** |
| 25 | **B–K2!!** | |

(**q**) This move, so extraordinary because of its elegant simplicity, wins a piece! Prove this by showing that the Knight has no move.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | . . . | **Q–Q7** |

Trying to make the best of it.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 26 | **Q×Q!** | |

(**r**) Another simple (but not obvious!) move. Could White have won a piece by 26 P×Kt, and if your answer is "yes," how can you account for the text, which wins only the exchange?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 26 | . . . | **R×Q** |
| 27 | **R–B8ch!** | **K–Kt2** |
| 28 | **K–B1!** | **Kt–Q2** |

(**s**) Show that unless Black gives up the exchange (28 . . . , R×B), the text is forced.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 29 | **R–Q8** | |

(**t**) Pinning the Knight—and threatening . . .?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 29 | . . . | **K–B3** |

(**u**) So as to answer White's threat with . . .?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 30 | **B–Kt5** | **R–Q4** |

(**v**) Why does Black prefer this move (which loses the exchange) to 30 . . . , K–K2, which would avoid the loss of further material?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 31 | **P–QR4!** | |

(**w**) Why is this more exact than 31 B×Kt, K–K2; 32 R-QKt8, etc.?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 31 | . . . | **R×B** |

Now that White's Bishop was protected, he threatened R×Kt; and, as you know from the previous reply, 31 . . . , K–K2 (instead of the text) would be quite hopeless.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 32 | **P×R** | **K–K2** |
| 33 | **R–QB8!** | |

(**x**) Since White is a Pawn ahead, why doesn't he simplify into a King and Pawn ending with 33 R×Ktch . . .?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 33 | . . . | **P–K4?** |
| 34 | **R–B6** | **P–K5** |
| 35 | **K–K2** | **P–B4** |
| 36 | **K–Q2** | **K–B2** |
| 37 | **K–B3** | Resigns |

(**y**) In explaining Black's resignation, take into consideration (i) the strength of White's 33rd and 34th moves; (ii) the manner in which Black's 33rd move facilitated the win.

For clarity of procedure and refinement of means, it would be very difficult to hit on a better example.

# LESSON XIV

## THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CENTRE—ATTACKING PAWN WEAKNESSES—LINE-OPENING—THE BLOCKADE OF PASSED PAWNS AND ITS REMOVAL—THE PIN

THE style of A. LILIENTHAL resembles that of his contemporaries, except that this young Hungarian player often develops a devil-may-care streak and takes the most daring risks. Both PANOV and KOTOV have a similar style, but this is characteristic of practically all the modern Russian masters. This tactical flair is illustrated in a most interesting way in the following game: the White Allies carry out their strategical aims by means of direct threats. This kind of contrapuntal play is not easy to master, but it produces the most interesting effects.

Moscow, 1937

### INDIAN DEFENCE

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| A. Lilienthal<br>V. Panov | B. Blumenfeld<br>A. Kotov |
| 1 **P–Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 **P–QB4** | **P–K3** |
| 3 **Kt–KB3** | **P–QKt3** |
| 4 **P–KKt3** | **B–Kt2** |
| 5 **B–Kt2** | **B–K2** |

For 5 . . . , B–Kt5ch see Lesson VIII. The text aims for a more complicated game by avoiding exchanges; but it also has the possible drawback of leading to too cramped a position.

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 **O–O** | **O–O** |
| 7 **Kt–B3** | **Kt–K5** |

(**a**) What is the basic idea of this move? What can you therefore deduce regarding the respective strategical aims of both players?

8 **Q–B2** **Kt×Kt**

(**b**) What considerations would enable you to determine whether or not Black should support the Knight with . . . P–KB4 . . .?

9 **Q×Kt** **P–Q3**

(**c**) As you will see, this move does not quite answer the needs of the situation. What would you suggest for Black?

10 **Q–B2!**

(**d**) With what tactical threat? With what strategical threat?

WHAT THREAT MUST BLACK GUARD AGAINST?

BLACK (Allies)



WHITE (Allies)

(After 10 Q–B2!)

10 . . . **Q–B1**

(**e**) Evaluate the alternatives . . . Kt–B3 and . . . P–KB4.

11 **P–K4** **P–QB4**
12 **P–Q5** **P–K4**

(**f**) White was threatening?

(**g**) What is the likely trend of the game after 12 . . . ; P×P . . .?

13 **Kt–K1**

(**h**) What is the purpose of this move?

13 . . . **Q–K1**

(**i**) What would be the drawback to playing . . . P–Kt3 followed by . . . P–B4, which seems the indicated strategy—or of playing . . . P–B4 at once?

14 **P–B4** **P–QKt4?**

(**j**) How is this likely to lead to a weakening of Black's position? Therefore this move should have been prepared by . . .? Meanwhile, White would continue with . . .?

15 **P×KP** **QP×P**
16 **Kt–Q3!**

(**k**) Does this move help you to answer the first part of the previous question?

16 . . . **B–Q3**
17 **B–K3** **Kt–R3**

(**l**) What are the alternatives?

18 **Q–Kt3!**

(**m**) Why is this move played?

18 . . . **P–Kt5**

Forced.

19 **P–QR3!** **Q–K2**

(**n**) What would White play after 19 . . . , R–B1 . . .? After . . . R–Kt1 . . .?

20 **P×P** **Kt×P**

(**o**) Can you find two good methods of procedure against 20 . . . , P×P . . .?

21 **Kt×Kt** **P×Kt**
22 **R–R5!** **KR–B1**

(**p**) . . . B–B2 would likewise be unsatisfactory. Why?

23 **KR–B1!**

(**q**) How would play proceed after 23 P–B5 . . .?

23 . . . **R–B4**

(**r**) Why should Black be willing to give up the exchange to prevent P–B5, when . . . B–B4 accomplishes the same object?

24 **Q×P!** **QR–QB1**

(**s**) Would 24 . . ., R×QP be better?

25 **B×R** **B×Bch**

(**t**) On 25 . . ., R×B there follows . . . ?

26 **R×B** Resigns

(**u**) Black's surrender must be based on the realization that both 26 . . ., R×R and 26 . . ., Q×Rch are inadequate. Prove that this is so.

# LESSON XV

THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY—LINE-OPENING—THE CONSTRICTION MOTIF—PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE CULMINATING IN CONTROL OF THE SEVENTH RANK—EXPLOITING PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—THE POWER OF THE CENTRALIZED KNIGHT

MODERN chess theory owes its present form primarily to the efforts of WILHELM STEINITZ (1836–1901). Although his life was characterized by poverty, ill-health, and controversy, he was World Champion from 1866 to 1894! The eminent masters (almost without exception) who have appeared on the scene since 1885 or so, have owed the basic groundwork of their chess knowledge to Steinitz. Such diverse chess personalities as Lasker and Tarrasch, Pillsbury and Schlechter, Janowski and Maroczy, Nimzovich and Capablanca, Keres and Flohr, and many, many others, have been stamped with the hallmark of the Steinitzian theories.

Even to-day, Steinitz is pityingly regarded in some circles as a fanatic and eccentric. The following characteristic game, however, shows how profound and clear his ideas really were. In many of his games Steinitz introduced a constrictive motif which has flourished right down to the present day.

Match, 1885

## FRENCH DEFENCE

| | White | Black |
|---|---|---|
| | W. Steinitz | A. G. Sellman |
| 1 | **P–K4** | **P–K3** |
| 2 | **P–Q4** | **P–Q4** |
| 3 | **Kt–QB3** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 4 | **P–K5** | |

A favourite move with Steinitz, but it virtually disappeared from serious master play thirty years ago.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | . . . | **KKt–Q2** |
| 5 | **P–B4** | |

(**a**) Indicating that he will answer Black's . . . P–QB4 with P×P, for reasons to be given later. The attempt to maintain the Pawn centre with 5 QKt–K2, P–QB4; 6 P–QB3, etc., seems plausible, yet Black can obtain the better game, namely by . . .?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | . . . | **P–QB4** |
| 6 | **P×P** | **B×P** |

(**b**) Has the preceding capture brought about any possible future strategical advantage for White?

(**c**) Discuss the relative strength of Black's Bishops. In giving your answer, take into consideration the nature of Black's position.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | **Kt–B3** | **P–QR3** |

(**d**) What are the two reasons for this move?

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | **B–Q3** | **Kt–QB3** |
| 9 | **Q–K2** | **Kt–Kt5** |
| 10 | **B–Q2** | **P–QKt4** |
| 11 | **Kt–Q1** | **Kt×Bch** |
| 12 | **P×Kt** | |

(**e**) Thus Black has obtained "the Bishop pair" (two Bishops against a Bishop and Knight). However, since his QB is so hemmed in and since White threatens

to assume the mastery of the black squares, Black should now play . . .?

12 . . . **Q–Kt3?**

How does White Gain an Important Strategical Advantage?

Black (Sellman)



White (Steinitz)

(After 12 . . ., Q–Kt3?)

13 **P–QKt4!**

(**f**) Immediately exploiting Black's mistake. Can you perceive the far-reaching strategical consequences of White's last move?

13 . . . **B–K2**

(**g**) Prove that 13 . . ., B–Q5? would lose a piece.

14 **P–QR3** **P–B4**

(**h**) Played in order to barricade the position; but it has two grave strategical drawbacks, namely . . .?

15 **QR–B1** **B–Kt2**

(**i**) What do you notice about the mobility of this Bishop?

16 **B–K3**

(**j**) How do you account for the fact that although

five of the seven White Pawns are on black squares, his Bishop has ample scope?

(**k**) Could 16 Kt–Q4 have been played here? If your answer is affirmative, explain why the order of moves actually adopted is even stronger.

16 . . . **Q–Q1**
17 **Kt–Q4** **Kt–B1**

(**l**) Compare the position of White's Knight on Q4 with that of Black's Knight or Black's QB.

18 **O–O**

(**m**) Do you think that 18 Kt–B6 would have been stronger?

18 . . . **P–KR4**

(**n**) Why is this move played, and what positional disadvantages does it entail?

19 **Kt–QB3**

Beginning one of those Knight manoeuvres for which Steinitz was famous. The Knight is headed for QR5, where it will further strengthen White's grip on the black squares and at the same time attack Black's QB.

19 . . . **K–B2**

(**o**) What is the twofold purpose of this move?

20 **Kt–Kt1!** **P–Kt3**

(**p**) Why doesn't Black play . . . Kt–Q2 directly? What is the disadvantage incurred by Black's last move?

21 **Kt–Q2** **Kt–Q2**

(**q**) In view of the weaknesses with which his Queenside is riddled, should not Black have freed himself with . . . P–R4 (at the same time preventing the entry of White's Knight at QR5)?

22 **Kt(2)–Kt3** **QR–B1**
23 **Kt–R5**

The Knight's tour is completed. White now plays for exclusive control of the QB file. Hence his move 26.

| | |
|---|---|
| 23 . . . | **B–R1** |
| 24 **R×R** | **Q×R** |
| 25 **R–B1** | **Q–QKt1** |
| 26 **Q–QB2!** | **B–Q1** |

(**r**) Why will the following forced removal of his KB be fatal for Black? Should he therefore have attempted to avoid the exchange by playing 26 . . ., B–B1 . . .?

| | |
|---|---|
| 27 **Kt(5)–B6!** | **Q–Kt2** |

(**s**) Why does Black decline the opportunity to rid himself of his hapless QB?

| | |
|---|---|
| 28 **Kt×Bch** | **R×Kt** |

Now the black squares are completely defenceless.

29 **Q–B7!**

Occupation of the seventh rank—the culmination of play in the open file.

| | |
|---|---|
| 29 . . . | **Q–Kt1** |

(**t**) How would the game proceed after the immediate exchange of Queens?

30 **B–B2!**

(**u**) Threatening?

| | |
|---|---|
| 30 . . . | **Q–Kt3** |
| 31 **Kt–B3** | **Q×Q** |
| 32 **R×Q** | **K–K1** |

(**v**) Why is this forced? Comment on the position of each of Black's pieces.

| | |
|---|---|
| 33 **Kt–Kt5** | **Kt–B1** |

(**w**) How would play proceed after 33 . . ., K–K2 . . .?

34 **B–B5!**

(**x**) Relentlessly intensifying his grip on the black

squares. What is the threat? Can Black play 34 . . ., R–Q2 . . .? or 34 . . ., R–Kt1 . . .?

34 . . . **Kt–Q2**
35 **B–Q6!** Resigns

(**y**) White's last move was even more forcing than the immediate Kt×P. Prove that Black has no moves.

ZUGZWANG!

BLACK (Sellman)



WHITE (Steinitz)

(After 35 B–Q6!)

The massive yet luminous manner in which White's position is built up, as well as the deliberate yet crushing assault which ultimately causes Black's game to crumble —these are true hallmarks of the style of Steinitz.

# LESSON XVI

PSEUDO-DEVELOPMENT—THE CONSTRICTION MOTIF—PLAY IN THE OPEN FILE CULMINATING IN CONTROL OF THE SEVENTH RANK—EXPLOITATION OF PAWN WEAKNESSES AND WEAK SQUARES—THE EFFECT OF A WEAK PAWN CONFIGURATION ON THE BISHOP'S MOBILITY—THE CO-OPERATION OF THE ROOKS IN A MATING NET POSITION

THE style of AKIBA RUBINSTEIN (born 1882) is famous for its unsurpassed elegance, its rigorous economy of means, its achievement of great results with the simplest of material. So subtle is Rubinstein's feeling for position play that some of his famous end-games have definitely increased the number of kinds of endings that may be won; before his time, a win was considered impossible or unlikely in these categories. Rubinstein has likewise refined the methods of Steinitz and Tarrasch in many other respects as well.

For a clearer comprehension of the constriction technique, the student should compare this game with the examples of Steinitz's and Tarrasch's play given earlier.

Vienna, 1922
(*First Brilliancy Prize*)

## INDIAN DEFENCE *

| WHITE | BLACK |
|---|---|
| A. Rubinstein | E. D. Bogolyubov |
| 1 **P—Q4** | **Kt–KB3** |
| 2 **P–QB4** | **P–KKt3** |
| 3 **Kt–QB3** | **P–Q4** |

* As a matter of fact, the actual order of the opening moves in this game was 1 P–Q4, P–Q4; 2 P–QB4, P–QB3; 3 P–K3, Kt–KB3; 4 Kt–QB3, P–KKt3; 5 Kt–B3, B–Kt2; 6 B–K2, O–O, etc. The order of moves has been arbitrarily changed in order to set the stage for a study of some of the basic concepts of the Gruenfeld Variation.

(**a**) Keeping in mind the most obvious rejoinder 4 P×P, Kt×P; 5 P–K4, Kt×Kt; 6 P×Kt, P–QB4 followed by . . . B–Kt2—what would you say are the fundamental ideas of this fusion of . . . P–Q4 with the fianchetto of the KB?

(**b**) What conclusions do you therefore draw regarding (i) the more favourable methods for White to adopt regarding his centre formation; (ii) the less favourable methods, from White's point of view.

4 **P–K3**

(**c**) Making use of your previous conclusions about White's policy in the centre, can you see what kind of strategy White intends to pursue, as indicated by the text? This strategy (foreshadowed by White's last move) will be one of the basic features of White's play *throughout the game*.

| | |
|---|---|
| 4 . . . | **B–Kt2** |
| 5 **Kt–B3** | **O–O** |
| 6 **B–K2** | |

(**d**) Show that 6 Q–Kt3 would be more forcing, and consider some possible lines of play thereafter.

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 . . . | **P–B3** |
| 7 **O–O** | **QKt–Q2?** |

(**e**) Can you see why this move is a serious positional mistake?

(**f**) Suggest some preferable alternatives.

8 **P×P!**

(**g**) What are the two great positional advantages to be attained by this exchange?

| | |
|---|---|
| 8 . . . | **Kt×P** |
| 9 **Kt×Kt** | **P×Kt** |

(**h**) What do you now conclude about the mobility of Black's KB, and what relation does this have to your first three answers?

10 **Q–Kt3**

A very natural move, but a very embarrassing one for Black!

10 . . . **Kt–B3**

(**i**) Consider the alternatives . . . Kt–Kt3 or . . . Kt–Kt1 or . . . P–K3. Evaluate these moves in respect of the possible weaknesses they may create, and also judge which one of them is the most effective against White's coming pressure on the Queen-side.

11 **B–Q2**

White is now ready to take command of the QB file. Black is unable to imitate this manoeuvre, as his QB cannot be moved at once.

11 . . . **Kt–K5**
12 **KR–Q1** **Kt×B**

(**j**) What are the good and bad features of this exchange?

13 **R×Kt** **Q–Q3**

(**k**) How do you appraise the value of Black's "Bishop-pair"?

ARE BLACK'S BISHOPS LIKELY TO BE USEFUL?

BLACK (Bogolyubov)



WHITE (Rubinstein) (After 13 . . . , Q–Q3)

14 **R–QB1** **P–Kt3**
15 **KR–B2** **B–Kt2**
16 **Q–R4!**

(**l**) What are the two general strategical goals aimed at by this move, and what is its immediate tactical significance?

16 . . . **P–QR3**

(**m**) Why is this move virtually compulsory, and what is the strategic disadvantage it entails?

17 **R–B7**

(**n**) White has now carried out the object sought for by his occupation of the QB file, which was . . .?

17 . . . **P–QKt4**

(**o**) What further strategic disadvantage does this move involve?

(**p**) Consider the alternatives . . . KR–B1 or . . . QR–Kt1 or . . . KR–Kt1 or . . . B–B1.

18 **Q–R5!** **QR–Kt1**

(**q**) What would be the likely continuation after 18 . . ., KR–B1 . . .?

19 **R(1)–B5!**

(**r**) How do this and White's previous move take advantage of the strategical drawback alluded to in questions (**m**) and (**o**)?

(**s**) Can you see any possible tactical reason for this move?

19 . . . **KR–Q1**

(**t**) How would play proceed after 19 . . ., P–K3 . . .?

20 **Kt–K5** **B–KB3**

(**u**) Demonstrate that 20 . . ., B×Kt? loses!

21 **Kt–B6!**

(**v**) This may be considered the winning move! Can Black play 21 . . ., B×Kt . . .?

21 . . . **P–K3**

(**w**) Evidently saving the exchange. How so?

22 **P–KKt3!!**

To make such a move requires considerable self-assurance! The text creates a "loop-hole" for White's King (which will be useful in at least two variations) and also serves to convince Black of his helplessness. In addition, the move plays a part in enmeshing Black's King in a mating net.

22 . . . **KR–QB1**

This in no way changes the situation, but he has nothing better.

23 **Kt×R** **R×Kt**

It seems that Black must now regain the exchange; but White has a remarkable combination available.

WHITE BEGINS A REMARKABLE COMBINATION

BLACK (Bogolyubov)



WHITE (Rubinstein)

(After 23 . . . , R×Kt)

24 **B×P!!** **B–Q1**

(**x**) What happens after 24 . . . , P×B . . .?

25 **B–K8!** **Q–B1**

(**y**) How would play proceed after the more obvious . . . B×R . . .?

26 **R×B!!**

(**z**) The whole point of White's combination. Why would 26 B×Pch be a crass blunder?

| | |
|---|---|
| 26 . . . | **B×Q** |
| 27 **R×R** | |

(**aa**) The exactitude of White's calculations now begins to be apparent. Prove that Black cannot try to save his Bishop by 27 . . . , B–Kt5.

| | |
|---|---|
| 27 . . . | **Q–Q3** |
| 28 **R–Kt7** | |

(**bb**) Prove that Black cannot save his Bishop with 28 . . . , B–Q1.

| | |
|---|---|
| 28 . . . | **B–Kt3** |
| 29 **R–B6** | **Q–Kt5** |
| 30 **B×Pch** | Resigns |

(**cc**) Why?

This game is a model example of the distinguished artistry for which Rubinstein is so famous.

# ANSWERS

## LESSON I

(**a**) Black plays for symmetry, early exchanges and a quick draw. The superficial character of this view is demonstrated quickly enough in this game. Simplification by itself does not produce a draw; it is mainly a question of *positional advantages*.

(**b**) 4 . . . , Q×P loses time (5 Kt–B3, etc.).

4 . . . , Kt×P; 5 P–K4 is not much of an improvement in this respect, as far as Black is concerned.

SHOULD BLACK DRIVE AWAY THE KKt WITH . . .
P–K4 . . .?

BLACK (Grau)



WHITE (Reti)

(After 7 Kt×Q)

(**c**) 7 . . . , P–K4 looks plausible, but would involve Black in difficulties, as White would obtain a strong initiative: 8 Kt(Q4)–Kt5, Kt–R3; 9 P–KKt3! and Black is badly off, as his QKt is poorly placed,

whilst White's KB will have tremendous pressure along the long diagonal.

Or if 8 . . . , K–Q1; 9 B–K3, Kt–B3; 10 P–KKt3 (the powerful fianchetto development is an important motif in White's play here), B–Q2 (the premature attack 10 . . . , Kt–KKt5 is answered by 11 R–Q1ch, B–Q2; 12 B–R3!); 11 R–Q1, K–B1; 12 B–Kt2, P–QR3; 13 Kt–Q6ch, B×Kt; 14 R×B, and White has decidedly the better of it; he has a much superior development, two strong Bishops and pressure on Black's weak black squares.

(**d**) In view of the great power of White's KB later on, Black should have neutralized the pressure on the long diagonal with 9 . . . , B–Q2; 10 B–Kt2, B–B3. In that event White would still remain with some positional advantage, but with by no means so powerful a game as he soon obtains in the text.

(**e**) By playing . . . P–K4, Black has exposed his Q4 to invasion. With 11 . . . , P–KR3, Black would have been able to retain his KKt on KB3, which is essential if he is to prevent White from posting a formidably *centralized* Knight at Q5. On this square, the White Knight soon menaces KB6, K7, QB7, and QKt6 by direct tactical threats.

(**f**) As just set forth, White will remove the KKt in order to *centralize* his own QKt with great effect on Q5.

(**g**) . . . O–O? is definitely bad, as Black's King is removed too far from the menaced centre squares, thus making White's later tactical threats more serious than ever.

Much better than the text was 12 . . . , O–O–O. This would have kept the King near the centre, and would have saved a tempo in bringing a Black Rook

to the Q file. As the game goes, White soon seizes this file to further his own purposes.

(**h**) There we have it. White is actually threatening to win a piece with QB×Kt, etc.

How does White Proceed against 13 . . ., QR–Q1 . . .?

Black (Grau)



White (Reti)

(After 13 KR–Q1)

(**i**) Against 13 . . ., QR–Q1 White proceeds in precisely the same way: 14 QB×Kt! Black can now choose between (i) 14 . . ., B×B; 15 Kt–B5, B–B1; 16 Kt×RP! (announcing the indirect co-operation of White's KB!); and (ii) 14 . . ., P×B; 15 Kt–Q5 (threatening to win a Pawn by 15 Kt×Bch and 16 B×P), B–B1 (or 15 . . ., KR–K1; 16 Kt–B5!, B–QB1; 17 Kt×Bch, R×Kt?; 18 B×Kt winning a piece; if 17 . . ., Kt×Kt; 18 Kt×P, etc.); 16 QR–B1! threatening R×Kt! No matter how Black plays, he will have to lose at least a Pawn.

Note the important role played by White's KB in these variations.

(**j**) If 14 . . ., B×B; 15 Kt–B5, B–B1; 16 Kt–Q5

with the winning threats of 17 Kt–Kt6 (winning at least a Pawn) or 17 Kt×Bch, P×Kt; 18 R×Rch, Kt×R; 19 R–Q1, winning a Pawn.

Again, it is interesting to observe how White's KB co-operates indirectly on the long diagonal.

(**k**) White threatens to win at least the exchange with 16 Kt–Kt6. Now that his Knight is *centralized*, it takes only a few moves until Black's poorly placed pieces are reduced to utter helplessness.

(**l**) White threatens to win a piece by 17 Kt×Bch.

16 . . ., B×Kt is clearly inadequate, for White replies 17 Kt×Pch and 18 Kt×B with the exchange and a Pawn to the good.

16 . . ., B–K1 is a bit better, but still unsatisfactory, in view of 17 Kt×Bch, Kt×Kt; 18 Kt×KtP.

(**m**) No matter how Black plays, he must come out the exchange and a Pawn down. If he captures either Knight, then 18 Kt×Bch, etc.

If 17 . . ., B–K1; 18 Kt—Q7ch, etc.

*SUMMARY: Black neglected to struggle for control of the centre. He did not attempt to neutralize the pressure of White's KB on the long diagonal; he allowed White to seize control of the vital square Q5; he weakened his Pawn position; he did not take adequate measures to dispute the Q file. All these seemingly minor sins were fatal in their cumulative effect.*

(**a**) 6 . . . , P–B3 indicates that Black does not intend to "give up the centre" by . . . P×P. This forecasts a policy of *over-protection* of K4 on Black's part. While this leads to a very solid position for Black, it exposes him to the danger of getting too cramped a game, so that his pieces cannot function efficiently.

(**b**) The alternative 6 . . . , P×P gives up the centre, and after 7 Kt×P it is clear that White's position is the freer and more aggressive of the two. In addition, Black's Queen-side Pawns are somewhat weak and require protection (if 7 . . . , P–QB4, White has access to Q5, while if 7 . . . , B–Q2, Black's QB has a predominantly defensive function).

The opening up of the position has, however, the compensating feature of giving Black's Bishops more scope than they enjoy in the text continuation.

AN IMPORTANT OPENING FINESSE: SHOULD WHITE PLAY 7 Kt–B3 OR 7 B–K3 . . .?

BLACK (Monticelli)



WHITE (Thomas)

(After 6 . . . , P–B3)

(**c**) If 7 Kt–B3, P–Kt3; 8 B–K3, Kt–R3 !; 9 Q–Q2, Kt–B2.

The manoeuvre . . . Kt–R3–B2 is useful to Black in two respects: (i) it prevents White from exchanging the KB by B–R6, etc., and thus creating weaknesses in Black's game; (ii) the Knight is well posted in support of the KP, and at the same time leaves room for further play in the K file (. . . Q–K2, R–K1, etc.).

However, after 7 B–K3 !, P–Kt3; 8 Q–Q2, Black can no longer play . . . Kt–R3, and is confronted with the unpleasant prospect of B–R6 in reply to . . . Kt–K2. He therefore discards the fianchetto altogether. In this way he avoids the creation of an organic weakness in his position (and also avoids the possibility of White's playing P–KR4–5 opening up the KR file); but this is achieved only at the expense of leaving himself with a *badly cramped game.*

(**d**) See the previous reply.

(**e**) From present indications, this Bishop has little prospect of being in active play. It is hemmed in by *Pawns on its own colour* (the KBP and QP); a clear case of "pseudo-development."

(**f**) Naturally White wishes to take advantage of this Knight's poor position to drive it to even worse squares.

(**g**) The alternative was 10 . . ., P–KR4; 11 O–O–O, B–Kt5; 12 QR–Kt1, Q–Q2; 13 Kt–K1, B–K3; 14 Kt–Q3, and, at all events, Black has a better game than after the text.

(**h**) . . . B–Kt5 would have been better, in so far as it would have given Black more room for his pieces and at the same time hampered White in the execution of his plans.

Black probably did not relish . . . B–Kt5 because

it virtually commits him to . . . B×Kt, opening up the KKt file for White. But he forgets the important rule that *a player with a cramped game should try to free his position by exchanging pieces*. As the game goes, Black's QB is perfectly useless, while White's KKt plays an important role.

(**i**) Black's KBP is a "target." The fact that it has advanced a square makes it possible for White to open up the KKt file by P–KKt4–5, with a vehement attack on the hostile King.

(**j**) . . . B–Kt5 would now be useless, as White would retreat his KKt and then play P–B3 and P–KKt4.

Black's minor pieces are all badly placed; a clear case of *pseudo-development*. These pieces have been developed in a purely formal sense, but they play no real part in the game.

(**k**) White's intention is to play P–Kt5, forcing open the KKt file; if Black answers P–Kt5 with . . . P–KB4, then P–Kt6 will force open a file just the same.

(**l**) Black hopes to create a diversion in the centre. This feeble counteraction is bound to fail, as his pieces have no points of support there; they have no real threats; and they can be driven away with no loss of time.

(**m**) 17 . . . , B×Kt has little to recommend it, for after 18 KtP×B, White cannot be prevented from opening the KKt file completely with P–R6.

(**n**) If 19 . . . , B×Kt; 20 KtP×B, B–B1; 21 Q–R2 ! and Black has no defence against the threatened P×P.

If 19 . . . , P–Kt3; 20 Kt×Bch, R×Kt; 21 B–Q4 ! and White wins a Pawn with no diminution of his attacking chances.

Observe how the *opening of lines* favours the player *with the better development.*

(**o**) If 21 . . ., Kt×P; 22 Q×Pch, K–B1; 23 Q–Kt6, B–Q1; 24 R–R7 and mate follows.

If 21 . . ., Kt–Kt1; 22 Q×Pch, K–B1; 23 P–B5, B–Q1; 24 B–R6ch with a quick mate in the offing.

If 21 . . ., R–R1; 22 Q×Ktch, K–Kt1; 23 P–Kt5, P–KB4; 24 P–Kt6 and wins. Again the *opening of lines* proves fatal for Black.

(**p**) The threat is 24 B–R6ch, Kt×B; 25 Q×Ktch, K–B2; 26 Q–Kt6ch and mate follows.

(**q**) Black vainly hopes to provide a flight-square for his King. If 23 . . ., Kt–Kt4; 24 B×Kt, P×B; 25 Q–R8ch followed by mate.

(**r**) If 24 . . ., R–K2; 25 R–R8ch!, Kt×R; 26 B–R6ch and mate in two.

*SUMMARY: Black saddled himself with a cramped position and took no measures to bring about exchanges which would have freed his cramped game somewhat. The result was that his pieces had little mobility, and were thus able to offer little resistance to the attack.*

(**a**) White threatens 5 B×Kt, QP×B; 6 Kt×P and the Pawn cannot be regained, as his own KP is secure.

(**b**) This indirectly parries the threat, for if 5 B×Kt, QP×B; 6 Kt×P?, Q–Q5 and wins.

(**c**) White can gain a strategical advantage here by 5 B–K3. The mating threat alluded to in the previous answer is thus parried, and hence there is no time for . . . B–Kt3. Black must play 5 . . . , B×B, opening the KB file for White, or 5 . . . Q–K2.

(**d**) 5 Kt×P looks attractive, for if 5 . . . , Kt×Kt; 6 P–Q4. But then Black simply plays 6 . . . , Kt×P and comes out a Pawn ahead. White cannot play 7 P×Kt? as this would fatally expose his KBP. Hence he must play 7 P×B, Kt×QBP and Black is a Pawn to the good (8 Q–Q5, Q–K2).

The exchange transaction (5 Kt×P) which we are studying here is often effective. In this particular case it does not work well because White has already played up his QP one square (move 4) and *thereby lost useful time*—as far as the exchange transaction is concerned.

(**e**) As was pointed out in answer (**c**), it would be advantageous for White if his opponent played . . . B×B and thereby opened the KB file for him. Naturally Black refuses to oblige; and the text-move is part of a manoeuvre, as you will see, to compel Black to exchange. But in the process two moves are wasted (P–QR4–5) which Black utilizes to seize a slight lead in development; and White is left with a weak QRP.

(**f**) Black has two possible plans now: (i) . . . Q–K2 or . . . R–K1 followed by . . . P–Q4; (ii) the text

continuation, consisting in opening up the KB file. Both plans are promising, as they leave Black with a fine solid Pawn centre.

(**g**) P–R3 may involve difficulties later on because it may very likely become a target for Black's Bishop, possibly permitting the sacrifice of this Bishop for the KRP; or else Black may later desire to post his Knight at the strong (and therefore attractive) post KB5. Normally White could prevent this with P–Kt3; but once P–KR3 has been played, the preventive move P–Kt3 will be impossible.

(**h**) You will recall from the previous answer that White cannot play P–Kt3.

(**i**) To play . . . Kt–B5 at once would be less favourable, for then White would play Kt×Kt, whereupon . . . P×Kt gives White play in the centre (P–K5 later on); or if . . . R×Kt, White plays Kt–R2 and plays to liquidate on the KB file, so that the game is fairly even.

After the text, however, Black is prepared to recapture with the KKtP, *opening the KKt file for his Rooks.*

(**j**) Intending P–Kt3 to keep Black's Knight out of White's KB4.

(**k**) Crossing White's plan because P–Kt3 is prevented.

(**l**) White protects his KRP once more so as to be able to play P–Kt3. This plan proves impracticable; hence White should have played 21 P–KKt4, to be followed by Kt–Kt3–B5 (preceded by R–KKt1 to make this manoeuvre absolutely safe). In this way, White's disadvantage would be minimized, although he might have had difficulties with his QRP, especially in the ending. His game would not have been an easy one; but in the text continuation, he is even worse off.

(**m**) P–Kt3 is out of the question, the KRP being attacked too many times.

(**n**) It is difficult to suggest alternatives to this capture. An advance in the centre by P–B3 and P–Q4 is made impossible by the fact that White's QBP protects his QKtP; doubling the Rooks on the KB file has the drawback of exposing White's QRP to attack (another drawback of his 10th move); finally, if White just marks time, Black rearranges his pieces in some such way as the following: . . . K–R1, . . . R–B2–R2, . . . R–Kt1 and is then ready to proceed with . . . P–R4 and . . . P–Kt5. This latter procedure would bring to light still another harmful result of 16 P–R3, namely, that *it had created a target for the line-opening process just outlined.*

(**o**) Capturing with the KP would be a gross inconsistency; for the merit of the plan envisioned by Black consists precisely in the fact that he can now occupy the KKt file with his heavy pieces—a procedure which White *cannot imitate.* Hence Black will be *attacking* and White *defending.*

(**p**) As just pointed out, Black has the initiative based on exclusive occupation of the KKt file. If White resorts to purely defensive moves like R–B2 and Kt–K2, Black will triple on the KKt file, eventually making use of the sacrifice . . . B×RP at a favourable time. The student should play out the position along these lines.

The underlying idea of the text is *to open the KKt file for White as well,* in the hope of thereby being able to neutralize Black's grip on the KKt file. This hope proves abortive, because of Black's tactical threats, based mainly on the possibility of . . . B×RP.

(**q**) If 26 Q–B3, Q–Kt2! (not 26 . . . , QR–KB1?;

27 Q×R, R×Q; 28 R×R and White's game is quite satisfactory, because of the action of the united Rooks); 27 Kt–K2, QR–KB1; 28 Q–R1, B×RP!; 29 K×B, Q–Kt5ch; 30 K–R2, Q–R4 mate.

Or 27 R–B2, QR–KB1; 28 Q–K3 (if 28 Q–K2?, Q–Kt6ch), R–B3 followed by . . . R–Kt3, as in the game.

(**r**) If 28 Kt–K2, B×RP!; 29 K×B, Q–Kt5ch; 30 K–R2, Q–R5ch and wins. Thus we see how White is unable to remove his Knight from KKt1, which means that he is unable to dispute the KKt file. Note further that his troubles *stem from the weakness of his KRP*.

(**s**) The purpose of this move is of course to triple the heavy pieces on the KKt file. Note that the Rook is immune from capture because of the mate threat at KKt2 (based on *Black's exclusive control of the KKt file*).

WHITE IS IN VIRTUAL ZUGZWANG!

BLACK (Pillsbury)



WHITE (Walbrodt)

(After 28 . . . , R–B3!)

(**t**) (i) If 29 Q–Q2 or Q–K2, Q–Kt6ch; 30 K–R1, B×RP wins. (ii) If 29 K–R1, R–Kt3; 30 Q–K1,

R–Kt7 threatening . . . Q–Kt6. (iii) White's Rook at B2 obviously cannot move. (iv) If 29 R–B1, Q–Kt4! and White is lost (30 Q–K1, Q–Kt6ch; or 30 R–K1, Q×Q; 31 R×Q, R×Rch; or 30 R–K2, Q×Q; 31 R×Q, R–B7ch; 32 K–R1, R(Kt1)–Kt7 and wins). (v) If 29 R–K1, R–Kt3 and White must choose between 30 Kt–K2, R–Kt7ch; 31 K–R1, B×RP! and 30 R–B3, R–Kt7ch; 31 K–R1, R–R7ch! and mate next move. Note how neatly these variations sum up the previous *leading ideas* of the game.

(**u**) The next and decisive step is to focus more forces on the KRP—for example, by threatening . . . R–Kt4–R4.

(**v**) The strongest continuation after 31 Q–B6 would have been 31 . . . , Q×Q; 32 R×Q, R–Kt7ch; 33 K–R1, B×KtP, and Black should win the ending without any trouble. Less good, however, would be the superficially attractive 33 . . . , R×Kt; 34 R×B, R(Kt1)–Kt7 (threatens mate); 35 R–B7ch, K–Kt1; 36 R(K6)–K7 and White is just as well off as Black. If for instance 36 . . . , R×BP; 37 R×P, R(Kt7)–Q7 (threatening mate), White draws by perpetual check with R–Kt7ch, etc.

(**w**) After 31 . . . , R–Kt7ch; 32 K–R1, all of White's weak points are protected and some new method must be sought for. The text is based on the threat 32 . . . , B×RP!; 33 Q×B (K×B is wholly out of the question), R–R4 winning the Queen.

(**x**) (i) If 32 R–B6?, R–Kt7ch; 33 K–R1, R–R7ch! and mate next move. (ii) If 32 Q–B3, B×RP! etc.

(**y**) If White moves the menaced Rook, then . . . B–Kt7ch forces mate. Since this latter move is threatened anyway, White has nothing better than 33 Q×B, but then 33 . . . , R–R4 wins the Queen.

White could not hold out very long, as his King would be exposed and his Knight would have little scope.

*SUMMARY: In replaying, Black's play should be studied from the point of view of the exploitation of the KKt file and the tactical menaces against the KRP.*

(**a**) Black fianchettoes his QB as he wishes to control the long diagonal—and more specifically K5.

White fianchettoes his KB to neutralize the pressure of the hostile Bishop on the long diagonal. It is also likely that White's KB will take part in the struggle to force P–K4.

Thus we see that the struggle for control of the centre has already begun. As we shall see from the sequel, however, Black does not realize the full implications of this conflict.

(**b**) At this given moment, it would be more to the point for Black to play . . . P–B4. Since White cannot push by, he must either play P×P or allow P×P (unless he wishes to play P–B3, which has the drawbacks of (i) condemning him to a passive position in the centre, since he has voluntarily renounced P–B4; (ii) depriving White's QKt of its best development—at QB3; (iii) making the development of White's QB somewhat of a problem, since after P–B3 the fianchetto of this Bishop is no longer feasible).

Once that White's QP disappears, however, it follows that Black's KB, when it is finally fianchettoed, will have a powerful grip on the long diagonal. Here is an example: 1 Kt–KB3, Kt–KB3; 2 P–Q4, P–QKt3; 3 P–KKt3, B–Kt2; 4 B–Kt2, P–B4! (transposition); 5 O–O, P×P; 6 Kt×P, B×B; 7 K×B, P–Kt3; 8 P–B4, B–Kt2; 9 Kt–B3, Q–B1; 10 P–Kt3, Q–Kt2ch; 11 P–B3, P–Q4 (Capablanca–Botvinnik, Nottingham, 1936). Black has somewhat the better game and the initiative, and White has to play very carefully later on to avoid getting into serious difficulties.

(**c**) Here White has a chance to rule . . . P–B4 virtually out of consideration by himself playing 5 P–B4! If then 5 . . . , P–B4; 6 P–Q5! and it is true that Black's KB has a clear diagonal. But this is only temporary, as White will continue with Kt–B3 and P–K4 with a powerful centre and far more mobility. The worst feature of this line of play from Black's point of view is, however, that his QB is completely out of the game.

(**d**) Again Black should have played . . . P–B4, with much the same possibilities as in answer (**b**). It is important to remember that in that event 6 P–B4 would have to be answered *at once* with 6 . . . , P×P clearing the long diagonal for Black's KB and preventing his QB from being blocked out by P–Q5.

We have now reached the point where it will be useful to make some general comments on the double fianchetto development (this also applies to a lesser extent to the fianchetto of one Bishop).

To be effective, a fianchettoed Bishop *must be trained on a hostile object*: an isolated Pawn for preference, or at all events a centre Pawn which is not part of a Pawn mass; or else an important centre square. Thus in the Capablanca–Botvinnik fragment given above, Black has a strong pressure along the long diagonal and specifically against White's Q4.

To be effective, a fianchettoed Bishop cannot very well be opposed by a powerful Pawn mass *which only acts as a stone wall to the Bishop's activity, and is itself not an object of attack.*

To be effective, a fianchettoed Bishop must generally be assisted by a *flank thrust* at the enemy's centre (. . . P–B4 in this game), *which will open up the diagonal.*

One more important point: A Bishop may be

## The Problem of the Fianchettoed Bishop

Black



White

A strong fianchettoed position: White has pressure on the weak Pawns.

(From a game Tartakover–Marshall, New York, 1924)

Black



White

A strong fianchettoed position: Black has perceptible pressure along the diagonal.

(From a game Alekhine–Reti, Pistyan, 1922)

Black



White

A bad fianchettoed position: White's powerful Pawn centre smothers Black's pieces.

(From a game Morphy–Meek, New York, 1857)

Black



White

A good fianchettoed position: but it is outweighed by White's formidable control of the key points.

(From a game Alekhine–Saemisch, Berlin, 1922)

effectively fianchettoed, and yet his usefulness may be impaired by the general superiority of the opponent's position. A Bishop may be ineffectively fianchettoed, and yet his uselessness may be neutralized by the general inferiority of the opponent's position.

In the present game, Black will have no compensation for the ineffectiveness of his Bishops.

(**e**) As already indicated, White would answer 6 . . . , P–B4 with 7 P–Q5.

(**f**) Black should have played 7 . . . , Kt–K5 in order to try to control K5. In this way he would prevent (at least temporarily) White's P–K4 and thus carry out the basic idea of the fianchetto.

(**g**) Q–B2 prevents . . . Kt–K5 and prepares P–K4. Thus Black has lost the fight for control of the centre. Once White achieves the broad Pawn centre he is playing for, he will threaten to disorganize Black's game still further with P–K5—a serious threat, considering that Black's Bishops are so poorly placed that his position offers little scope for constructive planning.

There is still another purpose behind 8 Q–B2! In view of the threatened P–K4–5, Black will have to counter with . . . P–K4. But White has made room for his Rook at Q1—where it will indirectly prevent . . . P–K4 or else exploit the newly-opened Q file.

(**h**) In line with the previous reply, we see that the Rook is played to Q1 to prevent . . . P–K4—for the time being, at any rate.

(**i**) Black wants to play . . . P–K4 in order to restrain White's ultimate P–K4–5, which would be the beginning of the end for him, in view of the extremely limited scope of his pieces.

*All his difficulties stem from the fact that he did not smash*

*White's centre with . . . P–B4, or (later on) exercise a restraining influence on it with . . . Kt–K5.*

(**j**) As already pointed out, Black has little choice: he cannot very well allow P–K5, in view of his decidedly inferior position. (Such an advance as the contemplated thrust of the KP might be considered risky in certain circumstances—where, for example, *Black's pieces were well posted and could later institute a counter-attack against the advanced Pawn.* This is clearly not the case here.)

(**k**) White exchanges Pawns in accordance with the general rule that *the better-developed side should play for the opening of lines; for this facilitates the deployment of the superior force at his disposal.*

In the given position, this rule inexorably takes either one of the following forms: (i) *Black gives up the centre, in which case White breaks through* and gains a decisive advantage in material; (ii) *Black holds the centre, but in order to do so, he allows the full opening of the Q file*—a great advantage for White.

(**l**) The recapture with the Pawn allows White to exert powerful pressure on the Q file.

The alternative 11 . . . , Kt×P? loses a piece after 12 Kt×Kt, R×Kt; 13 P–B4, R–K1; 14 P–K5!, B×B; 15 P×Kt! Here is a drastic instance of how superior development profits by the opening of lines.

(**m**) White threatened to increase the pressure with B–R3 and doubling on the Q file. The text only enhances Black's difficulties because it weakens his Q3 and makes it accessible to White's pieces. As played, the fatal aspect of White's occupation of Q6 consists in the fact that *on this square the White Rook attacks two pieces, and one of the menaced pieces has to guard the other threatened piece.*

(**n**) A better defence (better in the sense that it would avoid immediate material loss) was 12 . . ., Q–K2 (ridding himself of the pin on the Q file); 13 Kt–Q5, B×Kt (forced; if 13 . . ., Q–Q3??; 14 Kt×Ktch wins, while if 13 . . ., Q–Q1?; 14 Kt×Ktch, B×Kt; 15 B×B wins a piece); 14 BP×P and White's pressure on the backward QBP and his otherwise superior position assure him a fairly quick win.

(**o**) If 14 . . ., B–B1; 15 R–Q6, B–K2 (there is obviously nothing better, in view of the threatened tripling on the Q file); 16 B×Kt!, B×R (this is better than 16 . . ., B×B; 17 R–Q2, and now White threatens QR–Q1 as well as Kt×P: if 17 . . ., Q–B2; 18 Kt×P! just the same); 17 B×P and White comes out a Pawn ahead.

Yet even this cheerless prospect was preferable to the text.

(**p**) 15 . . ., B–Kt2 would remove the KB from attack, but then the pin would be fatal: 16 QR–Q1, B–QB1; 17 Q–Q2 and a piece falls.

(**q**) If 17 B×Kt, KR×B; 18 R×B, K–Kt2 and the White Rook is trapped. It is a well-known rule covering the process of exerting pressure in an open file, that a *decisive step should not be taken until the pressure has been increased to the utmost.* This is borne out by White's very next move.

*SUMMARY: Black's omission of any measures of constraint against White's centre completely nullified the strength of Black's Bishops and left Black with so cramped a position that the opening up of the Q file soon proved fatal. The process was facilitated by White's occupation of a weak point in the Q file, supplemented by a pin by no less than five pieces—a clear expression of the superb effectiveness of White's forces.*

# LESSON V

(**a**) There does not seem to be any need for P–B4 at the moment. The object might be to prevent . . . P–Q4—but Black rarely plays this move in the early stages of the Sicilian Defence.

(**b**) If White has nothing better than this move (and he should have been able to foresee such an eventuality three moves ago) then the utter superfluity of 3 P–B4 has been convincingly proved. There is no connection whatever between White's third move (which aims ostensibly at preventing Black from setting up a centre) and White's sixth move (which ostensibly permits Black to set up a good centre formation).

THE PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE AGAINST A WEAK PAWN
(Black's QRP and QBP are weak)

BLACK



WHITE

(From a game Rubinstein–Salwe, Lodz, 1908)

THE PLAY IN AN OPEN FILE AGAINST A WEAK SQUARE
(White's Q3 and Q4 are weak)

BLACK



WHITE

(From a game Salwe–Rubinstein, Carlsbad, 1907)

(**c**) After the normal-looking move 6 Kt–QB3, Black would continue with the troublesome reply 6 . . ., B–Kt5 indirectly menacing the KP and threatening in some eventualities to obtain a quick initiative.

(**d**) Black's chief reason for this move is that by opening up the Q file, he uncovers the weakness of White's Q4 (made a hole by White's third move) and also White's Q3, which has to be guarded by White's KB.

(**e**) The position of Black's King is certainly not risky, since the exchange of Queens eliminates any possible danger for the King. In the event of a check on the Q file, the King goes to B2.

The position of the King in the centre is certainly useful, as this piece is at least two squares nearer to the centre than it would be in the castled position (at KKt1). The Black King, as will soon be seen, has great potentialities (playing to QB4 after the necessary simplification and weakening of White's Pawn structure).

(**f**) P–B3 obviously *restricts the scope* of White's KB; for the more White Pawns that are placed on white squares, the less scope White's KB has. In addition to this limitation of scope, the KB is reduced to purely *defensive* functions. And finally, the squares of the remaining colour require more protection.

Note, however, that after Black's QB plays to K3 (after . . . P–K4) it will be *aggressively* posted (it will *attack* White's QBP).

(**g**) 8 P–K5 would be definitely disadvantageous, as the KP would be weak, and this in turn would bring other weaknesses in its train. Thus: 8 P–K5, Kt–Kt5; 9 P–B4 (not 9 B–B4, B–B4; 10 B–Kt3, B–Q5; or

10 P–B3?, Kt–B7 winning the exchange), B–B4 (again threatening to win the exchange); 10 B–K2, Kt–K6; 11 B×Kt, B×B and Black's two Bishops give him a strategically won game. This would be true even if White succeeds later on in exchanging his KB for Black's QB. The fact remains that Black's KB has enormous scope.

8 B–Kt5 (threatening P–K5) would doubtless be met by 8 . . . , P–KR3 forcing B×Ktch (in order to retain the KP). Again Black would have two strong Bishops and an open KKt file to boot. His doubled KBP would not be much of a weakness, as White will hardly be in a position to exploit it.

Note also that the disappearance of White's QB (his *good* Bishop) would weaken White's black squares, their chief protection being White's QB.

(**h**) The immediate object of . . . P–K4 is of course to allow for the development of Black's QB. Note that this does not essentially weaken Black's white squares, as his Q4 is still guarded by his QBP. Contrast this with the state of White's Q4, which is *unprotected by Pawns* and therefore a hole, i.e. it *must be protected by pieces.*

. . . P–K4 also has the effect of fixing White's KP on K4, an important link in the process of keeping White's KB in subjection.

(**i**) It is difficult to see what object this move has. It might have been played to prevent . . . B–Kt5ch —but why should Black want to play that move?

Or perhaps 10 P–QR3 was played in order to proceed with 11 P–QKt4—but in that event, the reply . . . P–QR4! would smash up White's Queen-side. This consideration is of great importance, because *Black's QB4 is a pivotal square for his pieces*, and hence its command and unhindered occupation are vital factors.

10 P–QR3 also has negative importance, however—it weakens White's Pawn position, as will be seen. The student should observe this effect with great care.

(**j**) As previously explained, it is very important for Black to occupy his QB4. His object at this point is to play . . . B–QB4 in order to bring about the elimination of White's *good* Bishop (his QB). This will mean that White's black squares will have lost their best and most natural protection. It will also mean that White will be left with his distinctly inferior KB. These two combined factors will make possible the advance of Black's King (it can now be seen that the King has potential points of invasion at QB4 and Q5; and while this projected invasion may never *materialize*, its potential existence acts as an intangible limitation on White's freedom of action).

(**k**) The intention here is to advance farther with . . . P–R5. This signifies the *artificial isolation* of White's QBP, inasmuch as the normal protective move P–QKt3 would no longer be available.

(**l**) While White could have prevented Black's next move with 12 P–QKt3, he refrains; mainly because the QRP then requires constant protection by the QR; or after an exchange of Bishops at Black's QB4, the White QKtP is constantly menaced by Black's Knight, which is firmly established by that time at Black's QB4.

(**m**) White's last move makes it impossible for him to avoid the exchange proposed by Black. It has already been shown that this exchange *leaves Black in control of the black squares, and also saddles White with the inferior KB.* Black's Knight can now operate on the black squares with no interference from the remaining White Bishop.

(**n**) The comparative scope of the Bishops is striking: White's Bishop is hardly better than a Pawn; it has hardly any moves; *at most it has defensive value*. Black's Bishop, on the other hand, is not hemmed in by Pawns; it is played to K3 as the result of a *free choice*, and not because it has no other square. In other words, Black has the initiative.

(**o**) White is "between the devil and the deep blue sea." If he tries to dispute the Q file by Kt–B1, then he allows . . . Kt–Kt6 and Black has his choice of occupying the wonderful square Q5 or of increasing the pressure on the QBP by . . . Kt–R4.

It should be noted also that since simplification only brings so much nearer an ultimate ending of Black's Bishop or Knight against White's Bishop (*definitely the inferior piece!*) it clearly follows that simplification has no charms for White.

(**p**) The disadvantages that White intends to alleviate with P–KKt3 and P–B4 are of course the lack of scope for his Bishop, and the presence of his Pawns on white squares.

(**q**) If 22 K–K2, B–Kt5ch; 23 K–K1 (not 23 K–B2, B×R; 24 R×B, R×Ktch and wins), B×R; 24 R×B, Kt×P; 25 Kt×Kt, R–K6ch, etc.

(**r**) Naturally White's KR cannot move, and Kt–B3 is impossible. But meanwhile Black threatens 23 . . ., B×R; 24 R×B, R×Ktch; 25 R×R, Kt×Pch and the King and Pawn ending is of course easily won.

(**s**) Black can simplify down to a King and Pawn ending at once, it is true; but the resulting ending, while it would be in his favour, does not seem to be won: White has enough defensive resource. The logical deduction is of course that one or two moves must first be interpolated *to create weaknesses in White's*

*Pawn position*; and this is exactly what Flohr now does.

(**t**) For White's KBP falls at once, after which White has no chance.

*SUMMARY: The things to be studied here are the way that Black operates on the open Q file; the way he creates and exploits weaknesses in the enemy's Pawn position; the way that he utilizes these positional advantages for steady and favourable simplification.*

(**a**) The other two most likely developments are: (i) 5 P–Q4 (5 P–B3 would very likely transpose into the text continuation), P–QKt4!; 6 B–Kt3, Kt×P; 7 Kt×Kt, P×Kt; 8 B–Q5 (but not 8 Q×P?, P–QB4; 9 Q–Q5, B–K3; 10 Q–B6ch, B–Q2; 11 Q–Q5, P–B5 winning a piece), R–Kt1; 9 Q×P, Kt–B3 and Black's game is quite satisfactory.

Or (ii) 5 B×Ktch, P×B; 6 P–Q4, as in Lesson II.

(**b**) The underlying idea behind this move is that Black means to "hold the centre"; White's P–Q4 will definitely *not* be answered by . . . P×P. But after P–Q4, White will menace the pinned Knight with P–Q5; hence the text, which relieves the pin.

(**c**) 5 . . . , P–B4 seems rather dubious on the face of it, as it opens up the game at a stage where White has already castled and has two minor pieces in play, whereas Black has brought out only one—which is pinned!

Our suspicions are confirmed when we see that after 5 . . . , P–B4; 6 P–Q4! White opens up the game still more advantageously: if now 6 . . . , KP×P?; 7 Kt×P; or 6 . . . , BP×P; 7 Kt–Kt5 (the simplest; complicated but less conclusive is 7 Kt×P!; P×Kt, 8 Q–R5ch, K–K2; 9 B–Kt5ch, Kt–B3; 10 B×Kt, P×B; 11 P×P, Q–Q4!; 12 B–R4!, K–K3!; 13 B×Kt!, P×B; 14 Q–K8ch, K–B4; 15 Q–R5ch, with perpetual check!).

(**d**) 6 P–Q4 is answered by 6 . . . , P–QKt4 (note how this useful interpolation is made possible for the second time by Black's third move); 7 B–Kt3, Kt×P; Kt×Kt, P×Kt; and since 9 Q×P? loses a piece

(9 . . . , P–QB4!), White must have recourse to the gambit attack 9 P–QB3.

6 P–B4 is probably the most promising move available. It prevents . . . P–QKt4 and thus prepares for P–Q4. Also, in the event of 6 . . . , P–B4; 7 P×P, B×P; 8 P–Q4 leaves Black's position too exposed.

However, Black can answer 6 P–B4 with 6 . . . , P–KKt3; 7 P–Q4, B–Kt2 with a playable game.

(**e**) The continuation of Black's development with . . . Kt–B3 and . . . B–K2 is colourless and leaves Black with no play in the K file and little scope for his KB and consequently no future for his Queen.

The intended fianchetto development, on the other hand, indicates a future for Black's KB (pressure on White's Pawn centre), play in the K file by . . . R–K1 and/or . . . Q–K2, and is thus more promising than the alternative continuation just examined.

(**f**) The drawback inherent in the text stems from the fact that it opens the Q file for Black. In addition a vulnerable square in White's camp (Q3) is exposed to attack. In order to shield this square from Black's pieces, White later undertakes a manoeuvre (see his 16th and 17th moves) to block the Q file; but this proves unavailing.

(**g**) Black could castle directly; but this would permit the enemy to post the QB very strongly at QB5. True, the Bishop could be driven away later; but this would require time and effort, and hence it is better to prevent the invasion from the very beginning.

(**h**) The purpose of this move is to prevent Black's castling because of the reply B–B5; but since it is obvious that Black will parry this threat with . . . P–Kt3, the only effect of the injudicious advance is to *weaken White's Queen-side Pawns.*

As for the possibility of any alternative line, there can really be no constructive plan. There seems to be nothing better than moving the Queen in preparation for disputing the Q file and adopting a waiting policy without weakening the position any further. Loss of the initiative is not necessarily fatal; loss of the initiative *plus* weaknesses are too much of a handicap to overcome.

(**i**) 12 P–KR3 is played to prevent . . . Kt–Kt5, exchanging the Knight for the QB. The Pawn move is frequently played in analogous positions for the same reason. It is important for White to prevent this exchange, as his Knights have pitiably slight scope.

(**j**) Black begins an attack on the Queen-side Pawns, in the hope of inducing P×P, after which Black has an open QR file and White's QRP and QBP are weak and readily subject to attack; or else Black hopes to induce the reply P–Kt5.

WHITE IS VULNERABLE ON THE QUEEN-SIDE

BLACK (Alekhine)



WHITE (Sergeant)

(After 14 P–Kt5)

WHITE HAS A LOST ENDING

BLACK



WHITE

(From a consultation game Kashdan–Alekhine, New York, 1933)

(**k**) This is clearly advantageous for Black, for with this and the next move, White places additional Pawns on white squares; this means that *he is decreasing the scope of his KB* (the Pawns on white squares are in its way!); in addition, as White's Pawns move on to white squares, he loses command of the black squares. This is effectively brought out by the following journey of Black's QKt, culminating on the splendid square QB4.

With the above considerations in mind, one sees that 14 P–R3 was better; for then the KB retains all the mobility now available to it, and at the same time White's hold on the black squares is undiminished (Black's Kt cannot occupy QB4!). However, this line of play would still leave the initiative in Black's hands. There are several promising manoeuvres at his disposal, such as doubling Rooks on the QR file, or . . . Kt–R4–B5, or . . . Kt–R2–B1–Q3. Nevertheless, reviewing the first paragraph in this answer, you will observe that 14 P–Kt5 is more disadvantageous than the suggested alternative 14 P–R3.

. (**l**) 15 P–B4 would be even worse, as it would close the KB's diagonal and also expose White's Q4 (which would now be a "hole") to the danger of invasion by Black's Knights. See answer (**f**) and the first paragraph of answer (**k**).

(**m**) The exchange of White's QB will leave him with the more ineffective of his two Bishops, as the remaining Bishop will be sorely overworked. White is aware of this difficulty and accordingly attempts to post the KB aggressively—but the disadvantage cannot be minimized.

(**n**) With proper play on White's part (20 Q–B2) he *must guard the Pawns on his white squares*. Instead, White embarks on combinative plans.

(**o**) Naturally Alekhine does not snap at the exchange, for if 20 . . . , Kt–Kt6?; 21 Q×P, Kt×R (or 21 . . . , B–Kt2; 22 Q×P threatening Kt–Kt5); 22 Q×Pch, K–R1 (not 22 . . . , B–Kt2?; 23 Kt–Kt5, KR–K1; 24 B×Pch and Black must resign); 23 Q–R6ch with perpetual check.

(**p**) We have already seen from some of the previous answers that White has the inferior game, because of the need for protecting his Pawns on white squares. Had he now played 21 Q–B2, his difficulties would have been intensified by the loss of time involved. However, Black would not have so radical a solution of his problems.

(**q**) If (i) 23 KR–R1, B×R; 24 R×B, P–QKt4 regaining the piece with the exchange ahead; (ii) 23 R–R2, R×B!; 24 P×R, B×Kt and Black regains the exchange, remaining two Pawns ahead; (iii) 23 Kt–Kt2, B×QR; 24 Kt×B, Q–R6; 25 B–B6, R–Q3; 26 B–Kt5, P–B3 and White must lose a piece, remaining with the exchange down.

Black's "sacrifice" of the exchange has been well worth while, as his Bishops are in powerful play, he has two Pawns compensation and will soon annex a third, and one of his Pawns is already passed.

(**r**) 25 KR–K1 puts up a somewhat better fight: 25 . . . , R–K1; 26 QR–Q1, P–K5; 27 Kt–R2 (a sorry retreat, but he must keep the QP protected), B–Q6. Black's Bishops dominate the board, and he will soon win another Pawn.

(**s**) If 28 Q–K3, R×P with a clearly winning position.

*SUMMARY: Contrast White's planless play (extemporizing from move to move) with the purposeful way Black's pieces operate after* 21 . . . , *Kt×RP!!*

(**a**) On K2 the KB is hemmed in by Pawns on the same colour (Q3, K4) and therefore has purely defensive functions.

At QB4 the KB is posted aggressively on a free diagonal; this naturally makes the text an attractive move.

(**b**) Paradoxically, the development of the KB at K2 is not so objectionable as it seems at first sight; the KB, it is true, has only defensive functions, *but that is all that Black has a right to expect in the early stages.* At all events, the KB is not exposed to attack at K2, and at the same time rules out the possibility of a pin by B–KKt5.

The "beautifully developed" KB at QB4, however, is bound to encounter difficulties: it is obviously exposed to attack by P–B3 and P–Q4, or else it looks on idly while White exercises a troublesome pin on Black's KKt.

The KB is posted on what seems to be a good diagonal. Yet, as the whole trend of Black's game in this opening is passive (at least for some time to come), the KB is useless *and does not co-operate with the other Black pieces.*

An accurate and vivid term for such inharmonious but superficially attractive development is *pseudo-development.*

(**c**) At first sight it seems that White can now win a Pawn by 5 B×Kt, QP×B; 6 Kt×P, as the reply 6 . . ., Kt×P seems too dangerous, whilst 6 . . ., Q–Q5? is definitely out of the question because of 7 Kt–KB3. However, 6 . . ., Kt×P is quite playable,

for if then 7 Q–K2, Q–Q4! gains valuable time: 8 Kt–KB3, O–O, etc.

(**d**) White was now threatening to win a Pawn, as his KP was amply protected by his last move.

(**e**) With 6 P–Q4! White furthers his development without loss of time, and also takes the initiative because his strengthening of the pin (recall what was said about the *necessarily defensive nature* of Black's game) puts Black on the defensive.

Note by the way that Black cannot *hold the centre*: 6 . . . , B–Kt3?; 7 P–Q5, P–QR3; 8 B–R4 winning a piece.

(**f**) Black could take the sting out of the pin on his QKt by 7 . . . , B×Kt; but, in that event, he facilitates White's development, and in a move or two he will be faced by the unpleasant threat B–Kt5 followed by Kt–Q5, ripping up Black's King-side.

So Black decides to retain his precious KB—not that it will be of any use to him.

AN ANNOYING PIN FOR BLACK

BLACK (Allies)



WHITE (Lasker)

(After 9 B–Kt5!)

(**g**) If 8 . . . , O–O; 9 B–Kt5 with the strong positional threat of leaving Black's Pawn position in a fearful state by 10 Kt×B, P×Kt; 11 QB×Kt, P×B (not . . . Q×B, as the Bishop must be protected).

Black would then be embarrassed for a good reply: if 9 . . . , B–Kt3; 10 Kt–Q5 (how sadly the KB is missed at K2 !) with virtually a winning position. Or 9 . . . , B–K3 (to capture the Knight if it goes to Q5); 10 Kt×B, P×Kt; 11 KB×Kt and Black's Pawn position will surely cost him the game (all the result of the venturesome KB's having come out too far).

(**h**) This pin involves the threat of Kt–Q5, crippling Black's position and fatally exposing Black's King in the event of castling. All the difficulty arising from this pin is of course due to the incorrect development of the KB to QB4.

(**i**) The general aim of the text is to bring about an exchange; *when a player has a cramped game, exchanges are generally useful to him.* As explained in another Lesson, *one's pieces cannot function at their most efficient level in a cramped position;* they are therefore being exchanged for pieces of equivalent value *which have more scope.* Or, put it this way: *a defensive* (*passive*) piece is being exchanged for an *aggressive* (*active*) piece. Clearly the transaction helps the man with the cramped game.

An example of how thoughtless exchanges might free Black's game may be seen from this plausible line of play: 10 B×Bch, Kt(4)×B; 11 Kt–Q5, P–KR3; 12 B–R4, P–Kt4; 13 B–Kt3, O–O (. . . Kt×P? is much too dangerous) and Black has a playable game despite the weakening of his King-side.

(**j**) 10 P–QR4 ! has several good points—

(i) It frees White's QKt from the defence of the KB, and thus makes it possible to avoid B×Bch.

(ii) It establishes a potential threat against Black's misplaced KB (P–R5 in certain eventualities).

(iii) In the event that Black plays . . . B×B, White will reply P×B ! with an open QR file operating against a backward QRP.

(iv) The text also makes possible, as you will see, an amazingly rapid and effective participation of White's QR in a powerful attack.

(**k**) As a result of this exchange, White gains the open QR file.

10 . . ., P–B3 can hardly be any better, since it creates a weak QP which requires constant attention.

(**l**) It is now clear that Black's KB must remain at its present post to guard the QRP. But this means that White can now post his KKt (at present poorly placed at Kt3) at the beautiful square KB5. Watch how this works out.

(**m**) Black intends to answer 12 B–R4 with . . . Kt–Kt3.

(**n**) When Black castles later, the advance of the KRP may be troublesome for him. As you know, *the advance of a Pawn in front of the castled King creates a target, and is thus likely to facilitate the enemy's attack.*

(**o**) 12 . . ., P×B has several drawbacks: it makes it virtually impossible for Black's King to castle on either wing, and it allows White to post his Knights in particularly menacing fashion at Q5 and KB5.

(**p**) If 14 . . ., B×Kt; 15 Q×B and White wins a Pawn by force; if Black stops to protect the QRP, there follows 16 P–KB4. If 14 . . ., P–Kt3, Black succeeds in keeping the Knight out of KB5, but only at the cost of weakening his game still further (and his Bishop would not be on hand to defend the weak black squares !).

(**q**) White was already threatening, you see, to play R–R3–KKt3. Note how strongly the Knight is placed at KB5. It not only menaces Black's castled position, but also exerts pressure in the centre. In combination with the *centralized Knight* at Q5, this pressure is indeed powerful.

(**r**) . . . P–KB3 is open to the objection that it weakens the white squares (particularly Black's KKt3 and K3). This is a serious weakness, as the QB (which would normally guard these squares) was exchanged quite some time ago.

(**s**) 16 . . . , P–QB3 would be bad because it would leave a weak Pawn on the open Q file (general principle). This Pawn would as a matter of fact be lost at once: 17 P×P, P×P; 18 Kt×B, Q×Kt; 19 Q×P, Q×P?; 20 R–QKt3 winning a piece; or 17 P×P, Kt×P; 18 Kt×B, Q×Kt; 19 Q×P, Q×P; 20 R–QKt3, Q×P; 21 R–Kt3, P–KKt3 (if 21 . . . , R–KKt1; 22 R×Pch!!); 22 R×P!! and wins (specific analysis).

WHAT IS BLACK'S BEST DEFENCE?

BLACK (Allies)



WHITE (Lasker)

(After 17 R–KKt3)

16 . . . , P–Kt3 results in a dangerous weakening of the castled King's position (general principle). There would follow: 17 R–R3!, P–KR4 (if 17 . . . , P×Kt; 18 Q–R5 wins); 18 R×Pch!, P×R (if 18 . . . , K–Kt1?; 19 Kt(Q5)–K7ch is crushing); 19 Q×Pch, K–Kt1; 20 Q–R6 and mate is unavoidable (specific analysis).

(**t**) . . . P–Kt3, as you have already seen, weakens Black's King-side. There would follow 18 R–KR3! with the following possibilities—

(i) 18 . . . , P×Kt; 19 Q–R5 (threatening 20 Q×Pch and 21 Q–R7 mate), Kt–B2 (if 19 . . . , R–K1; 20 Q×RPch, K–Kt1; 21 P×P and wins; or 19 . . . , K–Kt2; 20 R–Kt3ch, Kt–Kt5; 21 Q×P and wins); 20 P×P! and wins, as there is no good reply to the threatened Q–Kt6ch.

(ii) 18 . . . , P–KR4?; 19 R×Pch!, P×R; 20 Q×Pch, K–Kt1; 21 Kt(Q5)–K7ch and wins.

(iii) 18 . . . , Kt–B2; 19 Kt–Q4 and White has a strong initiative. This seems to have been Black's relatively best course.

An even simpler and stronger reply to 17 . . . , P–Kt3 might well be 18 Kt×B, RP×Kt; 19 P–KB4!

It is interesting to observe how White's play in the above variation centres around *the white squares* and the *other weaknesses created by Black's Pawn weaknesses.*

(**u**) White threatens 19 Kt×KtP, smashing up Black's King-side (if 19 . . . , R×Kt; 20 R×Rch, K×R; 21 Kt–K6ch: this may also be played in the following order: 19 R×Pch, R×R; 20 Kt×R and again Black cannot retake).

(**v**) White intends to continue with 20 R–KR3 and 21 Kt×RP. Note how he hammers away at the *Pawn weaknesses.*

(**w**) If now 20 . . . , Q×Kt; 21 R×Pch!, R×R; 22 Q×Pch and mate next move.

(**x**) If 21 . . . either R×Kt; 22 R×Rch, R×R; 23 Kt–B8ch winning the Queen. Meanwhile Black is helpless against 22 Q×Pch!!, K×Q; 23 Kt–B5ch, K–R2 (if 23 . . . , K–R4; 24 Kt–B4 mate!); 24 R–R3ch, K–Kt3; 25 R–R6 mate! But the Allies avoid either of these exquisite finishes, and thus we have another "dull modern" game!

*SUMMARY: Black's* pseudo-development *of the KB kept this piece out of play for the whole game.* White centralized *his Knights formidably, provoked weakening Pawn moves, and in this way laid the basis for a brilliant sacrificial win.*

(**a**) 6 Kt–B3 allows the weakening of White's Queenside formation by 6 . . . , B×Ktch. Black then "fixes" the doubled QBP by playing . . . P–B4, with the idea of playing . . . Kt–B3–R4, . . . B–R3, . . . QR–B1, etc., in the middle game. The White Pawn at QB4 would be all the weaker because it is not defended by White's KB.

(**b**) 7 QKt×B is by no means so effective as 7 Q×B. The idea behind the latter move is that the Knight is placed more strongly at QB3 than at Q2. At Q2 the Knight blocks the Q file and also lacks command of the important square Q5.

(**c**) Had White played 7 Q×B and 8 Kt–B3, Black's last move (8 . . . , P–B4) could be answered by 9 P–Q5, P×P; 10 Kt–KR4 and White recovers the Pawn with a considerable advantage in terrain (10 . . . , Kt–K5 can be answered by 11 Q–B2 or 11 Kt×Kt, P×Kt; 12 Kt–B5 !).

But as you see, with White's QKt at Q2 in the text position, 9 P–Q5 is not feasible (9 P–Q5?, P×P; 10 Kt–KR4, B–B3 ! and Black retains the Pawn). Here we have one example of the inferiority of 7 QKt×B.

(**d**) White has little choice. If 10 P–K3?, P×P; 11 P×P, P–Q4 ! and White will be left with a weak centre and weak white squares.

Or if 10 Kt–Kt3, P–Q3 and White's QKt is very badly out of play. 10 Q–B3 is possibly best, but then Black could simplify (if so minded) by 10 . . . , P×P; 11 Kt×P, Kt×Kt !; 12 Q×Kt (forced), B×B; 13 K×B, P–Q4, and Black is none the worse off.

In the above variations, we can again see how White is hampered by the position of his QKt on Q2 instead of on QB3. His inability to command Q5 adequately and to operate on the Q file allows Black to get a good position with little effort.

(**e**) By means of the foregoing exchange, Black has stabilized the Pawn position in the centre to his own advantage; once he plays . . . P–Q3, he has provided support for his Kts at K4 and Q5, and has ample manoeuvring room on the second rank. In addition, he has opened the QKt file, which will be useful for the purpose of exerting pressure on White's QKtP.

One would think that White has also profited by the foregoing exchange, but this is not the case. He has obtained an open Q file, which indicates the policy of doubling his Rs on the Q file in order to attack the hostile QP. But in the first place, this is a laborious process (again the inferior position of White's QKt makes itself felt!) and, secondly, the "weak" QP can be defended rather easily (. . . KR–Q1, . . . Kt–K1, etc.).

Nor has White's Pawn position benefited from the exchange. The QKtP, as already mentioned, will soon be observed by Black's QR on the QKt file. As for White's central Pawn position, it offers no prospects of any kind, for P–K4 would signify a permanent loss of command over White's Q4, which would thereafter have to be *protected by pieces.*

(**f**) The bad features of this move have been set forth in the previous paragraph. As already stated, White should have played to double his Rs on the Q file. While this manoeuvre should not achieve a positive result, it would at least not give Black a free hand, as does the text.

(**g**) Black's last move had only a psychological meaning—namely, it is a waiting move, played so as to see how White will proceed.

White's reply 14 P–QR3 may have been played with the same subjective motivation as 13 . . . , P–KR3. But after the text, the QKtP can no longer be protected by Pawns (as after P–Kt3), but must now be *protected by pieces*.

Thus White has already created two defensive tasks for his pieces: protection of the square Q4 and of the backward QKtP.

(**h**) This ties White's QKt down to its present square, for if 15 Kt–Kt1 (in order to clear the Q file and play the Kt to the more useful square QB3), then 15 . . . , Kt(Q2)–K4! threatening . . . Kt×Ktch followed by . . . Kt–Q5. The power of such a *centrally placed Knight* is enormous, as will be seen later on in this game.

(**i**) This restrains a possible advance of the QKtP later on, so that White cannot seek to eliminate this weakness.

(**j**) This move has the function of driving back the Knight at once, so that White cannot gain more terrain with P–B4. It is as yet too early to play . . . Kt–Q5, as the QKt could not be maintained there.

(**k**) If 17 . . . , P×Kt; 18 Q×RP, Q–Q1 (or 18 . . . , KR–K1; 19 P×P, followed by R–B3–Kt3ch); 19 P–K5, QP×P; 20 R–K4. Or 19 . . . , KKt×P (instead of 19 . . . , P×P); 20 P×P followed by R–B3–Kt3ch.

(**l**) As previously forecast, Black keeps the QKtP under observation. Black thus strengthens his initiative: he keeps an eye on the QKtP because he *wants* to, whilst White keeps an eye on the QKtP because he *has* to.

(**m**) This is bad, for as we have already seen (discussion of Black's 14th move) the QKt is needed to back up his colleague on KB3, if Black is to be restrained from occupying White's Q4.

(**n**) This not only accentuates the weakness of the QKtP, but allows the entry of Black's Knight without any struggle whatever. Hence White should have returned his QKt to Q2.

(**o**) 24 Kt–Q2 suggests itself, in order to protect the long diagonal by the continued presence of the Bishop and at the same time to guard the QKtP. But then follows 24 . . . , P–B4 !, 25 P×P (Black threatened to win a P by . . . Kt×Bch followed by the capture of the KP), B×B; 26 Kt×B, R×KtP, etc. Or 25 B–Kt2, P–B5 with a winning position.

If 24 R–B3, Kt×Bch; 25 Q×Kt, P–B4 wins a Pawn.

BLACK'S BISHOP IS STRONG: WHITE'S BISHOP IS WEAK

BLACK (Khan)



WHITE (Soultainbeieff)

(After 24 . . . , P–B4 !)

(**p**) . . . P–B4 ! is certainly the logical move, as it opens up the long diagonal and the KB file for Black,

making possible a fatal convergence on White's weak KB3. With Black's Knight, Bishop and Rooks trained on this square, White's capitulation cannot be far off.

Incidentally, the manner in which Black's Knight strikes both at KB6 and the weak QKtP is an indication of the vast and concentrated power exerted by a centrally posted Knight.

(**q**) About the only alternative worth mentioning is 25 P–B3. This would hold out longer than the text; but after 25 . . . , P–B5 ! (making possible a concentrated attack on the weak KBP by Black's Rooks) White's game would be hopeless. Play this out.

(**r**) If 28 Q–K1, Q–QKt2 ! (threatening . . . R×Pch ! and thus utilizing his powerful position on the long diagonal); 29 B×R, Kt×Bch; 30 R×Kt, Q×R and wins. The same holds good for 28 Q–Q2.

(**s**) White's Queen has only two squares. If 29 Q–Q2, R×R; 30 Q×R, Kt–K7ch or 30 Kt×R, Kt–B6ch. The same piquant possibilities obtain after 29 Q–K1.

*SUMMARY: In replaying, note that White's play is of an improvisatory character, lacking foresight and coherence. Black's play, on the other hand, is clearly based on definite objectives.*

(**a**) Black fears that if he continues along the regular lines of the Meran Defence, he will run into difficulties after 5 . . ., QKt–Q2; 6 B–Q3, P×P; 7 B×BP, P–QKt4; 8 B–Q3, and now after Black prepares for . . . P–B4 (a necessary freeing move) with 8 . . ., P–QR3, White plays the formidable 9 P–K4.

There is a great deal of complicated analysis on this variation, but present opinion holds that White gets the advantage after 9 . . ., P–B4; 10 P–K5, P×P; 11 Kt×KtP, Kt×P; 12 Kt×Kt, P×Kt; 13 Q–B3. Without studying this complicated variation in detail, we can understand why Black plays the much simpler text: as the game goes, he at once advances his QBP, with a pressure in the centre which takes the sting out of P–K4.

(**b**) The text might result in a weakness on the black squares if White now answered 6 P–B5. White's strategy would then be to restrain the freeing advances . . . P–K4 or . . . P–QKt3, or to exploit them in some way once they are played. A plausible example would be: 6 . . ., QKt–Q2; 7 B–Q2, P–QKt3; 8 P×P, Kt×P; 9 Kt–QR4 (threatening B–R5), etc. Black is now on the defensive on the Queen-side, his Pawn structure there being weak.

Once Black accomplishes the removal of the cramping White QBP, he must try to play . . . P–QB4, *so as not to be left with a backward QBP.*

(**c**) . . . Q–B2 may later have the possible drawback of exposing the Queen to the attack of a White Rook on the QB file; however, Black's development is so good that he can chance this inconvenience.

(**d**) The manoeuvre beginning with P–QR4 is ordinarily a good one; but here it would be ineffectual. The continuation would be 12 . . . , P–B5! (usually this is not good because it relinquishes command of the centre); 13 B–Kt1 (not 13 B–B2?, P–Kt5 winning a piece), P–Kt5; 14 Kt–R2, R–B1; 15 P–K4, P–K4; 16 P–Q5, B–Q3 (Dake–Reinfeld, New York, 1933), and Black has a splendid position.

(**e**) White's motivation for this exchange must be along these lines: the position of his QKt and KB is insecure (as we have seen from the previous answer); his QB has no future. Black's Bishops, on the other hand, have beautiful diagonals, and in a move or two (after castling) Black will be ready to play . . . P–B5, *establishing the Queen-side majority of Pawns.* It is only natural for White to conclude that he must open up the centre and try to take advantage of the absence of Black's Rooks from that sector.

(**f**) If now 14 . . . , Kt×B; 15 Kt×P?, Black, to be sure, cannot reply 15 . . . , Kt×R? because of 16 Kt×Q *check.* But Black can play 15 . . . , Q–Q2!, 16 Kt×Bch (if 16 Q×Kt?, B×Pch!), Q×Kt; 17 B–B3, Kt×R!

Hence: White cannot answer 14 . . . , Kt×B with 15 Kt×P. It is worth pointing out that in calculating such a series of exchanges, you must always be on the look-out for a *breaking of the chain by an interpolated check or any other attack which demands prior consideration.*

(**g**) Black cannot win a Pawn by 14 . . . , Kt×B; 15 Q×Kt, B×Kt; 16 P×B, B×Pch; 17 K–Kt2; for no matter how he plays, the double threat of 18 P–B4 or 18 Kt×P regains the Pawn. His decision to castle is therefore a wise one, as he prefers to avoid complications while his development is incomplete.

(**h**) If 15 Kt×P, P×Kt; 16 P–QKt4, R×P; 18 P×Kt, B×P; 19 B×P, R–Q1, and Black definitely has the initiative.

(**i**) If 15 . . ., B×Kt; 16 Q×B, B×Pch; 17 K–R1, and the double threat of 18 P–KKt3 or 18 Kt×P regains the Pawn.

But Black's last move finally removes the Queen from the dangerous QB file.

Observe that while the last five moves or so have gone off rather quietly in the game, they have involved quite a few difficult decisions!

(**j**) P–QKt4? creates two weaknesses: (i) it fixes the QKtP on a black square, where it can be threatened later on by Black's KB; (ii) it creates a bad weakness at White's QB4, which is on an open file and thus accessible to Black's pieces.

Black's general policy will be *to play for as many exchanges as possible, in order to exploit these weaknesses the more easily.*

(**k**) Black recaptures with his QB in order to force the exchange of the White Bishop *which commands the white squares and more particularly White's QB4.*

(**l**) The exchange of Black's Knight for White's Bishop leaves Black with a Bishop which has considerably more scope than White's Knight. The reason for this is that the Knight cannot be *centralized* permanently at the effective square Q4, as it can be driven away by . . . P–K4. The Bishop, on the other hand, has the choice of the diagonal KB1–QR6 (attacking White's QKtP) or KR1–QR8 (the long diagonal, on which it is posted most powerfully, as you shall see).

(**m**) Black threatens to win the Queen with . . . B×Pch; thus he occupies the Q file without any loss of time.

(**n**) You can now see that Black is simplifying in order to gain control of one of the centre files, after which he can penetrate into White's game because of his superior mobility; remember that the *need of protecting the QKtP* hampers White's mobility to a certain extent.

(**o**) Black now has control of the QB file; after due preparation, he will advance his control to the extent of playing . . . Q–B5 or . . . Q–B6, with a decisive strengthening of the pressure.

(**p**) In the endings with the heavy pieces, it is always advisable to create a loophole for one's King, to avoid variations in which a *mating threat on the last rank* may force material gain or other advantage.

(**q**) P–R3 is necessary in order to lend the QKtP more protection. It changes Black's task to the extent that invasion on the sixth (instead of the seventh) rank will now be called for.

If 25 P–QR4, Black plays 25 . . . , P–Kt3, followed by . . . Q–B5 and the QKtP soon falls. A good example of what was said in the previous answer would arise after 25 P–QR4, Q–B5?; 26 Q×Q, R×Q; 27 R–Q7!, B–B3; 28 R–R7, and White has at least a draw; or 27 . . . , B–B1; 28 P×P, P×P; 29 Kt–K5, likewise with at least a draw. This shows how easily one may *lose the initiative* by attempting to *utilize an advantage prematurely*.

(**r**) . . . P–Kt3 is clearly played with a view to removing any possible mating threat on the last rank.

It is better than . . . P–R3 because in a few moves Black will begin to limit the mobility of the Knight by appropriate Pawn moves. Thus, if the Knight is on Q4, Black plays . . . P–K4 and the Knight cannot play to KB5, but must retreat. (It turns out that

as the game actually goes, Black need not adopt that process.)

(**s**) Black forces a winning ending on the basis of the following advantages: (i) his Rook commands an *open file* and can attack the weak QRP, whereas White's Rook is *purely passive*; (ii) the Bishop is far more active than the Knight (note that all of *Black's Pawns are on the opposite colour*, so that the Bishop has plenty of scope); (iii) White's Pawn position has distinct and irrevocable weaknesses.

BLACK FORCES A WINNING ENDING

BLACK (Euwe)



WHITE (Piazzini)

(After 26 . . . , Q–B6!)

(**t**) If 27 R–Kt1, Q×Q; 28 R×Q (if 28 Kt×Q, R–B7; 29 K–B1, B–B3; 30 Kt–Q4, B×Kt; 31 P×B, R–Q7 wins; or 29 R–R1, B–B3 and White must either allow the fatal . . . R–R7 or play 30 Kt–Q4, permitting . . . B×Kt, etc.), R–B8ch! (driving the White King away from the protection of the BP); 29 K–R2, P–K4! (cutting down the mobility of the Knight); 30 Kt–B3 (if 30 Kt–K2?, R–B7), P–K5; 31 Kt–Q4 (if 31 Kt–Q2, B–Q3ch!; 32 P–Kt3, P–B4; 33 K–Kt2,

R–B7; 34 Kt–Kt1, B–K4! and the invasion of Black's King by . . . K–B2–K3–Q4–B5 decides the issue), B–Q3ch! (forcing White's reply and thus cutting down the mobility of White's King); 32 P–Kt3, B–K4 followed by 33 . . ., B×Kt; 34 P×B, R–Q8 and wins.

Note the enormous strength of Black's Rook, and the decided superiority of the Bishop over the Knight, whose mobility has been systematically reduced. If 27 Q–R2, R–Q1 and the threatened . . . P–K4 (or in some cases . . . B–B3) forces a winning invasion of the seventh rank.

(**u**) If 29 Kt–B3 or Kt–K2, R×KP! wins a Pawn —another example of the power of the Bishop.

If 29 R–R2, B×Kt; 30 P×B, R–Q6 and wins.

(**v**) White hopes to be able to exchange as many Pawns as possible, this being his best drawing chance. If he can dissolve all the Pawns on the Queen-side, he will have good drawing chances (despite his Pawn down) with all the remaining Pawns on one side of the board.

The theoretical basis for this is that *the weaker side has less ground and less weaknesses to protect.*

(**w**) If 30 . . ., R–Q6?; 31 P×P, P×P; 32 R–R5 and the game is drawn.

(**x**) If 32 R–Kt1, R×QP followed by the march of Black's King to QB5 with an easy win.

(**y**) The check drives White's King away from the centre. Thus White loses valuable time getting to the important zone.

(**z**) Black will advance the QKtP as far as is consonant with its safety, threatening to queen it. He will then play his King to QB5 or QB6 to carry out the queening menace. *White's Rook will be tied up by*

*this threat;* and even if it captures one (or even two) of Black's King-side Pawns, that will be irrelevant.

(**aa**) Black plays 43 . . . , R–Kt7ch, forcing 44 K–K3 and thus making 44 . . . , R–B7 possible.

(**bb**) Black threatens . . . P–Kt7 winning at once.

In addition, he cuts off White's King irretrievably from any advance beyond the KB file. Thus the QKtP's advance is definitely assured.

(**cc**) 44 K–B4 seems better, for it prevents (or seems to) the manoeuvre . . . R–K4–QKt4. But Black plays 44 . . . , P–Kt4ch; 45 K–B5, R–K7!; 46 P–Kt4, P–Kt7; 47 P–B3, K–B6 (threatening . . . R–K8) and White is helpless: 48 R–B7ch, K–Q7; 49 R–Q7ch, K–B8; 50 R–B7ch, R–B7, etc.

(**dd**) Black threatens . . . R–Kt4 assuring the advance of the QKtP.

*SUMMARY: White created a weakness on the QB file and a weak Pawn structure with* 16 *P–QKt4? Black thereupon simplified to assure himself control of the QB file and effective play against the weak Pawn structure. He also undermined the effectiveness of White's Knight. These two combined processes led to the decisive win of a Pawn.*

# LESSON X

BLACK CONTROLS THE CENTRE WITH HIS QP

BLACK



WHITE

(Classical Method)

BLACK CONTROLS THE CENTRE WITH HIS PIECES

BLACK



WHITE

(Hypermodern Method)

(**a**) In the position arrived at after White's third move, he threatens to advance with P–K4, monopolizing the centre and driving back Black's pieces (by P–K5, for example).

It is therefore generally conceded that Black must exercise enough pressure on his K5 to prevent the immediate 4 P–K4, and the move almost invariably played for this purpose was 3 . . ., P–Q4. Here White's further expansion in the centre is prevented by the *classical* method of *Pawn-occupation of the centre.*

3 . . ., B–Kt5 has the same function, but it exemplifies the *hypermodern* method of *indirect control of the centre with pieces* (pinning of White's QKt).

3 . . ., B–Kt5 also gives Black far more options (he may continue to control the centre with pieces,

or he may play . . . P–Q4 later on, or he may set up the Pawn-formation Q3 and K4).

(**b**) The exchange of the Bishop for the Knight doubles White's QBP and makes it a weakness, as it requires protection against such manoeuvres as . . . Kt–QB3–R4, or . . . P–QKt3 and . . . B–R3, or . . . P–QB4 (fixing White's QBP so that it cannot possibly be dissolved by P–B5) followed by . . . QR–B1 and . . . P×P, opening up an attack by the QR on the QBP. An alarming picture of the QBP's feebleness!

(**c**) White's chief compensation for the potential weakness of the QBP is his likelihood of obtaining a *powerful centre*. If he can succeed in playing P–K4, he will have the "classical" centre made up of Pawns at K4, Q4 and QB3. In that event, he has considerable play in the centre, in some eventualities threatening P–K5 with direct attacking possibilities. Should Black play . . . P–K4 in order to stop the further advance of White's KP, then the latter still has good attacking chances by playing for the opening of the KB file with P–KB4.

(**d**) As we have just seen, White's natural policy will be to play for P–K4. As Black does not wish to allow the subsequent further advance (P–K5), he naturally takes steps to make . . . P–K4 possible.

(**e**) B–R3 is played to prevent . . . P–K4 at least temporarily, and also with the idea of possibly ridding himself of the doubled QBP by P–B5.

(**f**) Not only does . . . P–B4 interrupt the Bishop's diagonal; it *fixes* White's Pawn at QB4, thus preparing for subsequent manoeuvres against that Pawn.

(**g**) One would have expected White to continue P–K4 followed by B–Q3, etc. But in that event, Black's Bishop would soon come to QR3 and attack

the QBP. Evidently, White hopes that if he decides on the fianchetto development, his opponent will be reluctant to leave the long diagonal in White's control; hence Black adopts a counter-fianchetto, after which White can bring about an exchange of Bishops by moving his Knight. Thus the QBP's worst enemy will have been disposed of.

All very plausible reasoning, but in positions of this type, White's KB is the best defending unit of the QBP, and it behooves White to be doubly careful in guarding his QBP.

(**h**) The alternative to the fianchetto development has already been indicated: 8 P–K4, P–K4; 9 P–Q5, O–O; 10 B–Q3, with a heavily barricaded position in which White does not stand at all badly.

(**i**) Black's further object in adopting the counter-fianchetto is of course to exert pressure on his K5, *controlling this square with pieces*. This makes the coming exchange of Bishops all the more likely, as White is naturally desirous of having this square under his own control.

(**j**) It has already been shown that White wants to exchange Bishops in order to remove a piece which may exert pressure on his Pawn at QB4, and also to gain control of K4.

(**k**) The text is, however, far inferior to 11 Kt–Q2. This latter move is a *centralizing* one. It keeps the Knight in the centre, where it can exert the maximum strength and operate in the most useful and economical fashion. Thus, after Kt–Q2, the Knight protects the QBP and controls K4.

At R4 the Knight, not being *centralized*, does neither of these things, and in fact does practically nothing. The German couplet "Ein Springer am Rande/ Ist

stets eine Schande," very well sums up the matter; this may be rendered freely as "A Knight at the edge of the board always has pitiably slight scope."

(**l**) K×B is a blunder, for it enables Black to begin attacking the QBP with a valuable gain of time. The alternative Kt×B would not only save time, but would prepare for the subsequent *centralization* of the Knight with Kt–K3 (from where it would guard the QBP).

(**m**) 13 P–B3 would be an outright blunder because of 13 . . ., P–KKt4!; 14 Q–Q2, P–KR3 (not 14 . . ., P×Kt?; 15 Q–Kt5ch) and the Knight is lost.

13 Kt–B3 would naturally be superior to the text, as it would *centralize* the Knight. Black could continue favourably as he now does in the text; but his task would be less easy, as the presence of White's Knight *in the centre* makes it possible for him to put up a sturdier resistance.

(**n**) 15 KR–Q1 seems forced, for if 15 P×P, KtP×P and Black's threatened occupation of the QKt file (winning the Bishop right off!) is supplemented by the threatened win of a Pawn by . . . Kt–QR4.

It is now too late for 15 Kt–B3, e.g. 15 . . ., Kt–QR4 16 Q–Kt5, Q×Q; 17 P×Q, Kt–B5; 18 B–B1, Kt–Q4 winning a Pawn (note how powerfully the *centralized* Black Knights operate!).

(**o**) Black's advantage in posting a Knight at QB5 consists in the fact that the Knight commands a great deal of valuable terrain here (it attacks White's Bishop, guards the QP and QKtP in the event that these files are opened, and has access to the important central square K4); furthermore, White *lacks a Bishop that commands white squares*, so that Black's obstreperous Knight can be driven away only by White's Knight.

But this piece, not being *centralized*, is far away from the battle.

(**p**) . . . P–QR3 ! forces the opening of the QR file. White's isolated Pawn on that file is an easy objective, and must soon go lost.

(**q**) Black's Knights are powerfully *centralized*. They command important squares and attack valuable Pawns.

White's Bishop and Knight are scattered. They do not co-operate. They block the communication between White's Rooks. All of White's pieces are collectively so poorly placed that they cannot satisfactorily guard White's Pawns.

(**r**) Black's Pawns are compact and therefore easily protected. They are free from organic weaknesses. They are capable of mutual self-protection, if the occasion arises.

White's Pawns are scattered and therefore difficult to guard. They include two isolated Pawns, which are incapable of mutual self-protection, thus burdening White's pieces excessively.

(**s**) White is forced to play 24 R–Q1. Then follows 24 . . . , Kt×P; 25 R–B1 forced, R×P; 26 R×R, Kt–B6ch !; 27 K–R1, R×R and White must lose still another Pawn.

*SUMMARY: Note how Black carried out his plan (attack on the QBP) consistently, while White failed miserably with his counterplay in the centre. Extremely interesting is the metamorphosis of the weakness of White's Pawn on QB4 into the* weakness of that square itself.

(**a**) The natural and free development 3 . . ., B–B4 (Giuoco Piano) generally leads to numerous exchanges. These are avoided by the text, but only at the cost of submitting to a cramped game; for it is unlikely that Black will be able to play . . . P–Q4. He will therefore have to advance the QP only one square, blocking his KB.

(**b**) White goes to work energetically to increase his freedom of movement. After 4 . . ., P×P; 5 Kt×P, Black has given up the centre and his freedom of action is obviously considerably less than White's.

The text is consistent with Black's previous move in that it again envisages a cramped but solid position with little contact between the hostile pieces.

(**c**) With 5 P–Q5, White announces his intention to *constrict* Black's game gradually. Every attempt to obtain freedom is to be throttled.

(**d**) The two objects of 6 B–Q3 ! are: (i) it prevents the typical freeing move . . . P–KB4, after which Black has counterplay against White's Pawn structure and can choose between an open KB file and a Pawn advance with . . . P–B5, etc.; (ii) it prepares for an attack on White's Pawn structure (. . . P–QB3) by making the reply P–B4 possible.

White, in order to carry out his *constriction* project, must be in a position to maintain his Pawn-chain (K4 and Q5) intact. Hence the vital importance of 6 B–Q3 ! is at once apparent.

(**e**) 8 P–KR3 ! is also a part of White's *constriction* strategy. It prevents Black from obtaining a normal

development by . . . B–Kt5 and . . . QKt–Q2; and (what is even more important) it prepares for P–KKt4 in order to stop the freeing move . . . P–KB4. Thus after the thoughtless 8 O–O, Black would reply . . . Kt–K1 and he could no longer be prevented from playing . . . P–KB4.

This motif is often seen in Tarrasch's games.

(**f**) It has already been pointed out that Black's attempt to free himself is closely related to his attack on White's Pawn-chain. But White is well prepared for this counter-stroke.

(**g**) Black intends to play 10 . . . , Kt–B4; 11 B–B2, P–QR4, after which his QKt would be beautifully posted, compensating somewhat for the rather cramped character of his position.

This plan is nipped in the bud by White's reply 10 B–K3; for if then 10 . . . , Kt–B4?; 11 B×Kt wins a Pawn.

(**h**) Black hopes to be able to enforce . . . P–KB4; but as the following play shows, this is a hopeless undertaking.

An alternative plan would have been to play . . . B–Q2 and . . . Q–K1 in the hope of enforcing . . . P–QKt4 (counterplay by attack on White's Pawn configuration on the Queen-side). But this project might very well have also failed. The cramped position of Black's pieces makes the outlook for counter-attack rather dismal.

(**i**) 12 Q–B2 fits in with White's *constriction* policy, as it hinders . . . P–KB4.

(**j**) 13 KP×P? would be a very poor move, as Black would at once reply 13 . . . , P–B4, freeing himself at one stroke (and incidentally threatening to win a piece with . . . P–K5).

After 13 Kt×P, Kt×Kt, White, it is true, could still retake with the BP and thus prevent . . . P–B4; but he would have committed the strategical error of having allowed an exchange of pieces. By this time you are familiar with the rule that *where you have more mobility, you ought to avoid exchanges as much as possible in order to prevent your opponent from freeing his position.* (Naturally this rule does not obtain in positions which have already reached the drastic stage where an exchange is the necessary prelude to a direct winning continuation.) You can verify the usefulness of this maxim by observing the helplessness of Black's QKt throughout the game.

(**k**) Black is still intent on averting his fate. He hopes to play . . . P–B4.

(**l**) 14 B–KR6 crosses Black's intentions because the Knight which must now interpose at Kt2 will be pinned and can therefore take no part in the attempt to enforce . . . P–B4.

(**m**) With 15 P–KKt4! White definitely hinders . . . P–B4. Black must now reconcile himself to a cramped position and passive defence. Thus the first part of White's *constriction* policy has been successfully carried out. Now comes the second part: utilization of the cramped position.

(**n**) White is extremely cautious. He has placed the Rook on the KKt file so that even if Black does succeed in playing . . . P–B4, it will only be detrimental to him, because of the resulting opening of the KKt file.

The whole King-side formation set up by White has however a further significance: he is preparing to open up a file in that sector.

(**o**) 19 . . . , P–Kt3? creates a bad weakness on

BLACK HAS WEAKENED HIS WHITE SQUARES

BLACK (Showalter)



WHITE (Tarrasch)

(After 19 . . . , P–Kt3 !)

the white squares (Black's QR3, QKt4, QB3) which will be turned to account later on by Black.

19 . . . , P–QKt4 held out some hope of counter-play on the Queen-side, which might have diverted White from his intentions on the other wing.

(**p**) White wants to play Kt–K1 in order to continue with P–B4 (this will either open up new lines [after . . . P×P] or else cramp Black still more [P–B5]). But the immediate Kt–K1 would allow Black to free himself somewhat with the exchanging manoeuvre . . . B–KKt4. Naturally White *avoids the exchange.*

(**q**) Black prevents White from advancing P–B4; but now White has a target enabling him to open the KR file.

Note also that the text places another Pawn on a black square, so that the mobility of Black's KB is now seriously circumscribed.

The text at the same time leads to a further weakening of the white squares. In the event that White

can force the removal of Black's QB, the latter will be *left with weak white squares and his inferior KB.*

(**r**) In view of White's threatened attack on the KR file, Black must be prepared to flee with his King to the Queen-side.

(**s**) White's KKt is headed for KB5; but White postpones the actual occupation until he has removed Black's QB, and thus eliminated the most important piece guarding Black's KB4.

(**t**) The primary strategic object of 29 Q–K2 is to exploit the *weakening of the white squares* created by 19 . . . , P–Kt3?

It seems a very simple matter to protect the KKtP with 29 P–B3, but this would take away an important square (KB3) from White's pieces. The *irrevocable character* of Pawn moves makes it necessary to consider their possible outcome in cutting off one's pieces from access to certain squares. In the present position, 29 P–B3 would make it impossible for White to play the important move Q–B3 later on.

(**u**) The following exchange is advantageous for White, because all of Black's Pawns are on black squares. This means that (i) Black's white squares are weak, *and will be made still weaker by the removal of their best protection* (the QB); (ii) Black is left with the KB, *which is hemmed in on all sides by its own Pawns*, and thus has no scope.

Observe that the following exchange does not violate the rule of avoiding exchanges when one's opponent has a cramped game; for the exchange signifies a *considerable worsening of Black's game.*

(**v**) 33 . . . , BP×P would prevent White from controlling the KR file in its entirety, but would leave a very bad weakness (backward Pawn on an

open file). Play this out to study the effect of the weakness.

IS 35 . . . , K–Kt3 A SATISFACTORY DEFENCE?

BLACK (Showalter)



WHITE (Tarrasch)

(After 35 Q–B3!)

(**w**) If Black plays 35 . . . , K–Kt3 (not 35 . . . , Kt–K3??; 36 P×Kt*ch*) there follows 36 R(Kt2)–R2, and Black has a hopeless game.

(i) 36 . . . , Kt–K2?; 37 R–R6ch, K–B2; 38 Q×Pch, K–Kt1; 39 R–R8 mate.

(ii) 36 . . . , R–Q1; 37 R–R8, B–K2 forced; 38 R(R1)–R7 (threatening Q–B5ch!!), Q–B1; 39 R×Ktch!, K×R; 40 Q–R3 and Black must resign.

Note how these variations are a culmination of White's *play in the open file*.

(**x**) If 37 . . . , Kt–Kt2; 38 B×KKtP. If 37 . . . , K–K1?; 38 Q–B5 wins.

(**y**) The Knight is of course to be brought with great effect to KB5. This represents the triumph of White's policy of exploiting the weakness of the white squares.

(z) After 40 . . . , K–Kt3, White has two winning methods: (i) 41 B×KKtP!, P×B (if 41 . . . , Kt×B?; 42 R×B mate; if 41 . . . , K×B; 42 Kt×B, etc.); 42 Kt–R4ch!!, K×R; 43 Q–B5ch followed by Kt–Kt6 mate. (ii) 41 Q–R3 (threatening Q–R5 mate), K–B2; 42 Q–R5ch, K–B1; 43 Q–Kt6, R–B2 (not 43 . . . , Q–Q2; 44 R×B, Kt×R; 45 R–R7); 44 Kt×B, Kt×Kt; 45 R–R8 and Black cannot hold the position. Play this out with a view to extracting the maximum from the aggressive position of White's heavy pieces.

*SUMMARY: Almost from the very start, White played to constrict his opponent's game. This required a policy of repression (preventing Black from freeing himself with . . . P–KB4). Later on, White was able to gain two subsidiary but important advantages, strong play on the white squares and an inroad on the KR file. Black's game soon collapsed, for his position was so cramped that he could not manoeuvre with enough flexibility to repulse the onslaught.*

(**a**) The *aggressive* character of this move is hardly in accord with the *defensive* character of Black's position (. . . P–K3, QKt–Q2). One must therefore assume that unless White commits some error, the text will lead to inferiority (of varying degree) for the Black position.

(**b**) The purpose of the foregoing Pawn exchange was to make possible a simultaneous attack on Black's KB and QP—compelling Black to make up his mind about the disposition of his KB.

(**c**) 7 . . . , B–R4 would leave the Bishop in an extremely awkward position, whilst 7 . . . , B–K2? loses a Pawn at once.

If 7 . . . , Q–K2, Black is only temporizing with the problem of what to do with his KB, which will have to be exchanged or retreated later on. In any event, the pin on his KKt may very likely be inconvenient, and another difficulty will crop up with the development of the QB. This latter manoeuvre calls for a move of the QKt, allowing White to strengthen his position with Kt–K5.

7 . . . , B×Ktch has the merit of gaining control of White's K4 (by removing the QKt, which controls that square); but since Black's KKt is pinned, Black's hold on K5 is somewhat dubious. Furthermore, the absence of Black's KB implies a strong game for White on the black squares.

(**d**) By releasing the pin on his QKt, White threatens Kt×P and thus brings to a head the struggle raging around Black's advanced KB.

Note that 8 P×P would have been less good because

of 8 . . . , Q–R4! (threatening . . . Kt–K5) and Black's pieces come into action very quickly.

After 8 B–Q2, Black would be as good as lost if he played 8 . . . , P×P?; 9 Q×B, P×Kt; 10 B×P— and Black cannot castle, he has an isolated QP, his black squares are weak, and White's Bishops will have great scope.

TENSION IN THE CENTRE

BLACK (Tenner)



WHITE (Kashdan)

(Before 10 . . . , P–B5)

STABILIZATION OF THE CENTRE

BLACK (Tenner)



WHITE (Kashdan)

(After 10 . . . , P–B5)

(e) Black plays this move to prevent the possibility of P×P, which would leave him with an isolated QP and some of the other disadvantages mentioned in the previous answer. (It might be asked if this line of play is so good for White, why didn't he go into it on move 10? The answer is, that Black would reply . . . Kt×P, gaining time and furthering his development to an extent that would somewhat neutralize his positional disadvantages. Hence White prefers to postpone P×P until he has well-nigh completed his development. Meanwhile, however, Black cannot simply mark time

and look on while White's plans mature. Hence the drastic step which the text involves.)

Another idea behind the text is to obtain the Queen-side majority of Pawns, which is often an advantage in the ending. The text also has the further virtue of limiting to some extent the mobility of White's KB.

The move also has its drawbacks: White has the theoretical possibility of advancing strongly against Black's chain with either P–QKt3 or P–K4. And while Black's Pawns limit the scope of White's KB, they are also *targets*.

Finally, it should be noted that Black's QB is destined to have little mobility, as it will be hemmed in by several black *Pawns on the same colour* (white squares). The outlook for Black is therefore none too rosy; for his Knights will definitely have less mobility than White's Bishops, and in addition, as we have just seen, Black's remaining minor piece has none too promising prospects.

(**f**) 12 B×P? does not win a Pawn because of . . . Kt×B, and White *loses* a piece. This example is a very simple one, but is given to point the moral: *do not make a combination to remove the defence of a piece, when that piece can move away with a capture.*

(**g**) If 13 . . . , Kt×B; 14 P×Kt, Kt–B3; 15 Kt–Q2! White has now the better of it, as he cannot be prevented from advancing very strongly with P–K4 (the indicated attack on Black's Pawn chain). Play might proceed: 15 . . ., R–K1 (not 15 . . ., Kt–K5?; 16 Kt×Kt and Black's QBP is lost); 16 B–B3 and White will succeed in playing P–K4.

(**h**) 14 . . . , B–Kt2 seems better than the text, for then Black can continue with 14 . . . , KR–B1

completing his development—and avoiding the weakness created by the text. This weakness is twofold: it causes a certain insecurity in the diagonal KKt1–QR7, making possible hostile tactical threats, as we shall see later on. Secondly, it makes Black's K4 a "hole," so that it cannot be protected by Pawns and has to be guarded by a piece (thus the mobility of Black's Knight at Q2 is hampered by the fact that its removal from its present square permits White's Knight immediate entry on the strong square K5). This is piquantly emphasized at the very end of the game!

Note that the alternative 14 . . . , P–Kt5? is out of the question because it creates too critical a weakness —15 Q–R4 thereupon wins a Pawn at once (15 . . . , P–QR4; 16 Q–B6).

(**i**) The immediate, tactical significance of 15 P–QKt3! is that this Pawn cannot be captured (15 . . . , P×P?; 16 Q×P and White wins a Pawn). Its more general, strategic significance consists in this: it forces the *opening of the QKt file*, so that White will have an *effective line of operations for his Rooks*; in addition, it loosens up Black's Pawn chain, rendering the *Black Pawns more susceptible to pressure*, both positional and combinative—White's Bishops come to life.

(**j**) 16 . . . , QP×P seems more consistent with Black's plan, in the sense that it maintains the Queenside majority of Pawns. The text reduces the Black Bishop to *passivity*, but Black prefers this to 16 . . . , QP×P; 17 Q–Kt2! (utilizing the just-opened QKt file to attack Black's Pawn chain), B–B3 (not 17 . . . , P–QR3?; 18 B×Pch!); 18 B–Kt4, Kt–Q3; 19 Kt–K5! and White wins a Pawn by force.

(**k**) White threatens to win at least the exchange with B–B7.

(**l**) The threat could have been parried by 18 . . . , B–R3 or 18 . . . , B–B1 (less good is . . . QKt–B3, as this permits 19 Kt–K5). The outcome is then dubious, for Black's weak QP and his Bishop's lack of scope are somewhat compensated for by his passed QBP and the strong position of his Knight on K5.

(**m**) By retreating the Bishop to Kt3, White continues to exert pressure on the QP.

(**n**) On 20 . . . , R–QB1 there follows 21 B–Kt4 !, Q–R3 (not 21 . . . , Q×B; 22 Q×B, R×Q; 23 B×Pch or 22 . . . , Q–Q3; 23 B×Pch with a decisive material advantage in either event); 22 KR–B1 followed by Kt–K5 with a winning game.

Almost all the variations hereabouts indicate how powerful the Bishops have become *since the position was opened up.*

(**o**) If 21 . . . , Q×B; 22 B×Pch, K–R1; 23 Q×B and Black's game is hopeless.

(**p**) The answer will be clear from the following play.

(**q**) For if 26 . . . , Q×Q; 27 R–Kt8ch, K–B2; 28 Kt–K5ch regaining the Queen and remaining the exchange ahead with an easy win (play this out).

*SUMMARY: Black did not prove equal to the task of defending the weaknesses his early play had created. Once the position was opened up, White proved by far the better tactician.* All *of the combinative strokes may be traced back to definite positional lapses by his opponent.*

(**a**) If 5 P×P, P×P; 6 Kt×P?, Kt×Kt!; 7 B×Q, B–Kt5ch. Now White must lose *his* Queen, and he will be a piece down.

(**b**) In view of the Pawn configuration, White is bound to have a fully open or half-open QB file sooner or later (either when he plays P×P or when Black plays . . . P×P). If the QB file is fully open, the chances are that White will be able to control it. If the QB file is half-open, the White QR will exert a certain amount of pressure on Black's game.

The text-move is also often played as part of the "struggle for the tempo." What is meant by this is that White tries to postpone B–Q3 as long as he can, so that when Black plays . . . P×P (which is almost inevitable, if he is to obtain more room in the centre) White's KB will have reached B4 in one move. (Of course, if White has played B–Q3 in the interim, his KB will have reached QB4 in *two* moves.)

As we shall see, Capablanca (whose style inclines decidedly toward simplification and the avoidance of tension) has no interest here in the "struggle for the tempo."

(**c**) Black plays 8 . . . , P×P in order to be able to carry out the exchange manoeuvre . . . Kt–Q4. In this way he will exchange his KKt and KB (whose position is predominantly defensive and cramped) for White's QKt and QB (whose position is predominantly aggressive and free).

We have here an exemplification of the maxim that *the player with a cramped position should play for exchanges, as they tend to free his game.* This follows naturally from

the fact that when your position is cramped, your pieces are not functioning at their full strength and are therefore somewhat inferior to your opponent's corresponding pieces. It is therefore clear that exchanges are advantageous for the player with the cramped position.

Note also that the exchanging manoeuvre in the present position also involves the development of Black's Queen to a good square and without loss of time.

(**d**) Black's natural freeing move is 12 . . . , P–K4. If then 13 P×P, Kt×P, and the free development of Black's Bishop is assured. If White avoids 13 P×P, then Black plays . . . P×P himself (or possibly . . . P–K5) after which his Knight can move and make room for the development of his Bishop.

In the above line of play, Black's position remains intact; the text, on the other hand, results in a temporary weakness of his QBP which is cleverly exploited by White.

(**e**) As already hinted above, this move, by temporarily depriving the QBP of the best and most natural protection (*by a Pawn!*), enables White to bring pressure on the QBP.

In order to rid himself of this bothersome pressure, Black must needs play . . . P–QB4. This leads to the full opening of the QB file, which, however, White will be able to control exclusively; for he is ahead in development and already has a Rook on that file.

(**f**) White threatens to win a Pawn at once with 14 B–Q3. Note that this threat expresses the combined strength of White's superior development and pressure on the QB file.

(**g**) . . . P–QB4 will be forced sooner or later, as Black must liquidate his weakness on the QB file while he still has time:

Certainly *passive defence* of the weakness has no attractions, e.g. 13 . . . , B–Kt2; 14 B–Q3, P–Kt3; 15 B–K4 winning the QBP. Or 14 . . . , Kt–B3; 15 Kt–K5 again winning a Pawn. These brief examples indicate that *weaknesses tend to become untenable when coupled with inferior development.* Contrariwise (from White's point of view) *superior development has prospects of yielding dividends when directed at hostile weaknesses.*

(**h**) A younger or less experienced player would snap at the possibility 14 B–Kt5, P×P; 15 R–B7 (threatening Kt–K5 and/or Q–B6). But Black replies 15 . . . , Q–Q1 ! after which 16 Q–B6 can be answered by 16 . . . , Kt–B3 threatening . . . Kt–Q4. Or if 16 Kt×P?, Kt–B4 !

It may be that the first of the variations given above (16 Q–B6, etc.) may be worked out to White's advantage. Without going into that question more thoroughly it may safely be claimed that this line of play would require considerable study, would consume valuable time, would involve the calculation of several tactical finesses, and would give Black opportunities for counterplay.

As far as the *tournament* player is concerned, all these things mean taking superfluous risks and frittering away valuable time and energy. White therefore contents himself with what seems to be a slight positional advantage; but it has the merits of being *lasting* and of permitting his opponent no *counterplay.*

(**i**) 14 . . . , P×P would be even worse (an isolated Pawn on an open file !). For then 15 B–Kt5 removes the defence of the QBP and wins a Pawn at once.

WHERE SHALL THE KNIGHT RETREAT?

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Capablanca)

(After 15 P–QKt4!)

(**j**) The powerful advance of the QKtP forces Black's hand. If he plays 15 . . . , Kt–Q2, then 16 B–Q3! confronts him with a difficult problem: (i) 16 . . . , Q×P?; 17 B×Pch, K–R1; 18 R–B4!, Q–K2; 19 R–KR4 and the double threat of B–Kt8 dis ch! or B–K4 dis ch must prove fatal for Black. For example 19 . . . , P–Kt3; 20 B×P dis ch, K–Kt2 (if 20 . . . , K–Kt1; 21 B–R7ch, K–Kt2; 22 Q–K4, R–Kt1; 23 Q–Kt4ch, etc.); 21 B×P! and wins. (ii) 16 . . . , P–Kt3; 17 R–B7, and now that *the Q file is open and can be occupied at once by White*, Black is helpless. Among the threats are Q–B6, B–Kt5, B–K4, Kt–K5—with the pressure to be strengthened by R–Q1 if necessary. If 17 . . . , Q×P; 18 Q–B6 wins two pieces for a Rook. If 17 . . . , Q–Q1; 18 B–K4 wins a Pawn to begin with.

The student will find it instructive to study and refute possible alternatives to 17 . . . , Q–Q1 in this variation.

(**k**) . . . Kt–R3 has the purely negative virtue of

avoiding the cruel encirclement that follows the alternative . . . Kt–Q2.

. . . Kt–R3 also has the positive virtue of guarding Black's QB2. It must be borne in mind that one of the key reasons for the *command and control of an open file is ultimate occupation of the seventh or eighth square of that file.* This makes possible *turning manoeuvres, i.e. the horizontal deployment of the Rook* along the seventh and/or eighth ranks for the purpose of attacking weak Pawns, pinning or otherwise menacing hostile pieces or utilizing potential mating threats against the opponent's King.

However, the Knight's prevention of all such possibilities is bought at the dear price of loss of mobility and exposure to tactical threats.

(**l**) With his last move, Black seemed to be on the point of disputing White's command of the QB file with either . . . R–B1. However, by threatening the KRP, White gains the necessary time to triple on the QB file, after which *his mastery of the file is incontestable.*

(**m**) Black is now unable to dispute the QB file, for if 18 . . ., QR–B1; 19 R×R, R×R; 20 Q×Rch !, B×Q; 21 R×Bch, K–Kt2; 22 B×Kt and White's material superiority is conclusive.

(**n**) White threatens to win the exchange by 20 B×Kt, B×B; 21 Kt–B6.

White's minor pieces are strongly centralized: White's Knight is on a vital central square, it commands QB6, another important square, it commands Q7, preventing Black from guarding the second rank with . . . R–Q2, and it can also be deployed on the King-side in certain eventualities. White's Bishop is equally useful, as its central post enables it to observe both wings simultaneously.

Black's Knight, on the other hand, is pitifully out

of play, having only the menial function of guarding Black's QB2. Black's Bishop, in turn, is similarly devaluated, as it must protect the Knight and its command of the long diagonal is thus neutralized.

CAN BLACK FREE HIMSELF WITH . . . P–B3 . . .?

BLACK (Steiner)



WHITE (Capablanca)

(After 20 P–B4)

(o) 20 . . . , P–B3 would likewise have been unsatisfactory; but in order to demonstrate this, Black's pieces must operate at the very maximum of their efficiency. The play would be: (20 . . . , P–B3); 21 Kt×P!, P×Kt; 22 B×Kt (making room on the diagonal QKt1–KR7 for the Queen; one is reminded of certain problems!), B×B; 23 Q×Pch, K–R1.

Now White has at least a draw by perpetual check, but of course he wants to win. 24 P–K4?? (in order to continue with the murderous R–R3ch) looks plausible, but then Black replies 24 . . . , Q–Q5ch, forcing a quick mate!

Avoiding this variation with a shudder, we turn to 24 Q–R5ch, for example, 24 . . . , K–Kt2?; 25 P–K4 (now White's Q1 is doubly guarded, preventing the

mate), Q–Q5ch; 26 K–R1, KR–K1; 27 R–Kt3ch, K–B1; 28 Q–R8ch, K–K2; 29 Q–Kt7ch, K–Q3; 30 Q–B7 mate.

All very pretty—but Black has a satisfactory defence with 24 . . . , K–Kt1 ! (after 24 Q–R5ch); for if then 25 P–K4, Q–Q5ch; 26 K–R1, R–B2 !

Shall we then conclude that despite White's definite superiority, he cannot find a win in this variation? No; *the win is there !* After 20 . . . , P–B3; 21 Kt×P !, P×Kt; 22 B×Kt, B×B; 23 Q×Pch, K–R1 White must play 24 P–Kt5 ! ! If then 24 . . . , B–Kt2?; 25 P–K4 ! wins, for if 25 . . . , Q–Q5ch; 26 K–B1 ! (a beautiful finesse !). Black has nothing better than 24 . . . , B×P; 25 Q–R5ch, K moves; 26 Q×B and White wins easily; he has a Pawn ahead, a far superior position, and splendid attacking possibilities.

Having analysed the specific tactical possibilities resulting from 20 . . . , P–B3, we must also grasp its general significance: 20 . . . , P–B3 *leads to a crisis: White cannot continue to maintain his positional advantage comfortably, but must strike out vigorously and accurately.* Countless players have transformed a clear advantage into an ignominious defeat against such great tacticians as Lasker, Spielmann, and Keres; and all because *the player with the advantage did not rise to the occasion—or did not even know it existed !*

(**p**) It is true that White can gain a second Pawn with 23 Kt×Kt, B×Kt; 24 Q×B, Q×B; 25 Q×KtP. But then Black becomes extremely menacing with 25 . . . , Q–K7 ! (threatening 26 . . . , R–Q7; 27 Q–Kt7, Q×KPch; 28 K–R1, R–K7 !; 29 R–KKt1, R–K8 forcing mate !); 26 P–R3, R–Q7; 27 Q–Kt 7, Q×KPch; 28 K–R1, R–Q2 !; 29 Q×R, Q×Rch; 30 K–R2, Q×Pch and White cannot avoid a draw.

White can, by the way, improve on this whole line of play with 24 B×P, RP×B; 25 Q×B, Q–Q7; 26 Q–B3, etc. But the method actually selected by Capablanca is just as conclusive and infinitely more artistic.

(**q**) The Knight has only two possible moves. If 25 . . ., Kt–Q6; 26 R–Q1, etc. If 25 . . ., Kt–Q2; 26 R–Q1, Q–K2 (or 26 . . ., Q–Kt1; 27 Q–Q2!); 27 Q–B7, K–B1; 28 B–Kt5, K–K1; and now White exchanges off all the pieces, winning easily with his extra Pawn.

(**r**) At first sight it seems that 26 P×Kt does not win a piece, in view of 26 . . ., Q×Pch; 27 K–R1, R–Q7. But there follows 28 Q–B8ch!, K–Kt2; 29 B–B3.

Nevertheless, Capablanca avoids this line, as he prefers to get the Queens off; and in addition, he is again choosing the more elegant line, without prolonging the game.

(**s**) The Knight has no other retreat, for if 28 . . ., Kt–Q6; 29 R–Q8, etc.

(**t**) White threatens B–Kt5 winning the Knight. This latter piece's continual lack of scope is in glaring contrast to the Bishop's fine free play.

(**u**) Black has to be in a position to play . . . K–K2.

(**v**) If 30 . . ., K–K2; 31 R×Ktch, R×R; 32 B×R, K×B; 33 P–QR4 and White's outside passed Pawn (following the centralization of his King) will win easily for him.

(**w**) 31 B×Kt, K–K2; 32 R–QKt8, R×B; 33 R×P looks quite rosy, but Black recovers one of the Pawns with . . . R–R2 and can then put up a lengthy although ultimately hopeless resistance. Naturally White prefers the easier way.

(x) 33 R×Ktch? would only draw, as White's material advantage is nullified by the fact that his QKtP is doubled and is of no more use than would be a single Pawn at QKt5.

(y) White's 33rd and 34th moves had the double function of immobilizing the Knight by attacking the QKtP, and at the same time limiting the scope of Black's King.

Black's 33rd move facilitated the win immensely for White by creating an entry for White's King at Q5, after which it would only be a matter of a few moves to force K–Q6 (or K–B6) with obviously disastrous results for Black.

However, even if Black had refrained from . . . P–K4, White would soon have forced an entry for his King with the suitably prepared thrust P–B5.

*SUMMARY: As the result of his opponent's faulty 12th move, White was able to gain undisputed control of the QB file and to centralize his minor pieces effectively. The result was that White, by utilizing his superior mobility, was able to force a winning ending.*

# LESSON XIV

## The Struggle for Control of the Centre

Black (Allies)



White (Allies)

(After 7 . . . , Kt–K5)

(**a**) Black has fianchettoed his QB in order to control the long diagonal with pieces. White was threatening to play 8 Q–B2, after which 9 P–K4 could be prevented only by . . . P–Q4. If P–K4 is allowed, Black's control of the long diagonal is at an end, and White's mighty centre paralyses Black. If the latter prevents this with . . . P–Q4, he has blocked the QB's diagonal. The text eliminates White's QKt, and thus prevents or at any rate postpones White's P–K4. The basic fight here is expressed in the fact that White tries to occupy the centre with *Pawns*, Black tries to occupy it with *pieces*.

(**b**) On 8 . . . , P–KB4 there follows 9 Kt–K5! Now Black's KKt is pinned, so that Black must play 9 . . . , P–Q4. This leaves White with a number of advantages: (i) his Knight cannot be driven out of

K5 by a hostile Pawn, whereas Black's Knight *can* be driven away; (ii) by playing P×P at a suitable moment, White can exercise pressure along the QB file on Black's QBP; (iii) the complex of Black Pawns on Q4, K3 and KB4 badly hampers the mobility of Black's QB and at the same time constitutes an object of attack to the hostile QB. Note that the seemingly plausible 9 . . . , P–Q3 would be answered by 10 Kt×Kt! and no matter how Black plays, he must lose at least a Pawn.

(**c**) The drawback of . . . P–Q3 is that it does not contribute anything to the *problem of controlling the long diagonal*. For this purpose, 9 . . . , P–KB4 was suitable. Then if 10 Q–B2, B–K5! If 10 Kt–Q2, B×B; 11 K×B and even though White will succeed in playing P–K4, his position in the centre will be loosened up so that Black will have counterplay.

(**d**) From what has been said previously, you know that Q–B2 is played with a view to P–K4; that is the *strategical* threat. But in the given position there is a *tactical* finesse: White threatens Kt–Kt5, winning the exchange because of the combined mating threat and the discovery on the long diagonal. It is worth noting that this latter point illustrates one of the dangers involved in the *opposition of fianchettoed Bishops on a diagonal*: White's KB is automatically protected by the King, whereas Black's Bishop is not protected in the same way.

(**e**) 10 . . . , Kt–B3 puts no obstacle in the way of P–K4, hence White could advance the KP with a strong game. A more complicated but possibly even more advantageous method of answering 10 . . . , Kt–B3 would be 11 P–Q5!, P×P; 12 P×P, Kt–Kt5; 13 Q–Kt3, Kt×QP; 14 Kt–Q4! (note that the whole

point of this variation lies in White's *utilization of the long diagonal*), P–QB3; 15 Kt×P, B×Kt; 16 B×Kt and Black is left with the serious positional weakness of the isolated QP.

10 . . . , P–KB4 maintains control of the diagonal at least temporarily, and is therefore more in accordance with Black's original plan. A violent attempt to cramp Black with 11 P–Q5!? is answered not by 11 . . . , P×P?; 12 Kt–Q4! followed by P×P with considerable positional advantage for White—but by 11 . . . , P–K4. Even here White can try to make capital out of the unprotected state of Black's QB by playing 12 Kt×P!?, P×Kt; 13 P–Q6. But Black simply plays 13 . . . , B×B and is none the worse off.

White's best reply to 10 . . . , P–KB4 is doubtless 11 Kt–R4 or 11 Kt–K1, with the idea of eliminating the Bishops and then advancing P–K4.

All the above is extremely interesting from the viewpoint that White's strategy is based on the idea of blocking the long diagonal, exchanging Bishops or else utilizing some tactical finesse to emphasize the unprotected state of Black's QB. All three types of manoeuvres are means of *counteracting the influence of Black's QB on the diagonal.*

(**f**) White was threatening the extremely troublesome B–R3, after which Black's Queen is tied to the defence of the KP, and the normal developments of the QKt to QB3 or Q2 are rendered impossible.

(**g**) After 12 . . . , P×P, White has a choice of (i) 13 KP×P, with a view to play in the K file in conjunction with pressure on the backward QP with B–B4. This is the commonsense and straightforward method of proceeding; or (ii) 13 BP×P with the idea of playing P–B4 and P–K5. This requires considerable

preparation, and allows Black counterplay in the form of the advance of his Queen-side majority of Pawns.

(**h**) White's last move is typical in such situations: when the centre is blocked by mutually opposing Pawns the natural reaction is to attack the enemy's advanced Pawn (K4) by a flank movement (P–B4). This will have one of two possible results: (i) opening of a file (here the KB file) or (ii) further advance on the flank (P–B5) with the object of cramping the opponent's game or else organizing a storming expedition with other Pawns (P–KKt4–5).

(**i**) The difficulty involved in playing . . . P–B4 (with or without . . . P–Kt3) is that White would establish a nasty pin on the KBP (at KB4) with B–R3 ! White would intensify the pressure on the KBP by opening up the KB file with P–B4. Black's game would surely become untenable, as you may see by playing out this line.

(**j**) The theory underlying this move is precisely the same as has been set forth in the comment on White's 13th move. (There is this difference to be noted: such an advance on the Queen-side has only *strategical* significance, whereas on the other flank, the proximity of the rival Kings gives it a primarily *tactical* importance.)

The text has the drawback, however, that after White plays P×KP, Black's QBP is deprived of Pawn support and may readily be attacked by White. The text should have been prepared by . . . Kt–Q2 (so that if P×KP, Kt×P) followed by . . . P–QR3. This, however, would have given White time for P–QR4 at the proper moment (preventing . . . P–QKt4). As for White's positive policy, he would doubtless have played P–B5 with the idea of advancing the KKtP

as noted above. This line would have great effect because of the cramped position of Black's pieces.

(**k**) The import of this move is clear: White gains time to menace the QBP, as will be made abundantly clear by his next move.

(**l**) There were alternatives to this move—but no good ones! Thus if 17 . . ., Kt–Q2 or 17 . . ., Q–K2; 18 P×P wins a Pawn and leaves the QBP in an enfeebled state. Or 17 . . ., P×P; 18 Kt×BP and White wins the BP just the same.

(**m**) The routine P×P would be less good, for although Black's QBP is weak, his pieces are in good play after . . . Q×P. The idea behind the text is to force . . . P–Kt5. This seems paradoxical, as the QBP is then screened from frontal attack. But White knows just how to increase the pressure thereafter.

THE ATTACK ON BLACK'S WEAKENED QUEEN-SIDE

BLACK (Allies)



WHITE (Allies)

(After 19 P–QR3!)

(**n**) You will note that White has temporarily switched his attack to the QKtP. His threat was P×P,

forcing two connected passed Pawns no matter which way Black recaptures—and in fact continuing with the mighty advance P–B5, which would completely disorganize Black's position. Since the latter must take measures to prevent the eventual P–B5, the text is the only move available for the purpose. Thus if 19 . . . , R–B1; 20 P×P and White wins a Pawn, as the QRP is unprotected. The objection to 19 . . . , R–Kt1 would be 20 P×P and Black cannot prevent P–B5, whichever way he recaptures.

(**o**) Against 20 . . . , P×P, White could proceed with 21 R–R5 (threatening P–B5 as well as KR–R1) or else 21 R×Kt, B×R; 22 P–B5, B–Kt1; 23 R–Q1. In the latter variation, the two passed Pawns and the greater freedom of White's pieces outweigh his exchange down. This should be played out.

(**p**) . . . B–B2 would be pointless, because of the reply 23 R–Kt5, winning at least the KtP. The text is more logical, as Black must at all cost prevent P–B5.

(**q**) 23 P–B5 is attractive, for if then 23 . . . , B×P; 24 R×B!, R×R; 25 P–Q6! and Black loses the Rook, as he dare not play 25 . . . , Q×P?; 26 Q×Pch, followed by Q×B. However, he plays 23 . . . , R×P!, 24 B×R, B×Bch and the win is not so easy as in the text continuation.

(**r**) The threat was P–B5. Black can prevent this with 23 . . . , B–B4, but then comes 24 R×B! (24 B×B, R×B; 25 Q×P is also good, and even simpler), R×R; 25 Q×P, R–B2 (if 25 . . . , QR–QB1; 26 B×R, R×B; 27 R–R1 wins easily); 26 P–Q6, Q–B1; 27 P–B5, R–Q2; 28 B–R3 and Black is lost.

(**s**) 24 . . . , R×QP loses a piece (25 P–B5 and two pieces are *en prise*). Of course if 24 . . . , R×R; 25 Q×R and P–B5 cannot be prevented.

(**t**) If 25 . . . , R×B; 26 K–R1 ! (not 26 R×R??, B×Rch) followed by R×R, after which White readily forces P–B5 in a few moves, giving up the QKtP if necessary by moving his Queen and playing P–QKt4.

(**u**) If 26 . . . , Q×Rch; 27 Q×Q, R×Q; 28 P–QKt4 and the steam-roller rumbles on with P–B5. If 26 . . . , R×R; 27 P–Q6 ! neatly winning a piece.

*SUMMARY: The chief point here is the skilful way that White builds up his Queen-side attack, and concludes it by smashing the blockade at his QB5.*

(**a**) The attempt to maintain the centre Pawns with 5 QKt–K2, P–QB4; 6 P–QB3 seems very attractive at first sight, as it seems to cramp Black's game appreciably and lay the basis for a strong attack.

Actually, however, the protection of White's Pawn-chain loses valuable time and retards White's development. The following method (worked out by Keres and Pirc) seems a definite refutation of the system: 6 . . . , P–B3; 7 P–KB4, QBP×P; 8 BP×P, P×P; 9 BP×P, B–Kt5ch! and whether White replies 10 B–Q2 or Kt–B3, the reply 10 . . . , Q–R5ch! is embarrassing, as it forces White's King to move. The student should verify this for himself.

(**b**) The foregoing Pawn exchange, by pre-empting the square Q4, has made it possible (theoretically) for White's KKt to be posted on the strong central square Q4. As you know, Knights are at their best when *centralized*. However, Black has so much pressure on White's Q4 that it does not seem very likely that White will ever succeed in planting a Knight at Q4.

(**c**) Black's KB has a fine free diagonal and ample scope, being unhampered by the black centre Pawns, which are on squares of the *opposite colour*. But just the *reverse* is true of the QB, *which is hemmed in by the Pawns on white squares*.

Black must therefore bear in mind, even at this early stage, that it is desirable to increase the scope of the QB, if the opportunity arises. He must also take into consideration that the *presence of most of his Pawns on white squares implies a weakness on his black squares*, since those squares lack their most natural protection.

(**d**) By playing . . . P–QR3 Black creates a retreat for his KB, so that piece cannot be driven off its splendid diagonal. (The presence of the KB is rather annoying for White, who, for example, cannot castle until the KB has been driven away.)

Another reason for . . . P–QR3 is the preparation of . . . P–QKt4, so that the QB can be played to Kt2.

In making these two Pawn moves, however, Black should not forget that he is placing more Pawns on white squares, i.e. he is further reducing the scope of his QB and further weakening the black squares.

This policy need not be fatal if Black realizes the dangers involved and takes the necessary precautionary measures.

(**e**) Since Black's QB is so hemmed in and since White threatens to assume the mastery of the black squares, Black should play 12 . . . , P–Kt5! This could be followed by . . . P–QR4, creating a beautiful diagonal from QR3 to KB8 for the QB. If White were to answer 12 . . . , P–Kt5! with 13 P–Q4 (which seems to have been feared by Black), three disadvantages would result for White: (i) White's Knights could no longer be *centralized* at Q4; (ii) Black's QB would have a clear diagonal from QR3; (iii) White's Bishop would have no scope (with White Pawns on Q4, K5 and KB4) and White would have a concomitant weakness on the white squares.

(**f**) By driving back the KB, White gains a hold on the black squares which cannot be shaken off. In this way he gives employment to his own Bishop, which would otherwise be hemmed in by White Pawns on black squares: he *centralizes* one Knight strongly at Q4, while the remaining one has an almost equally powerful post beckoning to him at QR5—another

black square; he obtains *exclusive control of the QB file*, since he commands all of the squares in that file and soon has unhampered communication between his Rooks, so that the KR can also join in the struggle for the QB file.

Finally, note that the position of White's QP effectively guards the two most important white squares in White's camp: K4 and QB4.

(**g**) If 13 . . . , B–Q5?; 14 QR–Kt1 ! and now White cannot be prevented from winning a piece with 15 Kt×B (15 . . . , Q×Kt?; 16 B–K3). An interesting point !

(**h**) By playing . . . P–B4, Black further decreases the potential mobility of his QB, and also renders the KP *backward*. This Pawn is thus more susceptible to attack and in addition *will require the protection of a piece*, which in turn lowers the efficacy of Black's forces. Note that Pawn weaknesses are *organic*; generally they cannot be eliminated or minimized, and are thus permanent weaknesses.

(**i**) The QB is hemmed in on all sides by Pawns on white squares, and thus has no mobility to speak of.

(**j**) The fact that five of the seven White Pawns are on black squares does not really limit the scope of White's Bishop. This is explained by the fact that the Bishop's action on the diagonal KKt1–QR7 is so powerful that this piece requires no more terrain.

(**k**) White could also have played 16 Kt–Q4 here (16 . . . , Q×Kt??; 17 B–K3 !). But then Black would have had time for disputing the QB file with 16 . . . , QR–B1. The text order of moves gains so much time for White that Black does not have an opportunity for opposition on the QB file, until it is too late.

(**l**) White's Knight on Q4 is strongly *centralized*: it menaces the backward KP, observes the weak square QB6 and in some eventualities even threatens a sacrifice by Kt×BP. Above all, the Knight's activity is purely *voluntary*.

Black's Knight, on the contrary, has no scope and is limited to a purely passive function. This Knight's activity is characterized by *duress*. The value of Black's QB is even more questionable, as it has about the same usefulness as a Pawn. Under the circumstances, Black's KB (which guards the black squares to a certain extent) is a very important piece.

This explains why Steinitz soon begins a manoeuvre to remove this valuable piece.

(**m**) If 18 Kt–B6, B×Kt (naturally Black seizes with avidity the opportunity to rid himself of the feeble QB, and in any event he does not care to part with the infinitely more valuable KB); 19 R×B, Q–Q2; 20 Q–QB2, K–Q1 to be followed by . . . R–B1.

It is clear that in the above line of play, Black's difficulties would have been considerably ameliorated. Hence Steinitz naturally prefers to develop and *strengthen the pressure*.

(**n**) Black plays . . . P–KR4 in order to prevent P–Kt4; while Black must look forward to being vanquished in the end by a policy of attrition, he would lose even more quickly if he were to allow the position to be opened up; for the exposed position of his King, coupled with his obvious lack of mobility, would lead to a speedy catastrophe.

Nevertheless, . . . P–KR4 further weakens Black's Pawn position, and makes the protective move . . . P–Kt3 (*additional weakening of the black squares!*) inevitable.

(o) Black plays . . . K–B2 in order to relieve the Knight of the task of defending the KP, and in this way making possible the communication of his KR with the Queen-side; another reason why . . . P–Kt3 will soon be necessary.

(p) If at once 20 . . . , Kt–Q2 then 21 Kt×BP!, P×Kt; 22 P–K6ch and White regains the piece (naturally Black must not play 22 . . . , K×P??; 21 B–Kt6 dis ch) with a winning advantage, as Black must soon succumb once the position is opened up.

As has already been indicated, . . . P–Kt3 contributes the finishing touch to the weakening of Black's Pawn position (all the Black Pawns are now on white squares!). At the moment, this weakness may not appear to be too serious; but once White eliminates the hostile KB, the fatally weak character of Black's Pawn structure will at once become noticeable.

### Should Black Attempt to Free his Game with . . . P–R4 . . . ?

Black (Sellman)



White (Steinitz)

(After 21 Kt–Q2)

(**q**) Certainly the idea of dissolving the whole Queen-side Pawn structure by . . . P–R4 looks attractive, as it promises to liberate the QB and in any event it prevents the settling of a Knight on QR5. But this project would fail, because *it would open up the game.*

Steinitz's keen eye for such freeing possibilities had already envisaged this plan, as may be seen from the following variation given by him: 21 . . . , P–R4; 22 Kt×KtP, P×P; 23 P×P, B×P; 24 Kt–Q6ch, B×Kt; 25 P×B, Q×P; 26 B–Q4, KR–Kt1; 27 Kt–B3 followed by Kt–Kt5ch and B–B5 recovering the Pawn with a fine attack.

(**r**) As already pointed out, the elimination of Black's KB will have fatal results for him because *his black squares will then be unprotected.*

To try to retain the Bishop by 26 . . . , B–B1 would be of little avail, as Black's Rook would then be out of play: 27 Q–B7, Q×Q (or 27 . . . , Q–K1; 28 Kt(5)–B6, B–KKt2; 29 Kt–Kt8!); 28 R×Q, K–K2; 29 Kt(5)–B6ch and wins.

(**s**) If 27 . . . , B×Kt; 28 Q×B, Kt–B1; 29 Kt×KP!, Kt×Kt; 30 Q–Q7ch, B–K2; 31 R–B6 and wins—a triumph of White's *constriction* policy!

(**t**) The immediate exchange of Queens would by no means improve the situation for Black. After 29 . . . , Q×Q; 30 R×Q, White can proceed with B–B2–R4, or else as in the text continuation.

(**u**) The Bishop begins to encroach on the black squares; the immediate threat is B–R4, winning at least the exchange.

(**v**) Aside from . . . K–K1, there is no other way to guard the Knight from the threat of B–R4.

Note the wretched position of Black's pieces: his

Knight is pinned; his Rook, which must protect the Knight, is in turn menaced by White's B–R4; our old friend the Black Bishop has no move whatever! The conclusion is inevitable that Black's position must soon fall to pieces.

(**w**) There is no escape for Black; if 33 . . ., K–K2; 34 B–B5ch leads to much the same position as in the text.

(**x**) White threatens nothing less than 35 R–K7 mate!—a forceful expression of his tremendous superiority.

Black cannot play 34 . . ., R–Q2, for then 35 R–B8ch wins a piece.

Nor can he play 34 . . ., R–Kt1; 35 R–K7ch, K–Q1; 36 Kt–B7ch, K–B1; 37 R–K8ch and again White wins a piece.

(**y**) Black has no moves: (i) he cannot move his King; (ii) he cannot move his Bishop; (iii) he cannot move his Rook (35 . . ., R–Kt1; 36 R×Kt!); (iv) finally, he cannot move his Knight (35 . . ., Kt–Kt3; 36 R–K7ch, K–B1; 37 Kt–R7ch, K–Kt1; 38 Kt–B6ch and mate follows). Black can play only 35 . . ., P–Q5, but then 36 Kt×P, R–Kt1; 37 Kt–Kt7ch, K–Q1; 38 P–K6 forces the game.

*SUMMARY: Black's positional blunder on move* 12 *had grave consequences: White obtained control of the black squares and of the QB file, and supplemented this with centralization. White steadily augmented his blockading powers in a process which ultimately resulted in the complete paralysis of Black's forces.*

(**a**) After the moves 1 P–Q4, Kt–KB3; 2 P–QB4, P–KKt3; 3 Kt–QB3, P–Q4; 4 P×P, Kt×P; 5 P–K4, Kt×Kt; 6 P×Kt, P–QB4, followed by . . . B–Kt2, we reach a position in which Black has achieved his purpose of obtaining *strong pressure on the long diagonal* for his KB. This pressure is supported by the *flank thrust* . . . P–QB4, which keeps the centre in a *state of tension*. White's Pawn centre looks formidable, but actually it must be nursed along carefully. This centre is in fact *not an attacking weapon, but a defensive liability*.

How true this is may be seen from an example (from the Philadelphia Tournament of 1936) in which White's play is exceptionally weak: 7 Kt–B3, B–Kt2; 8 B–Kt2? (compare the respective position of the Bishops on the long diagonal!), Q–R4!; 9 Q–Q2, O–O; 10 B–K2, R–Q1. Black has a strong initiative and by far the better development.

(**b**) We therefore draw the following conclusions—

(i) White must endeavour to *stabilize* the centre, solidify it, remove the tension if possible, so that Black's KB will come up against a stone wall. When this happens, the KB will suffer from "pseudo-development"—it will be off the last rank, but it will play a very minor role throughout the game.

Another excellent policy for White to adopt is to turn the tables and exert pressure on Black's centre! This course almost always involves Q–Kt3.

EXAMPLE: 1 P–Q4, P–Q4; 2 Kt–KB3, Kt–KB3; 3 P–B4, P–B3; 4 P–K3, P–KKt3; 5 Kt–B3, B–Kt2; 6 Q–Kt3, O–O; 7 B–Q2, Kt–K5? (disregarding White's

*pressure on the centre*); 8 P×P!, Kt×Kt; 9 P×P!, and White wins a Pawn.

In a game between Rabinovich and Freymann (Leningrad, 1934) Black played 7 . . . , Q–Kt3 (instead of 7 . . . , Kt–K5?); 8 Q–R3!, P–K3; 9 P×P, KP×P; 10 Kt–QR4, Q–Q1; 11 Kt–Kt6!! winning the exchange.

(ii) The less favourable methods, from White's point of view, are those which *do not stabilize the centre*, which do not exert enough *pressure on Black's centre*. So long as the centre is in a more or less fluid state, so long as Black is left to his own devices, he will thrust at White's centre in order to make the presence of his KB felt on the long diagonal.

EXAMPLE: 1 P–Q4, Kt–KB3; 2 P–QB4, P–KKt3; 3 Kt–QB3, P–Q4; 4 B–B4, B–Kt2; 5 P–K3, O–O; 6 Kt–B3 (White has been too easy-going), P–B4!; 7 BP×P (or 7 QP×P, Q–R4! threatening . . . Kt–K5. See how the KB comes to life!), Kt×P; 8 B–K5, Kt×Kt; 9 P×Kt, P×P; 10 B×B, K×B; 11 BP×P, Q–R4ch and although the KB has been exchanged, Black still has a slight initiative and at least equality. (Eliskases–Flohr, Semmering, 1937.)

In a game played a few months later, the continuation was 6 Q–Kt3! (pressure on Black's centre! He must take defensive measures), P–B3; 7 Kt–B3, P×P (Black tries to free himself); 8 B×P, P–QKt4?; 9 B–K2, B–K3; 10 Q–B2 (Euwe–Mikenas, Stockholm, 1937). What have been the results of Black's attempt at freedom? His KB is still out in the cold, his QBP is fatally weak, and White has powerful pressure in the centre.

(c) It has already been shown that White's basic aim will be to *stabilize the centre*. This he soon

accomplishes, with the result that Black's KB has little value.

(**d**) The strength of 6 Q–Kt3 lies of course in the twofold circumstance that it exerts pressure on the QP and also makes it difficult for Black to develop his QB.

Two instances of the strength of Q–Kt3 have been given in answer (**b**) (i).

HOW DOES WHITE OBTAIN A GREAT POSITIONAL ADVANTAGE?

BLACK (Bogolyubov)



WHITE (Rubinstein)

(After 7 . . . , QKt–Q2?)

(**e**) 7 . . . , QKt–Q2 is a serious positional mistake, because it permits White to exchange in the centre in such a way that (i) it becomes permanently *stabilized*, leaving Black's KB out of play; (ii) White will be the first to occupy the QB file, as he will *develop with gain of time.*

(**f**) Two preferable alternatives were 7 . . . , B–Kt5 and Black has chances of developing his pieces normally; or 7 . . . , P×P; 8 B×P, QKt–Q2 to be followed by . . . Kt–Kt3 and . . . B–K3–B5. In

either event White would have an advantage in space, but equalizing possibilities for Black would not be wholly out of the question.

(**g**) The two great positional advantages to be obtained by P×P, etc., have already been set forth in answer (**e**).

(**h**) Black's KB has virtually no mobility, because the *centre is stabilized.* The only way for this Bishop to obtain mobility would be by . . . P–K4—but this would involve *the creation of a positional weakness*: an isolated QP.

(**i**) 10 . . . , Kt–Kt3 would provide for the protection of the QP and the development of the QB. White would still have the advantage, based on such possibilities as P–QR4–5; or B–Q2–Kt4 followed by Q–R3; or doubling Rooks on the QB file with the placement of one Rook at QB5.

10 . . . , Kt–Kt1 would be played with the idea of bringing this Knight to its natural square (QB3) and incidentally minimizing White's pressure on the QB file. It would, however, contribute nothing to the problem of developing the QB.

10 . . . , P–K3 defends the QP, to be sure, but it *weakens the black squares* considerably (particularly Black's diagonal KB1–QR6), and is of no help as regards the problems of developing the QB and counteracting White's grip on the QB file.

It is reasonable to conclude that 10 . . . , Kt–Kt1 was best.

(**j**) The good features of . . . Kt×B are that Black removes a piece that might otherwise be annoying later on (B–Kt4, etc.), and thus he seems to guard his black squares to a certain extent.

The bad features of the exchange are that Black

moves a piece four times to exchange it for a piece that has moved once; White retakes with the Rook, gaining a tempo for doubling on the QB file, which signifies a further loss of time for Black; finally, the Knight was Black's best-posted piece, hence it is questionable whether it should have been exchanged so precipitately.

(**k**) The vitality of Black's Bishops is very low indeed. The KB is paralysed by the *solid centre* which opposes it; the QB has developing difficulties and will in any event never have real scope, because of the QP (*which is on the same colour*), which limits its activity considerably.

(**l**) The two strategical goals aimed at by Q–R4 are: (i) to secure the QB file for his Rooks by preventing . . . QR–B1 (the QRP must be protected!); (ii) to play B–R6, bringing about an exchange of Bishops, and permanently preventing Black from disputing the QB file.

Note the immediate tactical significance of 16 Q–R4!: if 16 . . . KR–B1?; 17 R×Rch, B×R; 18 Q–K8ch wins a piece.

(**m**) 16 . . . , P–QR3 can hardly be avoided, as it is necessary to prevent B–R6 and also to relieve Black's QR from the defence of the QRP, so that an attempt may be made to dispute the QB file. At the same time, the QB's mobility is curtailed somewhat.

(**n**) White's object in seizing control of the QB file was the *ultimate occupation of the seventh rank*, making possible attacks on whatever Black forces may be found there; disorganizing the communication of Black's pieces; and instituting mating attacks in certain situations.

(**o**) . . . P–QKt4 entails the further strategical disadvantage (which now becomes very acute) of

definitively stifling the QB, since *all the Queen-side Pawns are now on white squares*; there is also the concomitant (and even more serious) *weakening of the black squares* on the Queen-side. The result is that White's pieces take up posts from which they cannot be driven away.

(**p**) If 17 . . . , KR–B1?; 18 R×Rch, R×R; 19 R×Rch, B×R; 20 Q–K8ch (this is one of the reasons for 17 . . . , P–QKt4).

If 17 . . . , QR–Kt1; 18 B×P winning a Pawn (another reason for 17 . . . , P–QKt4).

If 17 . . . , KR–Kt1; 18 R–Q7 followed by R(1)–B7 with decisive effect (another reason for 17 . . . , P–QKt4).

If 17 . . . , B–B1??; 18 R(1)–B6, B–Q2; 19 R×Q, B×Q; 20 R×QKtP, etc. (another reason for 17 . . . , P–QKt4).

These possibilities are a dramatic demonstration of the need for 17 . . . , P–QKt4.

(**q**) If 18 . . . , KR–B1; 19 R(1)–B5!; R×R; 20 Q×R with distinct advantage.

(**r**) As we have already seen, 16 . . . , P–QR3 and 17 . . . , P–QKt4 weakened the black squares enormously. White's occupation of QB5 and QR5 is the direct result.

(**s**) The tactical basis of 19 R(1)–B5 is doubtless to make it possible to answer either 19 . . . , QR–B1? or 19 . . . , KR–B1? with 20 R×B! Previously this was impossible, because of the unguarded state of White's Rook at QB1.

(**t**) . . . P–K3 would signify a further weakening of the black squares. White would doubtless play 20 Q–B3 (threatening Kt–K5), P–B3; 21 Kt–Q2, followed by Kt–Kt3–R5, with further intensification of the pressure.

(**u**) If 20 . . ., B×Kt?; 21 P×B and Queen moves (. . . Q×P or . . . Q–K3) are answered by 22 R×B!

(**v**) Black cannot play 21 . . ., B×Kt? because of 22 R(5)×B and the Queen is lost; another proof of the extent to which the constriction of Black's game has proceeded.

(**w**) 21 . . ., P–K3 seems to save the exchange, for if 22 Kt×KR, B×Kt, etc., if 22 Kt×QR, R×Kt and Black regains the exchange by . . . B–Q1. However, White will have something to say about that!

(**x**) Naturally if 24 . . ., P×B; 25 Q–R7 and White remains at least the exchange ahead.

(**y**) If 25 . . ., B×R; 26 Q×B, Q×Q; 27 R×Q, R×B; 28 R×B and the ending is an easy win for White; not only is he a Pawn ahead, but he holds the seventh rank, and his King can be brought over to the Queen-side at once. As the ending would be quite hopeless, Black tries his luck in the ensuing complications.

CAN BLACK SAVE HIS BISHOP?

BLACK (Bogolyubov)



WHITE (Rubinstein)

(After 28 R–Kt7)

(**z**) If 26 B×Pch?, Q×B! with material advantage for Black.

(**aa**) If 27 . . . , B–Kt5; 28 B×Pch! and White comes out the exchange ahead with an easily won ending. The power of the combined Rooks, as shown here and in the sequel, is striking.

(**bb**) If 28 . . . , B–Q1; 29 R–Q7, Q–Kt3; 30 R–B8, B–B3 (if 30 . . . , B–Kt4; 31 P–KR4, B–B3 transposing into the main variation; or 31 . . . , B–R3; 32 B×P dbl ch, K–Kt2; 33 B–Kt8 dis ch! and mate follows. Note that the important move 31 P–KR4 was made possible by 22 P–KKt3!); 31 B×P dbl ch, K–Kt2; 32 B–Kt8 dis ch, K–R3; 33 R×Pch, K–Kt4; 34 P–R4ch and now we have the following charming possibilities—

(i) 34 . . . , K–Kt5; 35 K–Kt2 (threatening 36 P–B3ch, K–B4; 37 P–Kt4 mate!), Q×KtP; 36 B×P mate!

(ii) 34 . . . , K–B4; 35 P–B3 (threatening P–Kt4 mate!), P–Kt4; 36 P–Kt4ch, K–Kt3; 37 P–R5 mate!

The fact that Bogolyubov sees these beautiful mating variations and naturally avoids them, gives us a useful hint as to why modern chess seems boring to many people. Paradoxically, the losers are too good!

(**cc**) Black must of course lose the Bishop, after which White's material advantage wins comfortably. But there are also mating possibilities:

(i) 30 . . . , K–B1; 31 B×KtP!, Q–K8ch; 32 K–Kt2 (thanks to 22 P–KKt3!!), B–Q1; 33 R–B8, Q–R4; 34 P–QKt4 and Black must resign.

(ii) 30 . . . , K–Kt2; 31 B–Kt8 dis ch!, K–B3 (if 31 . . . , K×B; 32 R–B8ch with a conclusive material advantage; if 31 . . . , K–R1; 32 R–B8 wins); 32 R×Pch, K–B4; 33 R–K5ch, K–Kt5;

34 K–Kt2 and Black cannot stop all the mating threats: P–B3ch, P–R3ch or B–K6ch.

Incidentally, if in the above Black tries 31 . . . , K–R3, the mate is engineered by 32 P–KR4!, P–Kt4 (if 32 . . . , K–R4; 33 R×Pch, K–Kt5; 34 K–Kt2, Q–Q7; 35 B×P mate); 33 R×RPch, K–Kt3; 34 R×Pch, K–B4; 35 R–K5ch and now Black can have his choice between 35 . . . , K–B3; 36 R–B7ch, K–Kt3; 37 R×Pch, K–R3; 38 R–R7 mate!—and 35 . . . , K–Kt5; 36 K–Kt2, Q–Q7; 37 R×P mate.

It is instructive to see how powerfully White's pieces co-operate, while Black's forces look on helplessly.

*SUMMARY: White set up a solid centre which paralysed the hostile KB. He then seized control of the QB file, weakened the hostile black squares and invaded the seventh rank. The resulting constriction of Black's game reached its climax in a sharp tactical struggle in which White's mastery of the seventh rank proved the decisive factor.*

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